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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This project is an evaluation of the role major power managerial coordination played in the 
transformation of the international system from a war-inducing to a peace-inducing system. In pursuit 
of this goal I develop the concept of the regime of major power managerial coordination and argue 
that it was a novel innovation in late-18th century great power politics which greatly transformed  
conflict dynamics in international relations since 1816. Major power managerial coordination is the 
engagement of the major powers in consultation, multilateralism and the avoidance of adversarial 
coordination. The goal is to decrease the likelihood of major power military conflicts. Because minor 
power conflicts can bring in major powers by diffusion, the major powers engaged in managerial 
coordination also strive to decrease the likelihood of the use of military force by all states in the 
international system. 
   Major Powers engage in managerial coordination because their ruling elites became wary of 
war as an instrument of foreign policy due to fear of the consequences of great power war for their 
domestic political position. Beginning from the argument developed by Paul Schroeder that the 
Napoleonic wars were the first instance in which the majority of major powers suffered adverse 
results for domestic power structures, I develop an explanatory story of how the major powers 
engaged in managerial coordination decrease the likelihood of military conflict onset. This is via three 
mechanisms. One is denial, the denial of major power diplomatic and military support for the use of 
military force by other states. The second is discouragement, the threat of major power intervention 
and censure that may lead states to avoid the use of military force in order to resolve disputes. Finally, 
the pacification of international relations by major power managerial coordination may indirectly 
facilitate peace-fostering developments such as democratic reforms within states, and the creation of 
international organizations. It is thus that the transformation of international politics was brought 
about.  
To evaluate the transformation thesis, I develop the scale of major power managerial 
coordination intensity, a novel replicable instrument that captures how intensely the major powers are 
engaged in managerial coordination. To permit the comparison of pre-transformation and post-
transformation conflict onset dynamics I compiled a new dataset of militarized interstate disputes in 
the 1715-1815 period. This complements the extant datasets on the 1816-2001 period.  I then 
conducted quantitative evaluations of a number of hypotheses extracted from the explanatory story I 
presented. The findings supported the arguments that managerial coordination was a novel innovation 
for late 18th and early 19th century international relations.  
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The findings also indicate that increasing managerial coordination decreases the likelihood 
that two states would experience a military conflict in the 1816-2001 periods. Furthermore this is 
more likely to be due to denial rather than discouragement mechanisms. Finally, there were indicators 
that increasing managerial coordination fosters democratic reforms within states, but that it does not 
make states more likely to join international organizations. 
These findings will be of interest to those studying the evolution of the international political 
system, those studying how structural phenomena influence the behavior of states, scholars 
researching the impact of the Vienna System in the form international relations have today, and 
scholars engaged in research on conditions that help alleviate the issue of the use of military force in 
international relations.  
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C H A P T E R  1 :  T H E  I N T R O D U C T I O N  
A CRIME STORY, A BUSINESS STORY AND A PAINTING  
A staple of detective stories is that scene situated in a dark, shadowy basement, filled with the 
acerbic smoke of cheap cigarettes and cigars where rival crime bosses come together to forge a 
“gentlemen’s” agreement  so as to have peace amongst themselves. They come to that table typically after 
a period of gang warfare has cost them a combination of lives, money, leadership challenges, and raised 
the “heat” by the hardboiled police detective on their operations. War, initially a lucrative option to cut 
into other gang’s operations has now become too costly. Maybe it is a stalemate, maybe the increasing 
dangers to families and neighborhoods, but the gangsters have decided to cut a deal to stop the war. They 
may divide the city in territories, they may exchange hostages, and they may place some types of activity 
beyond the pale. They will to put it differently strive to create a regime to help them resolve past and 
future issues in a pacific manner. They will also defend the regime promising grisly ends to whoever 
breaks its rules and stipulations. Or alternatively, they might just place certain “tips” to informants of the 
hard-broiled detective.  But they will have peace to enjoy their hard, if ill-gotten gains. 
Let us move to a better lit conference space, situated not in the dank basement of a seedy 
establishment but on the top floor of a New York skyscraper. Still ubiquitous is the acerbic smoke of 
cigars and cigarettes, but this time of much better quality. The CEOs of rival companies are meeting to set 
up an oligopoly.  Years of competition has cost them money in advertising, losses from unstable markets, 
and closures of factory plants. Money is spent not on generating profit, but on just surviving the activity 
of the competition. The CEOs have had enough. The unstable market that is cutting profits is 
undermining their position with the stock-holders and thus casting a shadow over their long-term 
employment. In this meeting they will set up a regime to guide the interaction of their companies and 
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products in such a way as to maximize profit by minimizing the amount of money spent on competition. 
They will also defend this regime by pooling their resources to chase out of the market any defectors. 
Figure 1.1 The Congress of Vienna by Jean-Bastite Isabey, 1819 
 Source: Wikimedia Commons  
What possible similarity can these two scenes have with the scene immortalized by Jean-Bastite 
Isabey in an 1819 painting (figure 1.1), beyond the ever present acerbic smoke of burning tobacco? In his 
painting Jean-Bastite portrays the leaders of post-Napoleonic Europe meeting to discuss and create a set 
of regimes that would end the Napoleonic wars. In the beautiful  rococo and baroque interiors of Viennese 
chanceries and palaces, the lords of Europe weary of past warfare and wary of future warfare came 
together to create a regime that would help them avoid the dangers of a new major power war. They came 
together out of fear, fear of domestic revolution, fear of coups, fear of defeat, and cognizant of how close 
the furnace of the Napoleonic Wars brought each of the major powers to each of these results (Schroeder 
1994). Like the gangsters of the crime story and the CEOs of the business story, war has ceased to be 
profitable for them. They sought to create a regime that would help them avoid war. 
Marxism, anarchism and to a point liberalism would applaud this analogy of gangsters, CEOs and 
European royals. And one adhering to these philosophies would point out the egoistical motives that have 
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led these up to a moment ago war mongers to become peace-bringers. This would lead one to may-haps 
question the value of such a peace. But while this peace is the result of the self-interested goals of these 
actors, it is no less a real peace. Neighborhoods are not wrecked by gang violence, workers are not left 
unemployed as competition leads to factory closures, and young men do not march in columns against the 
thunder of guns. And ultimately peace can lead to gradual changes of the underlying social and political 
systems that brought them about, bringing an unjust peace closer to a just peace. 
This project focuses on the question of the success of the Vienna congress and similar endeavors 
by major power elites in bringing about pacific results in the last 300 years.  Are these oligopolistic 
regimes pacific? I am not just interested in whether such regimes brought peace among the major powers. 
By default the fact that they created them indicates a powerful selection effect on that question, even 
though failure is always a possibility. Instead, I broaden the question of peace to whether this type of 
regime also brings pacific results for states beyond the major powers, on how it brings about peace, and 
on whether that peace has long term effects that survive the demise of the regime. In pursuit of insights to 
these questions, I propose a novel conceptualization of the idea of major power cooperation, using the 
concept of managerial coordination, and a new operationalization of that concept, the scale of major 
power managerial coordination. 
WHAT IS AT STAKE?  
Over the last decade there have been articles that either imply or explicitly give agency to major 
powers for international phenomena beyond those of their own interaction. Bear Braumoeller presented a 
theory based on the nested politics model and a reciprocity mechanism on how major power activity form 
the regimes that make up a system and then how those regimes condition state activity (2012).  Sara 
Mitchell attributed the expansion of state use of third party membership to an initial push by democratic 
major powers like the UK and USA (2002). This argument on the role of major powers in the creation and 
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expansion of international organizations received a more explicit treatment by Ringmar (2012). There has 
been also a steady argument of articles that major power politics plays a big role in democratization (Boix 
2011). Kevin Narizny recently made the argument that the spread of democracy was the result of US and 
UK primacy (2012).  These studies do not address a new question. Scholars have been focusing on the 
role of major powers since the early days of the study of international relations. What these studies do is 
refocus the possible answers from overarching ideas like polarity to how major powers fit in a more 
complex reality.  
At the same time these studies spark a question that has not always been in the mind of scholars 
of major power politics.  What behaviors of the major powers are actually conducive to positive 
international outcomes? In general the studies in the vein of Mitchell and Narizny seem to indicate that 
primacy by specific major powers, the US and UK, is a key component for positive international 
outcomes. Other authors tend to look at cooperative arrangement of the group of major powers as 
conducive to pacific effects (Wallensteen 1984). While the complexity of international relations may very 
well provide some tie for these two distinct behaviors, the question does rise. Which one is it? 
Cooperation or Primacy? Which one is a key component of the causal chain of which positive 
international outcomes? Are they substitutable?  
In this project I argue on the side of cooperation. While primacy by liberal powers may be a force 
for “good” in international relations, those powers were never so powerful as to be able to bully the other 
powerful states of the international system at will. Positive results of primacy would have to be mediated 
through some kind of understanding with other major powers. Consequently it is my view that the fact or 
not of primacy is less important than whether the major powers are cooperating or not.  
One problem with resolving these questions is the lack of clear concepts and operationalization of 
major power behaviors. Concepts are not clear when it comes to exactly what major power cooperation 
entails or why would it have any effect beyond the circle of immediate participants.  Is cooperation 
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alliances? Is it shared international organization memberships?  How is sustained cooperation different 
from opportunistic agreements? What does sustained cooperation even look like? Where concepts are 
unclear, operationalization is unsatisfactory. The array of measures available in the literature for trying to 
capture the variance of major power cooperation faces challenges in satisfying the concepts. Some of 
them do not really measure behavior but instead capabilities or even more simply the number of major 
powers. They measure the structure rather than the system (Braumoller 2012:6,13,35-37). When such 
measures are used to try and capture cooperation, conceptual and empirical puzzles become aggravated. 
Other measures capture behavior but operationalize concepts that lack some clarity on specific 
mechanisms by which major power behavior affects the broader system. 
Any attempt to answer the basic question of this dissertation, which is whether the attempts by 
the major powers after 1816 to engage in sustained cooperation in order to avoid conflict were successful, 
requires new concepts and new measures of those concepts. This is what I do with the concept of major 
power managerial coordination and the scale of major power managerial coordination intensity. 
NEW IDEAS AND NEW TOOLS FOR OLD QUESTIONS  
In this project I present the new concept of major power managerial coordination in order to 
capture the collective behavior of major powers when their goal is to create cooperative regimes that seek 
to pacify international relations. A regime here is conceptualized as a set of linked norms and institutions 
that foster a specific type of outcome in the international system. For example the regime of international 
anarchy is constituted by norms such of non-aggression, institutions like international law, the norm of 
equality between states, etc. In another name a regime is broader than a norm or an institution, which can 
be part of a regime. A regime is also different from the environment of international politics, which 
includes the distribution of material capabilities, and from a system which includes multiple regimes and 
the actors that create and follow those regimes.    
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Managerial Coordination is the engagement by the major powers in three behaviors whose goal is 
to increase the cooperation between them in order to facilitate the avoidance of military confrontations. 
The main element of this concept is a regime built by major power consultation, major power 
multilateralism, and major power avoidance of adversarial alliances. Each one of these elements by itself 
could be an instance of opportunistic cooperation by the major powers. However, as the elements 
accumulate in major power interaction, the result is a regime for cooperation instead of an opportunistic 
break from antagonism. Sometimes the regime might last a long time, and sometimes it fails to withstand 
the rigors of major power politics. Nevertheless, the period of intense major power managerial 
coordination should be associated with an avoidance of military conflict between the major powers. 
This distinction between three different elements of coordination opens up the concept of major 
power cooperation, by looking at the behaviors that build it, rather than by looking at the effect. Past 
conceptualizations of major power cooperation tended to focus on the result of cooperation in order to 
locate it, a practice that raises the danger of cooperation becoming tautological to peace. The concept I 
use looks for major power cooperation not on the result of major power activity, but on the type of 
activities the major powers partake in during their interaction. It frees the concept from a possible 
consequence, in this case peace.   
This opens up the space for evaluating whether major power coordination activities succeed in 
fostering major power cooperation, and in turn of evaluating whether major power cooperation actually 
fosters peace. It also opens up the possibility of comparing the effectiveness of the three elements when it 
comes to fostering cooperation. While in this dissertation I assume they are equal in influence for the sake 
of simplicity and space, the scholar of the future could evaluate if they have a different influence, or if 
one is a pre-requisite for the existence of the others.  
Finally, I offer a complete explanatory story for why the major powers may engage in managerial 
coordination. This story begins with major power war, and the main working part is the fear that major 
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power elites have of the consequences of major power war on their domestic networks of power. From 
that fear, under specific conditions, raises the impetus for managerial coordination. While I detail the 
explanatory story in this dissertation, I do not evaluate it. It is available through for future research.  
My final theoretical contribution is the evaluation of mechanisms that may explain the influence 
of managerial coordination on the decision of states to use military force. These mechanisms are specific 
policies that major powers take that make other states less or more prone to use military force. I focus on 
policies such as alliance creation, transfer of military resources, interventions by the major powers, and 
the creation of permissive or restrictive international environments for the use of military force. To put 
some order into the various possible policies I divide them into two conceptual groups denial and 
discouragement activity. The first entails policies by which the major powers deny minor powers their 
support for military action. The second entails policies that proscribe the use of military force. I then 
evaluate how these policies fare in decreasing the likelihood of the onset of military conflict.   
To facilitate the evaluation of how much the behavior of the major powers conforms to the 
concept of managerial coordination I construct a novel measurement instrument, the scale of major power 
managerial coordination intensity.  This is a replicable behavioral measurement instrument of major 
power behavior which provides an indicator on how much the major powers are engaged in activities that 
fall within the three elements of the managerial coordination regime. It can range from antagonistic 
coordination characterized by major power adversarial alliances, to managerial coordination and points in 
between. Each of the three elements of the managerial coordination concept is operationalized using 
familiar data from the study of international relations. Consultation is operationalized by joint 
membership in specific types of international organizations, multilateralism by the shared membership of 
the majority of major powers in alliances that do not target other major powers, and antagonism by the 
membership of major powers in major power alliances that explicitly target other major powers. 
Combinations of these three variables are then used to create a four point scale ranging from antagonistic 
coordination (-1) to managerial coordination (2). 
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I use this measurement instrument to evaluate the association of increasing managerial major 
power coordination with conflict onset. I must stress that in this project I am characterizing evaluations 
and not estimating causal relations, a task for the future. Past research has looked at associations between 
major power cooperation and conflict, but my effort differs on some very crucial aspects. First of all I 
operationalize conflict onset not just by war onset, but I also look at military intestate dispute onset 
(MID). MIDs, instances of a violent military interaction between two countries below the intensity of war, 
far outnumber wars as international relations phenomena. Unlike war they are also not becoming rarer. 
Finally, almost all wars start as MIDs. Looking at MIDs as a phenomenon of interest permits me to 
evaluate whether major power managerial coordination has a positive effect on violent conflict on a lower 
level than war. This provides for two possible ways managerial coordination may be associated with 
pacific international outcomes. One by stopping wars before they start, the other by stopping wars by 
stopping the MIDs from which they spawn.  
Another crucial difference with past research is the research design.  Past research designs fell 
into two broad categories.  They either used a system level analysis focusing on counts of wars, or they 
used a dyadic level analysis in which structural variables were included directly in dyadic models. I avoid 
a pure system level analysis because I do not believe that it is useful for actually evaluating how 
managerial coordination influences the decisions about war and peace. Wars are not fought by systems 
but by pairs of states, and it is there that the answers lie. Furthermore, a system level of analysis research 
design would run into the issue of a small number of observations. Since I wish to conduct a quantitative 
study this is an important problem to take into consideration. This leads me to a dyadic level of analysis 
research design. 
I differ from previous dyadic level of analysis designs in that I do not include structural variables 
like managerial coordination as is, in models. I believe that doing so may create misleading results. The 
reason for this is that structural variables have a different data-generating process than dyadic variables. 
Dyadic variables are the result of interactions between two states. Structural variables on the other hand 
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are the result of interactions of large groups of states or other actors. Including the structural variable in 
the model without somehow controlling for the difference in the levels of analysis is conceptually 
problematic as the question arises of how the structural phenomenon affects the dyadic outcome. This is 
more so when the dyad members are not also members of the networks or group of actors that produce the 
structural phenomenon.  
To address this issue I use a novel variable to essentially build a hybrid dyad-system model. Since 
the structural phenomenon of interest is major power managerial coordination and the actors producing it 
are the major powers I assume that the mediating mechanism between the two levels of analysis is how 
influenced are dyad members by major power activity. The more influenced by the actors producing a 
structural variable they are the more influence the structural variable will have. This mediating variable is 
the sensitivity of dyads of states and individual states to major power activity. By including this variable 
both as a control and as an interaction with structural variables produced by major power activity, I hope 
to produce a more exact evaluation than would be the case with an as is inclusion of the control variables 
in a dyadic design.  
Finally this project has a rarely used temporal space in its research design, the 1715-2001 period. 
This is for the following reason. While the novel items presented above are hopefully important 
contributions to the study of the effect of major powers on international politics they do not exhaust the 
interest of this project.  More than just an argument that managerial coordination has a pacific I wish to 
evaluate whether it was a transformative phenomenon for international relations.   
NOT JUST PEACE BUT TRANSFORMATION   
Paul Schroeder in his monumental “The Transformation of European Politics” made the case that 
the Vienna Congress was something new in international relations (1994). This is an argument that I 
would extend to the whole idea of managerial coordination.  In this project I develop Schroeder’s 
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particular story of how the Vienna System was a transformative event to a broader story of how major 
powers come to become wary of war and that leads them to engage in managerial coordination. This war 
wariness leads them to try and contain conflict not just between major powers but due to the danger of 
intervention, diffusion, and linkages also conflicts between other states as well. 
Beyond the presentation of a story about why managerial coordination could be a transformative 
regime, I peel back the curtain of time in order to also empirically evaluate this transformative character. 
To do that, I conduct quantitative evaluations of the association of the quality of managerial coordination 
and the dynamics of conflict in the 1715-1815 period.  This is made possible by a new dataset on 
militarized interstate disputes in the 1715-1815 period compiled by the author and presented in this 
project. This permits me to compare the quality and effect of major power coordination before the 
hypothesized transformation date of 1816 and after. It also permits me for the first time in international 
relations research to conduct a preliminary exploration of the dynamics of conflict and some important 
variables, including managerial coordination, across the 1715-2001 period. With the exception of the 
1648-1715 period this covers most of what we would call “modernity” in the confines of the study of 
international relations.  
The transformation effect is not just exhausted to a pacifying association with conflict onset. I 
also evaluate whether managerial coordination fosters other peace inducing phenomena. I focus on 
advancements within polities towards democratization, since a relationship between this and major power 
politics is an argument made by recent scholarship. I also evaluate a broader argument about the 
relationship between major power managerial coordination and the enactment of constitutions in polities. 
This is inspired by Schroeder’s argument that the Vienna System was conducive to the enactment of 
limits on arbitrary power due to the ideology of legitimism (Schroeder 1994). Since constitutions are one 
of the earliest forms of putting limits to arbitrary rule I look at how managerial coordination affects their 
existence.  Finally the previous literature contains a thematic about a relationship between major power 
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behavior and international organizations. Building on that, I evaluate the association between major 
power managerial coordination and state ascension to international organizations.  
Finally, I also explore the possible mechanisms which may explain a negative association 
between major power managerial coordination and interstate military conflict. These mechanisms are 
long present in the literature and I only repackage them for clarity sakes into two distinct concepts. One is 
the concept of denial and the other the concept of discouragement.  Denial encompasses those actions by 
major powers that seek to deny other states their military and diplomatic support that could make those 
state more willing to use force to resolve their issues. Discouragement encompasses those actions by 
major powers that seek to dissuade or scare other states from engaging in military action.  I need to 
evaluate such mechanisms in order to provide some insights into possible causal relationships beyond the 
associations that will be uncovered by the quantitative evaluations. 
For denial, I evaluate the association between major power managerial coordination and the 
avoidance of entering exclusive alliances with minor powers by major powers, a denial of diplomatic 
support. I also evaluate the association of major power managerial coordination with the onset of mutual 
military buildups among states, a possible denial of resources.  For discouragement, I evaluate the effect 
of major power managerial interventions on the onset of military conflict. These are actions which I argue 
only happen during intense major power managerial coordination. These are interventions by the majority 
or all the major powers against a non-major power state in order to stop it from using military force or to 
terminate the use of force. Such actions may discourage other states from using military force as well. I 
also evaluate whether major power managerial coordination has a negative association with the diffusion 
of conflict, possibly the result of major power opposition to the use of force to resolve issues.  
To summarize the goal of these evaluations is to: 
 a) Establish whether major power managerial coordination has a pacific association with interstate 
conflict. 
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  b) Establish that this is transformative regime in the history of the modern international system with a 
pacific influence that goes beyond the regime itself. 
 c) Provide some indicators about the possible causal mechanisms that explain the association.  
THE LAY OF THE DISSERTATION  
Following this introduction are eight chapters each of which discusses the following: 
Chapter 2: In this chapter I look at the previous literature on the role of major power cooperation in 
international politics, the idea of transformative regimes, how my own project relates to that past 
literature, and the problems and inadequacies of past attempts to evaluate this relationships. 
Chapter 3: In this chapter I present the story of why I expect major power managerial coordination to 
have a pacific influence of international relations. I explain how denial and discouragement fit this story, 
and why major power managerial coordination may foster democracy and international organizations. 
Finally I also discuss why the major powers engage in managerial coordination and the concept of war 
wariness. In the end of the chapter I present the theoretical propositions extracted from this story. 
Chapter 4: In this chapter I present the operationalization of concepts into variables and of propositions to 
testable hypothesis.  I present the scale of major power managerial coordination intensity and the 1715-
1815 dataset. I also discuss the concept of sensitivity and how I operationalize it. I present research 
designs for the models that will evaluate the hypothesis and discuss control variables.  
Chapter 5:  In this chapter I present the results of the evaluation of the variables for the 1816-2001 period 
focusing on the basic relationship between major power managerial coordination and the onset of 
interstate military conflict.  
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Chapter 6: In this chapter I present the results of the evaluation of the variables that focus on the 
mechanisms that can possibly explain any relationships between managerial coordination and military 
conflict, and the broader influence that managerial coordination possibly has on international politics in 
the 1816-2001 period.  
Chapter 7: In this chapter I present a lengthy discussion of politics in the pre-1816 period, and a narrative 
of how the Vienna powers came to decide to engage in managerial coordination. I also present the 
findings from the evaluation of the hypothesis in the 1715-1815 period. These are novel findings in the 
study of international relations. 
Chapter 8: In this chapter I bring everything together and present the findings from the evaluation of the 
1715-2001 period.  
Chapter 9: In the conclusion I discuss the meaning of the findings for my project and the study of the role 
of major powers in international relations in general. I also point out topics for future research. 
           A short summary of the findings is that there were multiple indicators that increasing major power 
managerial coordination has a negative association with the onset of war or militarized interstate disputes 
in the 1816-2001 and 1715-2001 period. Denial mechanisms received more indicators of support than 
Discouragement mechanisms, with indicators of a negative association between increasing managerial 
coordination and the advent of mutual military buildups, and the creation of alliances between the major 
powers and minor powers. Managerial Coordination in the 1715-1815 period did not reach a point higher 
than the avoidance of adversarial alliances, and did not have a statistically significant association, a 
confirmation of the transformation thesis. Furthermore, there were indicators that increasing major power 
managerial coordination has a positive association with domestic political reforms that foster democracy.  
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BEFORE EMBARKING  
This is a project that focuses on the influence of one variable on interstate conflict. The positive 
result is a pacific one. But one should not assume that such a peace is also just. Just as the agreement of 
the gangsters of the first paragraph of this project to have peace may lead to a peace that hides immense 
human suffering, so the peace of major power coordination might not be just. It may protect injustice on a 
domestic level, and it may offer the opportunity for imperialism abroad. The ethical contours of such 
peace are important topics of study but not ones that are appropriate for the goal of this paper. In this 
paper I focus on peace in a very statist view, peace among states. This does not exhaust the meaning of 
peace. But it is a start, and as social scientific research has shown, interstate peace may be a requirement 
for progressive reforms within polities.  
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C H A P T E R  2 :  T H E  T R A N S F O R MA T I O N  T H E S I S  
INTRODUCTION                In this chapter I conduct a survey on three broad groups of  past scholarly work. I first look at past work on the transformation thesis, beginning with the work of scholars of economics and looking at position in support and against it in international relations research. I also explain why the question of transformation has generally been understudied by modern researchers, especially those working at the dyadic level of analysis. I then provide an overview of scholarly work on the role of the major powers in international relations, and past treatments of major power cooperation. I end with a review of past treatments of the transformation thesis by scholars of international relations. Throughout this overview I provide arguments on how my research relates to the past research corpus. 
THE ECONOMISTIC BEGINNINGS   
The thesis that the modern international political system was radically different from the 
European political system from which it arose first surfaced among scholars of economics. Norman 
Angell and Vladimir Lenin, writing on a foundation of liberal and Marxist economic thought going back 
to the 18th and 19th centuries, made the argument that the expansion of the capitalist economic system had 
radically transformed politics (Angell 1913; Lenin 1917). The thesis was later expanded by both Marxist 
influenced scholars like Immanuel Wallerstein (1980) and Karl Polyani (1944), and broadly liberal 
scholars like Milton Friedman (1962). 
The connection between the transformation of the economic and the transformation of the 
political system has tended to be underdeveloped.  Some good work has been done on the connection 
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between the capitalist and political transformation (Gleditsch 2008; Gatzke 2007; Mousseau 2003; 
Choucri 1980). But the general view is that the political system is epiphenomenal to the economic system. 
I disagree with this position and argue that while the expansion of the capitalist system has led to an 
increase in the interactions of states, and that increase in interaction has increased the demand for 
multilateral regimes, it is not per-se the cause of the creation of multilateral regimes.1 Instead it is 
interaction in general under certain assumptions that leads to the creation of political multilateral regimes. 
While economic transformation has been one of the main causes of the intensification of interaction in the 
modern world, it is not the only possible cause of this intensification (the spread of religions, or the 
attempt to create world empires are other causes, for examples see Buzan and Little 2000). 
Furthermore the regimes that will arise out of this intensified interaction in order to accommodate 
the demands it creates are not determined by the cause of interaction.  Mid-range variables explain the 
fact that the global expansion of capitalism in the 19th century was associated with two different political 
systems in Europe, the Vienna System (1816-1848), the Bismarck System (1871-1914), different systems 
in the Americas (British-US cooperative Hegemony 1830-1900), and another system in Asia and Africa 
(colonialism). States have options on how to address international issues, and those options are only 
partly determined by the character of the issues. 
One mid-range explanation for this variability is presented by a slightly different version of the 
economic transformation thesis, the hegemonic stability thesis expounded by scholars like Robert Gilpin 
(1981) and Robert Keohane (1983, 1984). For these scholars the changes brought about by economic 
transformation are translated to political changes through the actions of hegemonic powers that create a 
set of regimes. Different hegemons will create different sets of regimes in their attempt to manage the 
pressures and opportunities created by the capitalist system. As hegemons decline the economic regimes 
they set up also decline leading to systemic change, as either new hegemons arise to replace the declining 
                                                          1 The intensity of that interaction in turn is driven by the demands of citizens on states for international action, and by the decision of states among multiple options to address those demands on the international stage. For a full explanation see the nested model by Bear Braumoeller (2012). 
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ones and create new regimes or the regimes are taken up by consortiums of states as the rules for their 
interaction (on the replacement result see Gilpin 1981; on the consortium result see Keohane 1984). 
Compared to the economic transformation thesis, the hegemonic stability thesis captures the 
element of a mid-range variable in systems transformation. This is the role of powerful members of the 
system in the creation and maintenance of the regimes that make up the system. But there is a fault in the 
hegemonic stability thesis. First the thesis assumes, rather than proves that only hegemonic powers can 
create the regimes that define a system. This assumption is based on the domestic analogy where public 
goods, like economic regimes, must be provided by an entity willing to pay the price for providing the 
regimes, like the state apparatus. But regimes are a public good also in the sense that interacting social 
entities will be driven to create them where there are none. A hegemon may be useful, but is not 
necessary. As this project argues, under certain assumptions interacting states will always have an 
incentive to form collaborative regimes.  As critical theory scholars point out, history is replete with 
regimes formed in the absence of hierarchy (Cox 1981). 
Second, the historical narrative presented by hegemonic stability theorists is problematic as they 
tend to see hegemons where none may exist. For example the hegemonic stability theorists consider the 
1815-1871 system as one of British Hegemony. However some historians like Paul Schroder point out 
that the early part of this period, 1815-1848, was more a cooperative bipolar hegemonic system, between 
Russia and Britain with the accommodation of the other major powers, rather than a unipolar hegemonic 
system (1994). The point being that hegemony was far from certain, and hegemons many times behaved 
in a way not consistent with the theories.  However, the hegemonic stability thesis correctly focuses on 
the role of major powers in the formation and transformation of international political systems. 
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THE REALIST OPPOSITION  
 
The hegemonic stability theory, rather than as a part of the transformation thesis, was initially 
conceived as a way to address the flaws of the paradigm in international relations that most vehemently 
rejects the transformation thesis, “realism”. The belief that little or nothing has changed in the 
international political system was characteristic of classical realists like Hans Morgenthau (1948[2006]:4, 
7-26). Kenneth Waltz in his Theory of International Politics (1979) attacked the economic transformation 
thesis. Ever since then a rejection of the transformation thesis has been a characteristic of Waltzian 
structural realism. Waltz himself champions a nuclear transformation thesis (Sagan and Waltz 2003). The 
father of offensive realism, John Mearsheimer has repeatedly rejected a transformation thesis (1994, 
2003). For most realists there is no difference between a system in which war, and the threat of war is the 
only means to resolve an issue, and one in which war is just one among many means.2 
This “realist” rejection of the transformation thesis is shared by the liberal intuitionalists that rose 
out of realism, like Robert Keohane, and early regime theorists like Stephen Krasner. While both stressed, 
contra-realists, the important role intergovernmental institutions and regimes play in the management of 
international relations they ignored the question of whether those institutions and regimes constitute a 
different international system than one where they do not exist (Keohane 1983,1984; Krasner 1982). 
Keohane and Nye did differentiate between systems with complex interdependence and systems without 
it, but they had no explanation of how a system becomes a complex interdependence system, that is they 
have no story of transformation (Keohane and Nye 1989). 
A central failing of both “realists” and liberal intuitionalists is their incomplete view of the 
system. As Dina Zinnes noted a system to make sense must be different from an environment (Zinnes 
                                                          
2 Defensive realists have generally ignored the transformation thesis (Glaser 1994/5, 1997, 2003; Walt 1987; Grieco 
1988; Mastaduno 1991, Van Evera 1999).Randal Schweller is the only one that discusses the possibility of 
transformation of the system, when he argues that if there are no revisionist states a system can move from a system 
of polarity to a congress system (Schweller 1994: 107). My disagreement with this thesis is that only certain types of 
revisionism stand in the way of a managerial coordination system. 
19 
 
1980). The environment tends to be made up of elements that either change very little or very slowly, 
essentially over generations. Such is the number of states in the system, their material capabilities, 
whether states are armed or not. These elements tend to be attributes of a system rather than variables of a 
system.3 They change too slowly to affect state behavior in such a way as to constitute a system. States 
react to the distributions of the environment, but the same distribution could elicit radically different 
reactions. “Realism” focuses on these attributes and considers them as determining the relations of states, 
which is the behavioral element of a system (Zinnes 1980; 7-15). Because these attributes, like a 
symmetrical distribution of material capabilities, change very slowly on a systemic level “realists” see no 
system transformation except for those that lead from hierarchy to anarchy or from an armed world to a 
disarmed world. 
 For realists the only regime possible under these conditions is one of power politics, and any 
deviation from this political reality is either doomed to be short-lived, or in some way a part of the power 
political game (Morgenthau 1948). Just as simple economism sees the international political system as 
epiphenomenal to material economic forces, so “realism” sees it as epiphenomenal to other material 
attributes. Since liberal intuitionalists build their theory on the basis of a hegemon that “wins” the power 
politics game, determined by the same composite attributes used by realists, their theory also suffers from 
this flaw.  
Yet, these attributes are not sufficient variables for explaining state behavior. Changes in a 
composite attribute may elicit a change of behavior by states but what form that change will take, or even 
if there will be one is conditioned by intermediate variables such as foreign policy or the mix of regimes 
that exist in the system to guide behavior. To jump from attributes to behavior is to miss a big part of the 
story of international relations. Regimes belong to the second set of variables that Zinnes sees as 
characterizing work on the nature of international political systems. These are configurational variables, 
which tend to be behavioral and measure how actors use the environment they are situated within rather 
                                                          3 An equally plausible conceptual framework is the structure-system one in Braumoeller (2012:4-6) 
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than measuring the environment itself. Such variables are alignment patterns, normative cultures, regimes, 
or the prestige and standing of states. They are configurational because they answer the question of who is 
supposed to do what, or who can do what, instead of who has what. The main variable of this project, the 
intensity of major power managerial coordination in pursuit of cooperation is such a configurational 
variable.   
The following example may make the distinction of an environment of attributes (or structure) 
and a system of variables more clear. While “realists” claim to place in the center of their explanation of 
politics the relative material capabilities of states they assume that the only possible result of any 
configuration of this variable is some element of power politics. But the relative material capabilities of 
two states are a composite attribute, not a configurational variable. The reaction to that distribution, in the 
case of realism power politics, is a configurational variable. Realists assume that for a rational state that 
prizes survive over all, power politics is the only behavior that can rise from a distribution of material 
capabilities. This is not necessarily the case. Other configurational variables may impact the reaction. For 
example for defensive realists preference towards the status quo is one such variable.  It also misses how 
a configurational variable like “power politics” exerts its own causal influence on the behavior of states 
(Vasquez 1998). 
THE MID-RANGE IGNORES  
On the contrary configurational variables, how states (more properly state elites) conceive of their 
role and behavior in the international system, how they conceive of the regimes of the system, and what 
those regimes are greatly influence how states use their environment of attributes to attain goals and 
interact with each other. Mid-range theories of international relations have focused on trying to explain 
the diverse behaviors associated with different behavioral variables even when attributes do not change 
greatly. Dyadic explanations for war have produced an impressive array of social scientific findings, 
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especially those centered on the pacific effect of democratic political organization, trade, and international 
institutions (for overviews see Gleditsch 2008; Pollins 2008; Chan 2000; Russet and Oneal 2001; 
Mansfield and Pollins 2001; Schneider 2000). Below I look at some possible explanations for the 
transformation of the international system from a war-inducing to a peace-inducing one that begin from 
variables at the dyadic or monadic level before explaining why these are insufficient. 
There is a rich literature on the pacific effect of regimes in the system like intergovernmental 
organizations that provide states with pacific means for managing international issues. Wallensteen 
stressed the importance for peace, of states respecting norms and rules, which generally are translated into 
formal and informal international agreements (Wallensteen 1984). Scholars such as Kegley and Raymond 
(1982, 1984), Wallace (1982), and Vayrynen (1983) researched the effect of robust system-wide norms, 
and institutionalized forms of those norms on the propensity of states to go to war, and found that periods 
where norms are not permissive of unilateral behavior (such as war initiation), or periods when 
managerial alliances between states exist, are more peaceful than periods that lack these characteristics. 
Faber and Weaver (1984) in the period between 1816 and 1915 find that as the number of states 
participating in conferences whose goal was to promote peace increased, the number of states 
participating in warfare decreased. Significantly, Faber and Weaver distinguished between institutions 
that are specifically created to affect issues of war and security and all other institutions. Boehmer, Gatzke 
and Nordstorm (2004) also focused on the effect of global peace institutions, this time intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs). As Faber and Weaver did for informal multilateral peace institutions, they 
differentiate organizations depending on their level of institutionalization; how organized and 
bureaucratically rich they are. They also differentiate between organizations with security mandates and 
those without.4 Their most relevant finding for this paper (for the 1950-1991 period) is that highly 
institutionalized security mandate IGOs are more efficient in reducing the amount of conflict in the world. 
                                                          
4 This is proposition 6 on page 15, which focuses on the mechanism of costly signals and how IGOs affect it.  
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Another set of authors researched how institutions helped states mediate their differences, with 
Mitchell and Hensel (2007) finding that dyadic institution membership enhances compliance with 
agreements. Brochmann and Hensel find that river management that is institutionalized tends to lead to 
negotiation over river claims (Brochmann and Hensel 2009). To put it simply the existence of regimes 
that help states to solve their issue in a pacific manner will lead states to do so. 
Most of the explanations for the pacific effect of international institutions follow two distinct 
tacks, the rational model approach and the normative approach. The rational approach focuses on the 
effect that international institutions have on the shadow of the future and the communication of 
preferences as key factors for the stability of bargaining (Axelrod 1984:173; Fearon 1995, 1998;Ostrom et 
al 1999;Drezner 2000; Powell 2006, Cooper et al 2008). For example, Pahre (1994) focuses on the larger 
effect of the grim trigger threat, the complete collapse of cooperation if one actor defects, produced when 
the number of possible defectors is large (Lohmann 1997). David Earnest (2008) argues that 
multilateralism helps preference communication. The normative explanation argues that dense 
international institutions change the preferences of states. Russet and Oneal make this case for the effect 
of international organizations in conjunction with democracy and trade (Russet and Oneal 2001).5 A good 
overview of this literature is Raymond (2000). 
Another possible explanation for the transformation of international politics is the rise of liberal 
representative democracy as a political regime at the state level, and a spillover of pacific effects at the 
other levels of analysis. Oneal and Russet (1999) find empirical support for the proposition that high 
levels of democracy in the system, coupled with high levels of interdependence and intergovernmental 
organization density, is associated with dyadic peace. Mitchell (2002) finds that as the proportion of 
democracies in the system goes up the democratic norm of third-party dispute resolution starts been used 
by mixed and authoritarian dyads.  Maoz (2004) finds some support for an independent effect of systemic 
                                                          
5 Martha Finnemore has also studied the normative effect and the institutional expression of norms on state 
preferences (Finnamore and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore 2004). 
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democratization, which he attributed to a spillover of pacific norms from democratic to mixed dyads, and 
then to authoritarian dyads. A counter argument for the same effect has been put forward focusing on the 
war winning reputation of democracies (Russet and Starr 2000: 112-113; Biddle and Long 2004). 
As far as explanations for this effect, detailed explanations for the pacific effect of system 
democracy are sparse. Mitchell and Maoz tend to present the normative explanations. The normative 
explanation stems from Doyle’s Kantian thesis (1983, 2005). The normative explanation of the 
democratic peace has been supported by many scholars and some findings have been found to support its 
explanatory power (Rummel 1983; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Maoz and Russett 1993; Oneal and Russet  
2001; Dixon and Senese 2002; Mousseau 2003).6  
An alternative explanation to the normative one is the institutional one. The institutional 
explanation attributes the democratic peace to the way democratic states are set up (De Mesquita and 
Lamlan, 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993; De Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Reiter and Stam 1998). Finally 
there is an informational argument focusing on how the institutional makeup of democratic states has a 
positive effect on the communication of preferences (Schultz 1998, 1999). The thesis has its supporters 
(Kydd 1997; Letzkian and Souva 2009). However scholars that tried to extend the thesis implications to 
international trade have found it to be wanting (Kono 2006; Dai 2006 ab). These two last groups of 
explanations though are not well placed to explain peace beyond democratic dyads.  
THE INADEQUACY OF DYADIC EXPLANATIONS  
Studies focusing on the dyad have provided evidence for the pacific effect of some environmental 
attributes (democratic regimes) and variables (international institutions and norms). However, their 
explanations for these pacific effects are incomplete, whether rational, intuitionalist, or normative. This is 
                                                          
6 It also has its detractors (Rosato 2003). However, attacks on the dyadic democratic peace tend to target the 
monadic explanation rather than the dyadic one made by Doyle (1983), or ignore the interdependent character of the 
pieces of the liberal explanation (Doyle 2005; Kinsella 2005).  
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because no explanation is provided for the creation of these regimes, whether democracy, international 
norms, or international institutions. As a result such dyadic explanations may ignore selection effects 
created by the innovation process that brings about these mid-range variables. 
The normative approach to explaining the pacific effect of international institutions does not 
easily explain the source of changed norms. We have good explanations of normative change, even of 
how norm entrepreneurs “sell” norms to policy makers (Adler 1982). But we lack a story of why policy 
makers decide to follow those norms and why those entrepreneurs seek normative change. The rational 
explanations for the pacific effect of peace institutions do not provide a story for the innovation of those 
institutions, or which states will rationally conclude that the creation of those institutions is in their 
interest.  
The normative explanation for the democratic peace in the form expounded by Doyle suffers 
from the fact that the expected increased war-process of mixed-regime dyads does not materialize which 
questions its causal story. This seems to indicate the validity of Mitchell’s normative argument.  However 
for that argument to be correct it must first address the fact that that the norm entrepreneurs were two 
aggressive major powers, the US and the United Kingdom, or that the first states that copied these norms 
were the other major powers that the US and UK interacted with (the 1899/1907 conventions cited were 
both initiated by the autocratic Russian Tsar). 
The institutional explanations for the democratic peace tend to ignore the evidence that 
democracy to take root requires a fairly pacific international system with robust norms, a point that can be 
made about many dyadic level explanatory variables. Thus the pacific effects of trade-interdependence 
require a robust international market economy regime. The pacific effect of dyadic membership in 
international institutions has never been disaggregated from the multilateral character of those 
institutions. The democratic peace provides an excellent example of this dependency.  
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The democratic peace requires that the two states are democracies, and there are a number of 
social scientific findings that indicate that democracy itself may be crucially contingent on some 
multilateral factor. Gibler for example, presents an explanation that the democratic peace is the result of a 
pre-existing territorial peace (Gibler 2007; Hutchison and Gibler 2007). In turn the successful resolution 
of territorial problems hinges on the existence of a robust multilateral territorial integrity norm (Zacher 
2001). Even if we do not accept the connection between democracy and territory, the creation of 
democratic polities seems to hinge on the pacific character of the “neighborhood” of the transforming 
polity, a “systemic” variable (Ray 2000; Maoz 1996, 1998; Russet and Oneal 2001; Pevehouse 2002).7 
The above example and the previous discussion should make a case about why a strictly dyadic 
focus is inadequate to explain peace. It is not a claim that dyadic factors are not important. Indeed they 
are probably the most important factors. But their effect is in conjunction with monadic and systemic 
factors in the form of multilateral regimes.8 Dyadic explanations also suffer from a number of general 
problems when it comes to addressing the question of transformation, some shared with realism and 
liberal institutionalism, and some that are specific to the dyadic view of international politics. 
FIELD-WIDE ISSUES  
The field as a whole tends to suffer from two general problems that make it hard to study 
transformation in international politics. Frist of all, by and large, despite exceptions, we as scholars focus 
on the post-1815 period of history. For example, the most recent treatment of systemic variable covers 
only the post-1816 period (Braumoeller 2012). This is not wrong per-se, as we are not historians but 
political scientists. The contemporary past casts a stronger shadow on current and future policy than older 
                                                          
7 Alternatively, Kevin Narizny makes the argument that democratization in the system is the policy of major 
capitalist powers which react to the demand of domestic and international capital, itself a creation of the world 
system, for protection from rent-seeking (2007).  8 Braumoeller offers further argumentation for the inadequacy of a dyad only level of analysis exploration of conflict and peace(2012: 2-10,18-21). 
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eras. But it does inhibit the ability of scholars to evaluate long term change and its effect on political 
actors. 
Second, our research is biased from that temporal domain to treat the international system as one 
system. We ignore the fact that this international system was not the only possible evolution of the 
international system, and that the way it evolved from the multiple discrete systems that were its 
precursors has a large effect on the character of international relations.  This is a problem that the above 
literature suffers from. It is also a problem that most dyadic explanations of peace ignore.  Part of the 
incentive for this is the problems noted above. But in the case of strictly dyadic explanations, another 
motive is the vagueness of the concept of the system, and the problems with measuring systemic variables 
(Singer 1961; Braumoeller 2008,2012) 
Dyadic explanations are further inadequate in explaining peace because they suffer from the 
problems of bilateral solutions to war. If peace is just the result of bilateral interactions and the 
characteristics of the two actors interacting then we should had expected a rise in the number of wars in 
the 19th and 20th century due to the rise of  the number of bilateral pairings of states because of the 
increased number of states in the international system. Bilateral attempts to manage issues, if they are 
independent of factors from higher or lower levels of analysis, run into the problems of cooperation 
pointed out by Robert Jervis, James Fearon, and Robert Powell (Jervis 1978; Fearon 1995, 1998; Powell 
2006). 
More specifically, bilateral attempts to overcome the path to military conflict fall prey to the 
shadow of the future, and problems with the communication of preferences. While each of the variables at 
the center of the dyadic explanations of peace is postulated to overcome these two problems, multilateral 
versions may have a stronger effect. As David Earnest showed using ABM models, as the number of 
actors in negotiation goes up it becomes more efficient to communicate preferences (2008; for a counter-
view see Oye 1985). As far as the shadow of the future is concerned  making  agreements multilateral 
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helps lengthen the shadow of the future by mitigating the chance that third parties will try to annul the 
agreement due to externalities, by making costlier such an annulment, and by making collective 
punishment more possible (Oye 1985). 
Another theme of the above literatures that contributes to the inability to address the role of 
regimes in constituting a system or transforming a system is the way major powers are treated within 
those literatures. In the case of realism and liberal institutionalism it is a case of use and abuse.  Realists 
assume major powers are the most important countries for a theory, and usually do not provide a theory of 
why they are the most important states beyond their preponderant capabilities (see Waltz 1978; 
Mearsheimer 2001). In many ways major powers are used in realism as a “crash dummy”, the idea being 
that if it is shown that the most powerful states in the world cannot escape the demands of power politics 
then no state can escape them. Nonetheless, as noted above realists make too many restrictive 
assumptions about the behavior of states, and especially major powers. Major Powers are always the 
recipients of the demands of the international system rather than positive actors. Liberal intuitionalists 
have inherited an element of that restrictive view of major power behavior with only the extremely 
powerful hegemons being able to act positively on the system. 
In the case of mid-range theories the case is one of omission. If major powers figure in them at all 
it is as control variables. There is usually no attempt to theorize about the relationship between major 
powers and the pacific variables of interest. This is problematic because objectively speaking major 
powers are important. Major Powers are significant because they are the most interdependent states in the 
international system as a result of their increased capabilities, which in turn leads them to being the first 
states whose relations will be transformed by that increased interdependence (Holsti 1980). If new 
regimes or innovations of political behavior will rise in reaction to the demands of that increased 
interdependence and then spread to become international ones, they will first do so among the major 
powers. And as Hostli points out, whether interdependence will lead to positive or negative effects largely 
depends on context and more importantly on how states react to it (1980:27). 
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Furthermore, taking the relations of major powers seriously as the first focus of a study of the 
way states manage increased interdependence resolves the ecological fallacy of using system 
interdependence as a variable. Since any dyad may be less or more interdependent than the average 
system dyad, one cannot say that a more interdependent system has result a or b. But one can safely 
assume, to a point, that major powers are more interdependent than the average dyad. Consequently if one 
wishes to focus on the effects of high interdependence in international politics one can start with the 
major powers (Hostli 1980). 
MAJOR POWERS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
First, what do I mean by the term major powers? For the purposes of this study a major power is a 
sovereign weberian state that has material capabilities large enough to be able to gain a compromise 
settlement in a military conflict with the most powerful state in the international system when both have 
used the maximum available material capabilities in that conflict (Mearsheimer 2003). It is also a state 
that exhibits military and political activity outside its immediate geographical area.9 It is also a state that 
the most powerful state in the system seeks to ally with or considers an important actor of international 
relations. All of the above must be met. Specific periods may add requirements, like a nuclear arsenal, but 
the above elements are the minimum required. 
Scholars in the past have looked into the role major powers play in creating international regimes 
for the management of the relations of states. However, scholars looking at other pacific variables have 
failed to integrate their research with that past research on major power politics and peace. This project 
tries to do this to a point. When it comes to the study of major power managerial cooperation in the past, 
this tended to be part of two different traditions that made the same predictions. 
                                                          
9 Political Activity here means alliance (including asymmetrical relationships like protectorates) and 
intergovernmental organization membership. 
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One school, let us call it the “prudential diplomacy” school, tended to study the effects of a major 
power managerial system in a historiographic manner. Exemplars of this school are diplomatic historians 
like Norman Rich (1992), classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau (1948), English School scholars like 
Hedley Bull (1977), and scholars of foreign policy analysis like Henry Kissinger (1994). Scholars of this 
tradition tended to treat major power managerial systems as both outputs and inputs of international 
diplomacy. The other tradition is the peace science tradition, which tended to approach the subject in a 
quantitative manner, exemplified by the work of scholars such as  Raimo Vayrynen (1983), Manus 
Midlarksy (1984), and Peter Wallensteen (1981,1984). These scholars tended to treat a major power 
managerial system as an input only. 
Whilst the two traditions differed on methods and sometimes on questions, the basic proposition 
of these scholars was that major power behavior and policies have a huge impact on the propensity of 
states to resort to war. The relative pacific character of the 1816-1840 period and the 1870s to 1890s is 
attributed to the existence of some level of major power managerial cooperation in the form of a formal 
(the Congress of Vienna System) or informal (the Bismarck System) managerial system. Breakdowns of 
these systems signified a relaxation of international norms against unilateral behavior and an increase in 
war outbreak (Vayrynen 1983). 
The most systematic findings were those by Wallensteen. Systems with a major power 
managerial regime tend to be periods of “universalism”. In such periods, the major powers avoid 
expansionist excesses and follow a prudent foreign policy coordinating their imperialism against areas 
outside their immediate neighborhoods, or adhere to a diplomatic system of reconciliation. Such periods 
should be more peaceful than periods of “particularism”, characterized by major power discord, 
adversarial alliances, and a willingness to undermine the international diplomatic system. Wallensteen 
finds some empirical support for these theories  as periods of universalism (1816-48,1871-95,1919-
32,1963-76) were less war prone than periods of particularism in his 1816-1976 sample. 
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While this literature is rich in descriptive analysis and has produced some important findings, it 
suffers from a lack of an agreed upon operationalization of what a major power managerial system is. As 
a result, while all agree to an extent on what a major power managerial system entails, their findings are 
not perfectly compatible due to variance in how scholars conceptualize and operationalize the variable. 
This makes scientific consilience harder. 
Moreover, most of the studies tend to relate the pacific effect of the presence of a major power 
managerial system to the aggregate level of conflict in the system rather than the level of analysis in 
which the decisions to go to war usually take place, which is the dyad. As a result theoretical stories tend 
to under-explain how a systemic variable like managerial coordination affects dyadic outcomes. Few 
mechanisms that transport the systemic input to a dyadic outcome have been formulated, and even fewer 
have been evaluated. To rectify these problems in this project, I provide a replicable scale for evaluating 
the level of major power managerial cooperation for the system. Also, I evaluate the pacific effect of that 
level on the propensity of dyads to use military force to resolve their issues. The process that leads to war 
is largely dyadic, as is the process of war’s diffusion, even if the result is multilateral. It makes intuitive 
sense to evaluate if pacific factors affect that process (Pollins 1996). 
The above literature tends to focus on positive major power cooperation in resolving issues, 
which managerial coordination. This activist view is not the only possible way for major powers to 
cooperate. Sometimes just by trying to avoid interaction of certain issues major powers may be able to 
keep peace, even in the midst of enmity. This is the type of major power cooperative regime that Roger E. 
Kanet and Edward A. Kolodziej (1991) argue the Soviet Union and the United States developed during 
the Cold War. This cooperation by avoidance is a form of cooperation because it is made up of 
interdependent exchanges in which stakes and moves are defined by their mutually expected behavior in 
pursuit of shared and conflicting values and interests (Kanet and Kolodziej 1991:6). While this project 
focuses on the creation and maintenance of a more positive regime of major power cooperation, I do wish 
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the reader to be aware that pacific cooperation need not always be the result of active managerial 
coordination (Kanet and Kolodziej 1991:12). 
Lest the reader think that only cooperation by avoidance can exist in the context of opposition 
between the major powers, active cooperation in the form of regime creation can also exist in such 
conditions. Benjamin Miller presents a model of major power cooperation and conflict which is 
interesting and worth a more detailed look (1995). Miller’s thesis is that different structural (defined as 
polarity) and ideological (defined as ideological convergence) environments structure different types of 
major power cooperative or conflictual behavior when it comes to the onset of inadvertent and intended 
wars, or successful conflict management and conflict resolution (1995: 38,67). While his main thesis is 
problematic due to his reliance on difficult to determine structural factors (polarity), and his focus on the 
questionable concept of inadvertent war, the author provides some very interesting insights on the 
preconditions and character of major power cooperation. 
Miller argues that the key for the highest forms of major power managerial cooperation, which 
are concerts, is the convergence of leader perceptions in a process of cognitive learning by elites. For 
Miller this convergence is caused by a compatibility of state attributes and an explicit legitimacy of the 
status quo (1995: 6). While I agree that major power managerial cooperation as a regime is the result of a 
learning process, I disagree that this process is the result of compatible state attributes, although they can 
help. Instead my argument sees the root of cooperation in war wariness instilled in major power elites by 
threats to their domestic power due to major power war. That said, Miller is correct to stress that major 
powers must prefer the status quo to war for concerts to arise (one must note that preference for the status 
quo to war does not mean a preference for no change, just that any change happens according to existing 
rules rather than by violence). 
Miller looks at major power cooperation as part of the process of changing a spontaneously 
created balance of power system to a deliberate international society (1995:12-13). He argues that 
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Anarchy does not nullify cooperation but only produces variable versions of cooperation. This is based on 
the dual effect of the increased ability of major powers to withstand hurt and hurt others. On the one hand 
this puts a limit to cooperation as major powers can afford to renege more than minor states (Miller 1995: 
16-17). At the same time though the reality of increased major power ability to withstand hurt and give 
hurt means that unilateral actions are more costly and dangerous in the face of the shadow of the future. 
This is because they are less likely to prohibit reciprocation in kind and more probable to invite it rather 
than multilateral actions. Force is avoided exactly because the victim can retaliate or rely on a major 
power to retaliate. This provides an incentive for major powers to avoid unilateral military actions and try 
and coordinate their policies. 
As for his explanation for the rise of major power concerts his main variables are primarily from 
the unit level of analysis. These are regime similarity and fear of the domestic results of war. There is also 
one systemic variable, parity (Miller 1995: 90). The unit level variables in turn are determined by elite 
views of the dynamics of international politics, the relation between global politics and regional conflicts, 
and the image of opponents. He further argues that the domestic political system of the major powers will 
determine if a concert will be a concert or a condominium, with pluralist states creating the first and 
authoritarian the second type of cooperation. For Miller it is these domestic and quasi-domestic factors 
that determine major power cooperation as opposed with structural factors or relative capabilities (1995: 
93).  
While I agree with Miller on his assessment of the limits of structural explanations for major 
power cooperation I disagree on the explanatory variables to a point. I do not believe that ideological 
similarity is a key to the creation of a major power concert or the existence of high level major power 
managerial cooperation. The Vienna system was characterized by ideological plurality among the major 
powers that made it up (Schroeder 1994). I do agree that fear of the domestic consequences of war spurs 
elites to craft regimes that provide alternatives to war, but disagree that these fears are only of revolution 
caused by war or fear of inadvertent war (Miller 1995: 102). Any major power war can create such 
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economic and social demands that even victory would not avoid challenges to the social system, as 
happened with France and the UK after World War 1. Major Powers become status-quo powers or pacific 
revisionists because they see war as a means of revision as too dangerous for domestic reasons. 
In conclusion, the main point from Miller’s thesis is that major power cooperation is important 
for creating pacific regimes, and that the impetus for major powers to do comes from domestic dynamics 
tied to the costs of war. A specific form of major power cooperation is collective preventive diplomacy. 
Barry H. Steiner looked at collective major power preventive diplomacy in the case of ethnic crises 
(2004). While this is a different application of major power managerial cooperation than one that seeks to 
resolve peacefully international crises some interesting insights can be gained. One is Steiner’s finding 
that major power cooperative diplomacy seeks first to insulate major powers from a possible conflict, by 
decreasing the chance of the major powers entering unilaterally a conflict. This first phase then permits 
the major powers to intervene to diffuse the conflict between the primary antagonists (Steiner 2004: 
24,27). 
Collective major power cooperation works by increasing the leverage of major powers on 
primary antagonists and decreasing the incentives for opportunistic unilateral major power action (Steiner 
2004: 7). These two effects, the decrease of major power unilateral behavior and the fear of major power 
intervention, also affect interstate disputes. Another important point Steiner makes that also applies to 
international relations is that local resistance to major power intervention is not insurmountable if the 
major powers are actively cooperating. Steiner also offers a categorization of types of major power 
cooperation, differentiating between tight concerts, loose concerts and prevailing opposition (Steiner 
2004). While interesting his categories do not clearly clarify if they represent different causal mechanisms 
or different results. Furthermore they are too sparse to adequately capture the different levels of major 
power cooperation in the international system. 
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The final useful points from Steiner’s analysis of several case studies of major power preventive 
diplomacy are that major powers on average take great pains to be conciliatory with each other and to 
problem solve their differences even if they know that any solution is transitory (Steiner 2004:193). This 
is important because it indicates that even short shadows of the future do not nullify the drive for major 
power cooperation. Furthermore major power cooperation is a necessary condition to stop intrastate actors 
from gaining major power support for their wars (Steiner 2004: 199). It fits with my argument that one of 
the basic pacific effects of major power cooperation is to make it harder for conflicting actors to gain 
major power support for military activity. 
The above literature demonstrates that scholars have considered major power managerial 
cooperation as an important pacific variable in international politics. However, the regime of major power 
managerial coordination is something much more. Because of the temporal bias of the field noted above, 
these scholars have missed the innovative and in the end transformative character of the attempt of major 
powers to replace their opportunistic cooperation with managerial coordination. The advent of major 
power managerial coordination transformed a basically war-inducing system to a peace inducing system 
after 1816. There are scholars who have grasped the transformative potential of regimes and of major 
power managerial coordination especially and I will now look at their work. 
EXPONENTS OF THE TRANSFORMATION THESIS 
 
A good starting point when talking about transformation episodes is to think about what 
transformation means. Stephen Genco argues that system transformations are characterized by step rather 
than incremental change, are system wide rather than sectorial, and figure the extension of commitments 
into new areas (Genco 1980). Genco writes in reaction to integration theory and essentially argues that 
incremental processes like integration are not transformation episodes. The problem with incrementalist 
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views is that they use variables that refer to the initiation of change as explanatory of maintenance. For 
Genco crises are formative events that produce transformation episodes. 
There are reasons to agree and disagree with this view. To talk about the transformation of 
international politics, at some point there must be an event A before which there was system 1 and after 
which system 2. Crises, such a multilateral wars that threaten many major powers with extinction or 
demotion act as those points in most works that think about transformation (for example Gilpin 1981). 
But the arrival at event A is the results of an incremental procedure during which important states face a 
sequence of crises events that make them question the dominant system of regimes. Furthermore event A 
need not be a system wide event. What it must be is an event that influences all the major actors of a 
system, the ones that maintain regimes and the ones with ability to change them through coordinated 
action.  
Once the major actors have decided to create a new regime the other actors of a system either due 
to compulsion, or imitation will become members of the regime. Thus a major power regime will spread 
to the whole system. But the transformation has already happened as the major actors are not part of the 
old system anymore. A transformation may only slowly and incrementally expand to cover the whole 
system. That does not mean that a transformation did not take place, but areas in the periphery of a system 
may still operate under the old system, constituting a different system to the one where the new regime 
holds (Africa, Asia, South America in the 1815-1880 period).  
An example of a literature that looks at transformation episodes is the security community 
literature. First espoused by Karl Deutsch (1969), the literature on security communities expressly 
concerned itself with the transformation thesis (Adler and Bennet 1998). But as opposed to the 
transformation of the international political system as a whole, it focuses on transformation of parts of the 
system to essentially Kantian systems (Deutsch 1969; Jervis 2002). While this work is important it raises 
an salient question. Are these security communities possible in a general war-inducing international 
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political system or are they made possible thanks to the peace-inducing transformation of the international 
political system?  In other words, does the ability of states to avoid militarizing their issues first require 
that states have multiple means to resolve issues? This literature does not answer these questions. 
It is the work of a historian, Paul Schroeder, which gives a first glimpse of an answer. In his 
monumental “The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848”, Schroeder goes about to provide a 
historical narrative for the transformation of European politics from a pre-1815 balance of power system 
that was war-inducing, to a major power managerial system after 1815 that was peace-inducing (1994). 
Schroeder starts by laying forth a basic theoretical story that the governments of Europe because of the 
wars and war scares of the 1763-1815 period increasingly began to see the balance of power regime as the 
basic cause of their insecurity (1994: 5-11). The near extinction of a number of major powers in the 
Napoleonic wars, and the belief that the costs of war lead to revolution, led the European powers with 
Austria first, to innovate a new managerial coordination regime (Schroeder 1994:33-34,38,47-
48,65,77,88,91; Esdaile 2007). 
In Schroeder’s narrative the regimes of the balance of power system made it impossible for the 
major powers to manage the successive crises of the late 18th century without decreasing their security 
and increasing the chance of a major war. The Polish partitions, Dutch Revolt, Russo-Ottoman Wars of 
Catherine the Great, Belgian revolt of 1789, and Dutch Revolt of 1785-1787 were all managed in a way 
that increased the probability of a general war happening in the end, as happened after the French 
revolution of 1789. Schroeder does not see the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars as a result of 
ideological fervor but as a result of the failure of all the major powers to exit the zero-sum game of the 
18th century and resolve the issues at stake without decreasing their security (1994: 175-176).  
The state elites to first come to this conclusion were those of Austria that had faced the threat of 
extinction as a major power in 1756, saw its security undermined by balance of power politics in the East 
pursued by Russia, and faced the threat of extinction and domestic turmoil in 1803, and again in 1809. 
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But only once when the majority of major powers had arrived to the conclusion that the old “game” was 
too dangerous to continue playing did a new international regime arise. This happened thanks to the fact 
that all the other major powers found themselves defeated or isolated due to various events of the 
Napoleonic wars (1806 Franco-Prussian war, the isolation of Great Britain after the treaty of Tilsit 1807, 
the 1812 Russian campaign, 1814 campaign), and because Napoleon was unable to craft a peace system 
out of his empire (Schroeder 1994: 286-289,306,308, 316, 361-2,372-383,395, 433, 441, 451,458, 460-
1,469, 483; Esdaile 2007:563-565). 
Schroeder’s narrative then contrasts the old system with the more successful management of 
international issues after the 1815 system comes to being, with the Treaties of Reichnbach of 1813 as the 
crucial turning point that showed that at least three major powers , Austria, Prussia, and Russia had 
decided that their security was interlinked (1994: 473-4, 482-483). With Britain joining this new alliance 
system in 1814, and France accepting it terms in1815, the Vienna system came to the fore (Schroeder 
1994, 485-486, 492, 501, 504, 516, 523).  
The system successfully resolved the crises of the 100 days in 1815, the questions raised in 1815-
1818 over the territorial and political makeup of Europe, the Bavarian-Baden crisis of 1819, the Spanish 
and Italian revolts of 1820-1, the Greek Revolution of 1821-1830, the French intervention in Spain in 
1823, the Anglo-French intervention in Portugal, the Latin American revolutions, the July Revolt in 
France in 1830, the Belgian Revolt of 1830-1832, the Papal State Revolt of 1830, the 1830-1831 Polish 
Revolt, the creation of the Zolleverin, the Belgian-Dutch crisis of 1838, the Spanish and Portuguese Civil 
Wars of 1832 and 1833, the First Eastern Crisis of 1832, and the 1840 Rhine crisis, with only the Second 
Eastern Crisis being a failure of the system.10  
 The managerial regime according to Schroeder was based on a core of an accommodative Anglo-
Russian bipolar hegemony and legitimist ideology, a system that both states had sought to create earlier in 
                                                          10 For the individual crises see Schroeder 1994:523,525-7,536-8,550,562,608,610-12,617,620,622,624-631,633-
656,662,668,670,673-4,676,680-4,686-7,690-693,705,707,714,717,720,727,729-735-756 
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the 18th century (1994: 81-82,534,558). The system was bipolar in that Great Britain and Russia were 
impervious to the violent action of other states. It was hegemonic because outside of Europe the two 
powers largely did as they willed (Schroeder 1994: 575,757). But it was accommodative and cooperative 
within Europe as the two flanking powers were willing to work with, and respect the security needs of the 
important intermediary major powers. These in turn did not try to balance against the flanking powers. In 
turn all powers together tried to resolve minor power issues and major-minor power issues in a pacific 
manner or with the goal of avoiding a major power war (Schroeder 1994: 577-580). The elites of the 
system were liberal or legitimist, rather than reactionary or conservative.11  
Schroeder’s historical analysis is impressive. But his theoretical story is underdeveloped; 
something that makes sense as his is the work of a historian. The main problem is the lack of a more 
nuanced explanation of why the crises and wars of the late 18th and early 19th century would lead 
domestic elites to replace the international political system and its regimes. Schroeder notes the domestic 
consequences of war as the problem, but does not provide a story of why elites would care or react as they 
did. This project provides such a micro-foundation. The other problem of Schroeder’s analysis is that he 
considers the transformation of European politics from a war inducing regime to a peace inducing regime 
as a unique case, like any good historian would do. However another historian, Theodore Rabb, provides 
a narrative for a transformation of European politics between 1648 and 1715, which has many similar 
themes to Schroeder (1975).12  
Transformations of the kind described by the two historians, rather than unique phenomena, may 
be rare but recurring events of political life. At the very least this is a question that can be empirically 
                                                          
11 According to Schroeder the essence of legitimism was the recognition that sovereign power rested on the ability 
of rulers to provide their subjects with a rational, just and efficient government, as opposed to divine right.  The 
standard reaction of the system to domestic revolts was not force, but the promulgation of government reforms 
barring democratic expansion (Schroeder 1994: 545, 576; Esdaile 2007: 535-537). Interestingly the main proponent 
of this principle was Alexander I of Russia, who was willing to promote legitimism abroad but not in Russia itself.. 
The system fostered liberalism even if it did not foster democracy, more on which will be presented later.  
12 Rabb’s narrative in “The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe” focuses more on how political thought, 
art and legal thought indicate a transformation of perspectives of elites concerning international and domestic 
politics. The theme of change due to the failure of the old system to provide security is similar to Schroeder.  
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evaluated. My project is a first step in that direction by providing a political scientific evaluation of 
Schroeder’s transformation thesis and the consequences of the transformation deep into world history as I 
evaluate if the regime has an effect even when managerial coordination is low or non-existent.  
There is still the issue of crafting a theory about transformations and the pacific effect of major 
power cooperation. The work of three political scientists provides a stepping stone for theory 
construction. These are Hedley Bull, Alexander Wendt, and Robert Randle. 
Hedley Bulls work is a useful starting point, because it is one of the first clear expositions of the 
thesis that there is something different about the current international system compared to previous 
iterations.13 Bull is also important because he was among the first to associate international systems with 
specific multilateral regimes, although he did not use that language. These regimes, that transform a war-
inducing system to a peace-inducing society, are the norm of sovereignty, the balance of power, 
international law, the diplomatic mechanism, and the managerial system of major powers (1977: 8-9, 13, 
16-18, 44-49, 65-66. 71).  Bull’s analysis suffers from a number of problems. Bull exaggerates the 
lawless character of a possible war-inducing system (which he terms Hobbesian). Of the three 
characteristics that define a war-inducing system according to Bull; a lack of industry, trade and 
refinement, a lack of a common understanding of right and wrong; and a state of war, only the last 
corresponds to reality (1977: 46-47). This leads Bull to declare that European history since 1648 has been 
characterized as an international society (1977: 26-33). 
However this is an exaggerated and abstract view of a Hobbesian system. As Bull himself notes 
the conception of the society by 17th and 18th century thinkers was very vague (1977: 27-33). This 
vagueness in my opinion was a result of the lack of many of the characteristics of the Lockean system he 
claims existed. Early thinkers of the international society like Vittoria and Grotius were making 
prescriptive calls couched in natural law for common norms exactly because those common norms were 
                                                          
13 Angell’s work was too economically vulgar and underspecified. 
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not recognized.  International Law in the 18th century was very vague and primitive, essentially a 
courtesy. The Balance of Power as Schroeder points out, was mostly a pretext and justification put 
forward by a minority of states. The major powers did not actively manage cooperatively in a sustained 
manner the issues of the European system. The diplomatic system was tied to war and not an alternative.14 
Consequently Bull’s argument that there was an international society in Europe between 1715 
and 1815 does not hold. Most of the regimes he points to as elements of a society existed before and after 
1815. The only transformation of institutions that took place in his story is that of the managerial system 
of the major powers and international law. My study adds to his analysis by clearly claiming that major 
power managerial coordination in providing alternative means to warfare, and creating a benign 
environment for democratization and the creation of international pacific institutions, was the key factor 
to the transformation of the war-inducing 18th century system to a peace-inducing post- 1816 system. 
The next author of interest is Alexander Wendt. Wendt’s work followed a number of early 
constructivist criticisms of Waltzian structural realism focused on its inability to explain the dynamic 
character of international politics (Ruggie 1988). Wendt, unlike Bull, considers a war-inducing 
Hobbesian, pacific Kantian, and peace-inducing Lockean culture as the basis of different systems of 
international interactions. Wendt’s argument was ideational, in that the dominant norms of a system 
constrained and funneled the use of material resources into acceptable activity (1999: 99, 111). Different 
ideas about the use of material factors create different outcomes even if the material factors are the same. 
Wendt argues that the Lockean culture, which is the culture of the post-1815 system, is the result of 
interdependence, common fate, homogeneity, and self-restraint (Wendt 1999: 343). 
The problem with Wendt’s story of culture is his explanation. His interactionist model of 
ideational transformation is underspecified. Wendt does not provide an explanation of why continued 
                                                          
14 The only clear case of preemptive management of conflicts was the Polish Partitions (1772, 1793, 1795), and 
these were associated with Russian invasions of Poland and did not see consultation with all the major powers of 
Europe. 
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interaction should lead to a transformation from a Hobbesian to a Lockean system. His explanations lack 
a micro-foundation for a motive to avoid war and for states to form the regimes and norms that form the 
culture of a system. The Eastern Roman Empire and the Sassanid Persian Empire had a 200 year history 
of interaction but no durable common norms of coexistence surfaced. Wendt’s model of transformation 
by interaction cannot explain why culture transformed in one long-term interaction pair and not in 
another.  
In later work Wendt indicated that he believed that the liberal transformation thesis centered on 
capitalist globalization was the explanation (2000: 179). But as explained in the introductory chapter and 
earlier in this chapter, changes in the international economic system cannot by themselves explain 
changes in the international political system. That said Wendt’s focus on the ideas states have about the 
proper use of force as central to the character of different systems is the basis of the belief that a 
managerial coordination regime is different from other types of major power interaction, exactly because 
it places limits on how power is used.  
Robert Randle provides a theory of system creation and transformation based on the issues that 
dominate international politics (1987). For Randle issues arise out of perceptions of threat for values, and 
are activated either due to an endogenous process or by contagion (1987: 11-13). Issue characteristics 
determine if the issue is a primary issue, which can cause transformations of domestic or international 
politics, with the most important being their q-connectivity. This is the number of states for which the 
issues has high valuation intensity (Randle 1987:3-6). The way states resolve primary issues, by war, or 
by negotiation, or by redefinition, or by reduction of the number of states for which the issue has intense 
value, creates the constitution of the international system (Randle 1987: 32, 35). Major powers play an 
important role in the formation of constitutions by confirming the regimes used for the resolution of 
primary issues, which are also going to be used to resolve future issues (Randle 1987: 43). According to 
Randle a system transforms every time the resolution of a new issue creates a new constitution which 
entails a new ordering principle, new system actors, new norms, or new active issues (1987: 50, 55-57). 
42 
 
The signatories of a peace treaty and the states affected by it are all members of a new system 
constitution, whose scope increases the more multilateral the war that brought it about was, and whose 
sophistication increases the more organized and institutionalized its regimes are. The author locates a 
number of variables that he believes help pacifism; war weariness, norm acceptance, elite satisfaction, 
and the resolution of issues that were part of a treaty (Randle 1987: 61, 63). Randle also argues that stable 
regimes should be able to be implemented without creating insecurity for parties (1987: 65). For Randle, 
wars are one of the main causes of transformation. Constitutions themselves lead to the rise of new issues, 
leave space open for third party exploitation, see ideological issues rise, produce revisionism, and have 
technical defects that will lead to new wars (Randle 1987: 69). Other sources of transformation are 
technological or ideological innovation. 
Transformations, according to Randle happen whenever there is a change in the issues that 
dominate the system, since that leads to a change of regimes. This is because issues are the system. The 
state system is made up of active issue networks, plus the peace settlement regimes created by the last 
war, and the regimes created to resolve future expected issues (Randle 1987: 99-101,103). A change in 
the dominant issues leads to a change in regimes and thus a system transformation. Randle then applies 
his theory to a narrative of international politics from the 1500s to the modern times. Whenever there was 
a change in the mix of active transnational issues, the appearance or resolution of a dominant issue, or 
changes in the major powers, Randle argues that the system was transformed. This leads him to pinpoint 
26 transformations of the international system between 1550 and the present period (Randle 1987: 216-
233). This is the main point of disagreement I have with his analysis. 
Randle’s conception of systems as made up of states interacting in the context of certain regimes, 
and the consideration of large multilateral wars, technological innovation, and ideological innovation as 
causes of transformation are worthwhile points. However, I disagree with his argument that 
transformation happens when issues change. As Randle himself notes, the resolution of issues that make 
up a constitution can be accompanied by the creation of institutionalized regimes that remain even when 
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those issues are resolved (Randle 1987: 129). I would argue that it is not the rise of new issues that cause 
transformations but the inability of the old regimes to address those issues. If the old system of regimes 
can accommodate the rise of new issues (liberalism in the 19th century), new major powers (the USA, 
Japan, and Italy in the early 20th century), or a change in the mix of transnational issues (from the primacy 
of questions about the Rhine frontiers to the primacy of questions about the dissolution of the Ottoman 
Empire after the 1870s), then the system is not transformed by the new issues. Only if the regimes of the 
system buckle under the pressure, and that leads to a multilateral war or threat of war which leads to the 
creation of new regimes, is the system transformed.  
This creates not only a theoretical but also empirical difference between this project and Randle. 
Where he sees 26 or more transformations from 1550 to the present, I only see around six (1550-1648 
Reformation, 1648-1816 Westphalia, 1816-1890 Vienna System, 1890-1919 , 1919-1930, 1930-1945, 
1945-present). 
Randle also does not offer a story of why issues arise and why state elites will try to transform the 
international system in reaction. He identifies large multilateral war as a transformative episode, but does 
not explain why it would play that role. Why are wars associated with transformation? I provide an 
explanation for this association with the concept of war wariness. He also does not test empirically his 
theory. This project will test empirically the result of one transformation, the 1816 Vienna system. Finally 
while Randle notes the importance of major powers in issue systems he does not see their managerial 
coordination as an important regime in itself (Randle 1987: 126-127). I disagree and will explain later in 
the project why managerial coordination had a transformative effect. That said Randle’s work is full of 
rich concepts and ideas that will be used to enrich my explanation, more importantly his war-inducing and 
peace-inducing factors, the idea that regimes are created to resolve issues, that signatories of a peace 
treaty are members of the regime system it creates, and the maintenance of systems. 
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SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter I took a broad overview of the position of extant literature about international 
relations on the concept of transformation and the role and effect of major power managerial 
coordination. The overview spanned from the study of the transformative effect of capitalism in the early 
20th century to mid-range theories of the pacific effects of democratic regimes. As far as the concept of 
transformation is concerned the literature was found to either ignore the issue, as mid-range theories tend 
to do, oppose it as “realism” does, or present crude explanations and conceptualizations, as the economic 
transformation thesis does. Almost none of the works reviewed connected transformation concepts to 
major power managerial cooperation, instead focusing on only one or the other. The only one to make an 
overt connection was the work of a historian. The main causes of this situation is the temporal bias of the 
field, focused on the post-1816 era, a dislike for systemic thinking by the largely fertile mid-range 
theorists, or the making of unjustified assumptions about transformations or major power behavior.  
That said these past works can provide a rich fertile soil for a better explanation of the connection 
between system transformation and major power managerial coordination. Important is their 
documentation of the pacific effects of cooperative major power behavior, conceptualization of 
transformations and the role of regimes in them, and the correct expectation that transformations are 
connected with domestic political concerns and how domestic power structures are affected by 
international events.   
What my project ads to the past literature is an empirical test of a transformation episode, the 
change from a war-inducing 1715-1815 system to the peace-inducing 1816-2001 system, a discussion of 
transformation maintenance, and explicit connection of the transformation to major power managerial 
coordination, and an explanation of the causes of major power managerial coordination.   
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C H A P T E R  3 :  T H E  E X P L A N A T I O N  
INTRODUCTION   
The goal of this project is to show that major power managerial coordination was an innovative 
regime that transformed the European core of the modern international political system from war-
inducing to peace inducing, and how that impacted the dynamics of military conflict in the broader 
system that followed. Briefly put, major power managerial coordination is the attempt of the major 
powers through various policies and formal and informal institutions to coordinate their foreign policy in 
order to facilitate the cooperative and pacific resolution of international issues. I will expand on this 
definition later in this chapter, after I explain why we should expect this regime to have this effect. 
However, to make sense of the explanation I need to conceptualize the term international political 
system, how it is different from previous conceptualizations of the system, and why this conceptualization 
is superior. Once I have made our case for that element of the explanation the next phase is to move on to 
the explanation of what war-inducing and peace-inducing system mean. With those concepts articulated 
the idea of transformation and on how the regime of major power managerial coordination can affect a 
transformation can be tackled. Finally, I can attempt to answer the question of how the regime comes 
about.  
The chapter is set up as follows. I begin by defining the concept of international system, and 
explaining how it differs with previous conceptualizations. I then discuss the concepts of war-inducing 
and peace-inducing regimes within a system. After that I develop the idea of transformation as the 
creation of regimes of the one type or the other, and replacement of prior regimes of one type by regimes 
of the other. Following this discussion I present the concept of major power managerial coordination, 
explain why I expect it to have fostering effect for peace, and explain the direct and indirect mechanisms 
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through which that effect takes place. After that I describe how the major powers come to engage in 
managerial coordination.  I finish the chapter by providing theoretical propositions.  
THE “SYSTEM”  
 
In this project the international political system is conceptualized as the regimes that a set of 
polities use in order to resolve any disputes that arise from their interaction ( on the term international 
political system see Buzan and Little  2000:73,93-95). Let us unpack the elements of this definition.  
There are polities, organized groups of individuals that adhere to a set of rules and norms to resolve any 
issues that rise from their relations (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981:58-59). I assume that the goal of 
polities is to facilitate the pursuit of satisfaction of the stakes that their members have in social issues 
created under a condition of scarcity. International relations are the result of the attempt of polities to 
satisfy stakes on issues that are created by cross border social interaction (Braumoeller 2012). However, 
just the existence of polities, issues, and interactions do not constitute a system.  
That interactive behavior becomes a system only when it becomes regularized and takes place in 
a context of regimes.  Consequently it is the regimes, or lack of, which provides the tangible essence of a 
system (Krasner 1982,1983).  That said, I do not focus on only one regime as constitutive of a system as 
Waltz does with the presence or absence of sovereignty (Waltz 1979). Instead I follow Bull’s 
conceptualization of a system as made up of many regimes (Bull 1977). The consequence of this is that 
one has a more diverse set of systems possible than just hierarchical and anarchic depending on the 
regimes one focuses on. In this project the difference is between war-inducing systems and peace-
inducing systems, with the former being characterized by regimes that promote the use of military force, 
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and the latter by regimes that restrict military force and provide alternatives. Thus a peace-inducing 
anarchical system will see different behavior of the constituent members than a war inducing one.15  
Why are regimes crucial for the existence of a system? Without regimes that permit the 
accumulation of experience about behaviors, interactions lack the element of learning and future 
expectations that permits the tit for tat basis of cooperation (Axelrod 1984). Without learning, the ability 
to use past experience in order to predict and mold future activity, a system cannot exist. While learning 
can take place in the absence of regimes, such learning may fall prey to the passing of the generation that 
had immediate knowledge of an event. Regimes permit a system to survive beyond the first generation. 
The weight of the past on social interaction, crystallized in rules and norms of behavior, permits the 
expectation of future interaction (Pahre 1994). In another name there can be no system without behavior 
that takes place according to norms and regimes which themselves are historically constituted.  A system 
is these regularized modes of behavior. 
This behavioral conceptualization of the system is not novel in the study of international relations 
(see Deutsch 1969; Bull 1977; Adler and Bennett 1998). That said, it must be stressed that the behavioral 
aspect of the system is the result of the activity of the polities that partake in it, and not of the pressures of 
the environment, contra simplistic renditions of Waltzian realism (Waltz 1979, 1993).  The idea that a 
system causes the behavior of states to take a certain form is due to the conflation in realist writing of two 
different things, the environment and the system. I must stress again that as Dinna Zinne’s points out an 
environment is not the same thing as a system (a point reiterated by Braumoeller 2012). A system is a set 
of behaviors in reaction to an environment, in another name it is a malleable concept. The environment on 
the other hand is not as malleable because some elements never change, like geography, and others 
                                                          
15 Waltz also distinguished system according to polarity, because he expected different polarity configurations to 
lead to different state behavior. This is not a good basis for differentiating systems because the effects of polarity on 
state behavior are conditioned by other regimes that are not composite characteristics, as noted in Chapter 2. It is 
those intervening regimes that condition what behaviors will result from polarity rather than polarity in and itself. 
Depending of the regimes present two multipolar systems can be very different, as can be seen by a comparison 
between the Vienna System and the 1850-1914 system.  
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change more slowly, like population. To conflate one with the other is to conflate changes in populations 
with arms races. Changes in the environment may or may not lead to changes in the system. 
Realist authors sometimes conflate anarchy, which according to the materialistic description that 
Waltz gives can only be seen as an environment, with the regime of sovereignty. That an environment 
may be more conducive to some regimes that states come up with in order to manage their interactions is 
not the same as to say that the environment forces states to choose a specific regime. There are always 
alternatives that were not taken for reasons that are not always tied to environmental factors or 
alternatives that may be invented. While the environment may condition regimes, it does not eliminate the 
space of state action in creating regimes.  
As a result the environment plays a logically lesser role in defining state behavior than the human 
beings that make up states since it is their inventions that become regimes. As Wendt pointed, anarchy is 
what states make of it. Conflating a system of regimes with the environment, as the concept of an 
anarchical system does, hides the question of why states would create such norms and adhere to them 
(Alker 1996). And this question is important because it turns over its head the whole idea that systems 
determine the behavior of states. It does, but only in the sense that if you want to be in the system (or have 
no choice because others have made you part of it), you have to play by the rules. But the system itself is 
a creation of states in reaction to their environment, a creation most of the times chosen over other 
alternatives.  This is at the center of Braumoeller’s concept of reciprocity (2012). 
Furthermore, the idea of the system as a set of regimes that guide participant behavior raises 
questions about the idea that a characterization of a system can be reduced to just some of those regimes 
and norms. Systems are not exclusively built for enmity, rivalry, or friendship as Wendt claims (1999). 
On the contrary a system has regimes that guide all of these relationships. Consequently, isolating just 
one set of regimes and declaring them as the system is a failure to see that international relations are a 
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multifaceted subject. It also hides the connection between the creation of one set of regimes and norms, 
say those guiding enmity relations, and others, those guiding the transformation from enemy to friend. 
Boundaries exist in that specific regimes address specific issues and one will want to focus on 
those regimes when looking on those regimes, but it would be wrong to conflate the part with the whole. 
What is important is too make sure that regimes out-side the specific focus of a study do not play a role in 
the effect of the issue-specific regimes. 
Focusing on trying to find the general character of a system without focusing on regimes is not 
going to be fruitful. A system’s character, the general patterns of behavior exhibited by its members over 
a long period, is not the result of the ideas states hold about the system but of the regimes states, usually 
with those richer in capabilities in the forefront, decide are viable as useful tools to resolve issues. It is not 
the result of random chance but of conscious effort on the part of states to create regimes and norms that 
foster various behaviors they think facilitate a happy resolution of issues.  
Consequently if we are seeking to answer the question of how a system conditions the behavior of 
states in resolving issues, the question we want to ask is what are the regimes and norms of the system for 
guiding said behavior. What we should look at is what kind of behavior does the combination of regimes 
about a set of issues foster among states. When focusing on the use of military force, regimes can be war-
inducing and peace-inducing. The same system may have combinations present of both types of regimes 
and only a careful analysis of the regimes and the norms of a system will tell us what behaviors will 
predominate.  
WAR-INDUCING AND PEACE-INDUCING REGIMES IN SYSTEMS 
 
Instead of characterizing international political systems as anarchic, post-sovereignty, Hobbesian, 
Lockean, or Kantian, it may be more fruitful to admit that the regimes and norms of a system can serve 
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different and indeed contradictory purposes. Rather than being able to nail down the “character” of a 
system, scholars and analysts may be better served by looking at how various regimes foster or mitigate 
specific behaviors in the social interaction of states.  
When it comes to the question of interstate warfare the regimes that make up a system can foster 
warfare, or mitigate the occurrence of warfare among states. Regimes are not just meaningless rituals. 
Instead they are the accumulated repository of the experience of sustained social interaction by a number 
of states and constitute the corpus of solutions to past problems (Randle 1987). Regimes permit states to 
decrease the problems associated with private information (Fearon 1995, 1998; Levontoglu & Tarar 
2008). Certain regimes and norms are tied to certain goals and when a state enacts an activity guided by 
that regime or norm, or prescribed by that regime or norm it sheds some light on its goal. For example, if 
a state exits the non-proliferation regime it provides a signal that it has goals concerning nuclear 
proliferation that are not in accordance with the pacific character of the regime.  
Regimes may provide some protection to states from the negative consequences of an action 
when the action is guided by such a regime or norm. Alternatively, they may entail severe consequences 
if the action contravenes the norm. For example, 18th century states that entered war as auxiliaries of 
belligerents had a measure of guarantee against any territorial claims against them in the case of defeat. 
On the other hand the ability of the UN to coordinate sanctions against a state violating the injunction 
against aggressive war, as happened with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991, has made some states very 
leery of engaging in brazen aggression, instead preferring the use of military intensity at a lower level or 
when the political situation is murky, as is the case of Turkey’s intervention against Kurdish insurgents in 
northern Iraq.  
To understand the role norms and regimes play in fostering the behaviors of states, we need only 
consider the difficulty states have in innovating new regimes and norms. Except if the innovative action is 
in the form of a very clear signal, or supported by very influential or powerful states, the possible reaction 
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of states to this “radical” activity will be to try and interpret it according to system norms, which in turn 
will lead to a break of communication. This is partly the reason why the failed innovators will in time 
give up their radical scheme, like the French National Assembly did with the “Liberation of Nations” law, 
and the USSR did with its “proletarian revolution export” policy in the pre-Stalin era.  
Multiple regimes can also provide states with multiple options for addressing issues (Raymond 
2000). This permits a more flexible management of interstate issues that can lead to the avoidance of the 
use of force. Consider the options two states have for resolving territorial issues in the 21st century. They 
could use the regimes of military coercion, engaging in military threats and actions under the level of war. 
They could go to war. They could make public appeals to the principles of national independence, 
territorial sovereignty, or other principles. They could go to court, ask for UN assistance, work through a 
local organization to resolve the issue, or create an international guaranteed regime for managing the 
territory (like the Aland Islands). Indeed they could do all of these or a mix of these. Compare this to the 
options that states had in the 18th century for resolving territorial issues. They could attempt a swap of 
territory via diplomatic means, they could attempt to use military action to force another state to 
compensate one of the two sides for giving up its claims to territory, or they could fight each other. 
Compared to the rich tapestry of options and alternatives that states have today, the 18th century looks 
poor and dependent on force.  
If we focus on the question of war, what would a system that is predominantly war-inducing, a 
system where most regimes exist to facilitate the use of force, look like? A war-inducing system would be 
characterized by two elements, norms and regimes that facilitate war and an absence of true alternatives 
to war. If we take the rationalist explanation for war these norms and regimes would primarily decrease 
the costs of war for the participants (Jervis 1988; Fearon 1995,1998; Powell 2006). This can be done 
either by limiting the costs of the actual fighting, or limiting the costs that can be incurred by defeat. The 
norms and regimes could also create an environment that fosters misperception about the capability and 
motivation of the combatants and possible joiners, which can make it hard for states to successfully signal 
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resolve without the use of force, or interpret those signals in a fruitful way. It also makes it harder to 
successfully use battles to signal the balance of capabilities once in war since there is the possibility of 
future external intervention, creating pressures for escalation and diffusion. Both would increase 
information problems.  
Have such norms and regimes existed?  In the 18th century the layered war regime of the period 
provided multiple ways for a state to participate in war of which only belligerent status brought major 
negative consequences in the case of defeat. States could participate as auxiliaries of belligerents, 
marching their armies to war in the name of allies, but being spared of the de jure war status, and the 
consequent loss of trade or diplomatic relations with opponents. The only constraint was not attacking the 
enemy on their own or closing their ports and trade to it. More importantly, auxiliaries avoided territorial 
demands from victors, and could expect to have some of the costs of the war defrayed. The United 
Kingdom and France in the early phases of the War of Austrian Succession fought as auxiliaries of 
Hanover and Bavaria.  
States could also provide subsidies and “lend” military forces to a belligerent without risking 
entry into that belligerent’s war. Denmark in the late 17th and early 18th century was an exemplar of this 
“lending” of whole regiments. In the 18th and 19th century the rebus sic stantibus legal norm created a 
fluid alliance system, that always provided a possibility for a losing power to recoup losses by a rapid 
change in alliances (Vayrnynen 1983). The most celebrated example of this is the defection of Russia 
from the anti-Prussian camp in the Seven Years War to the Prussian camp when Peter III became tsar, 
which saved Frederick the Great from defeat. The rulers of Piedmont/Sardinia became something of 
experts in this rapid change of alliances.16 
Norms and regimes can fail to provide “true” alternatives to war and violence.  According to the 
territorial steps to war, one of the main factors that foster war is the lack of norms and regimes that 
                                                          
16 This is the legal norm that a treaty can be considered void if the context under which it was created changed. The 
opposite is pacta sum servanda, which means that the written word stands.  
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provide states with alternatives to war for managing territorial disputes (Vasquez 1993; Hensel 2001; 
Senese and Vasquez 2008; Hensel et al 2009). Lacking such alternatives, states become mired in the 
norms and regimes of war, like alliances, crisis initiation, and ultimately war itself. A system may seem to 
have alternatives but many times careful analysis shows them to be false hopes or abettors of war.  
Consider one of the main supposed alternatives to war for the resolution of territorial disputes in 
the 18th century; the compensation regime.  The idea was that a territorial dispute would be resolved by 
swapping the rights and stakes of one of the disputants for rights and stakes in another area, many times 
over territory of other states. At first glance this seems as a good alternative to war. However, the swaps 
many times were the result of militarized disputes between the competing states (the First Partition of 
Poland) and would require military pressure applied to the state whose territory would be used in the 
swap (Venice, and Poland were such victims).  
Even more dangerous was the way territorial compensation regimes would link issues, making 
impossible an issue by issue diplomatic resolution (Schroeder 1994; Lohmann 1997). This was the result 
of third parties demanding compensation for tolerating the initial bilateral compensations agreement. 
Consequently, from beyond just having to resolve their own issue the powers seeking a solution on the 
compensation regime found themselves embroiled in the new issues created by the demand of third 
parties for offering in order to tolerate their compensation. Such issue linkages fed alliances and 
ultimately interstate war. An example of this is the Crimean war in the 19th century when French threats 
to seek compensation in Belgium for Russian gains in the Near East partly led to the British attitude that 
would lead to war. Indeed it is interesting to note that the retreat of the Congress system in the later 
1850s, and the wars of the mid and later 19th century were accompanied by repeated attempts, primarily 
by Napoleon III, of states to revive the compensation regime.    
Equally damaging was the lack of norms supporting mediation, legal adjudication, fact-finding, 
and other non-forceful approaches to dispute resolution. That instances of such activity existed is without 
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a doubt, for example the Spanish-French resolution of the Andorra question. But it never succeeded in 
becoming a regime. Mediators were many times either weak state actors (the Papal State), or non-state 
actors (the Reich) which had little leverage with the disputing parties. Third party intervention to promote 
the peaceful resolution of a dispute by powerful allies would be more successful but invariably created 
demands for compensation, as the case of French involvement in Anglo-Spanish conflicts in the 18th 
century, and during the peace of Amiens shows. There were no international legal bodies to resolve issues 
submitted to them, and private arbitration attempts were never expanded beyond the management of the 
spoils of naval warfare.  
The above discussion should give a good understanding of what regimes would populate a war-
inducing system. What about a peace inducing system? A peace-inducing system will have norms and 
regimes that raise the cost of war or provide alternatives to war as a way to manage issues. If we take the 
rationalist explanation for war, peace inducing regimes would decrease the shadow of the future, reveal 
private information, and increase the cost of war.  
Some of these regimes are unique to the 20th century and not necessarily of decisive effect. An 
example of this is the 20th century law of war, and war crime regime. By conceptualizing clearly what acts 
in war contravene the regime, and establishing a regime to prosecute those who break the acts, the cost of 
war is increased. While only defeated parties tend to be prosecuted under the regime one must keep in 
mind that only the most lopsided of conflicts provide insurance to political leaders against prosecution. 
That leaders may consider this as important is indicated by the strenuous attempts of states to not present 
themselves as aggressors even in cases were the leadership enjoys domestic support for an aggressive 
war, for example the initiation of Attila B during the Cyprus crisis by the Turkish state.  
More effective is the dominance of the pacta sum servanda regime in the alliance systems.  In the 
Cold War period its dominance decreased the “fog of war” that was created in the 18th century by the 
possibility of rapid alliance changes (Kegley & Raymond 1982; Vayrynen 1983; Leeds & Anac 2005). 
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Weaker disputants wishing to engage in war inducing behavior on the assumption that opposing alliances 
will face defections have been let down in the 19th and 20th century. One could say that this was because 
smaller states have a smaller impact in the great scheme of things, but first we must remember that 
political elites did not think that way (ergo the vast expenditure of human lives and resources in Vietnam 
and Afghanistan during the Cold War), and second the defectors of the 18th century, beyond Russia’s 
case, were not always large powers. Consequently one would have to answer the question of why the 
alliances post-1815 were tighter? There was no miracle of Brandenburg for Adolph Hitler in 1945 as there 
was for Frederick the Great in 1762.  
Another major difference was the greater respect afforded to neutrality in the 19th century 
compared to the 18th century. The wars between 1816 and1914 saw fewer of the brazen violations of 
neutrality that the 18th century saw. Britain violated Danish, Dutch, Russian, Neapolitan, and Prussian 
neutrality during the War of American Independence and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. 
Prussia violated Polish and Saxon neutrality in the Seven Years War. Russia violated Venetian neutrality 
in the second Russo-Turkish war of Catherine the Great. France and Prussia violated multiple neutrality 
declarations during the Napoleonic Wars. In contrast the 19th century has little to show in the case of 
brazen neutrality violations. And if one excludes the two World Wars, neutrality has generally been 
respected in the 20th century.  Somewhere in the period the regime of non-belligerent neutrality became 
part and parcel of state social interaction.  The replacement of the layered belligerent regime of the 18th 
century with the belligerent-neutral regime of the 19th and 20th century forced states to consider very 
carefully if they would join into a war since they could not be considered immune from the consequences 
of defeat.  
If we look at the territorial steps to war as a guide to why war happens, regimes and norms can 
provide alternatives to war by fostering peace and permitting states to escape the path to war. The war 
inducing diplomatic system of the 18th century centered on the compensation regime has been replaced in 
the 19th and 20th century with peaceful alternatives. Such regimes are adjudication, international law, and 
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third party mediation by both states and intergovernmental organizations (Hensel & Brochman2009; 
Hansen et al 2008; Mitchell 2002; Hensel 2001; Mattli 2001; Zacher 2001; Russet et al 1998). None of 
these alternatives required the use of military force to coerce third parties to provide the territory that 
would be swapped for peace, as was the norm in the 18th century. Also, the conflict management and 
conflict resolution regimes of the modern international political system excel in disentangling issues and 
thus decreasing the chance of multilateral wars. 
Peace inducing and war inducing regimes can coexist in a system. Nevertheless, a system could 
have more regimes of one type rather than the other or key regimes that make it more likely to lead states 
to prefer one set over the other. The creation of new regimes of one type or the other, the innovation of 
key regimes, or the obsolescence of old regimes can lead to the transformation of the international 
political system from a predominantly war-inducing to peace-inducing system or the reverse. We shall 
now discuss the idea of transformation. 
TRANSFORMATIONS 
 
Three broad concepts of transformation can be delineated in the thinking of scholars of 
international relations. First, is the idea that the system transforms when the capability distribution 
between states, especially among the more powerful states, changes. This concept has taken its clearest 
form in the idea that the number of the major powers in the system corresponds to different behavior by 
states, most forcefully advocated by structural realists (Waltz 1979; Wohlforth 1999, 2012; Monteiro 
2011/2012; Layne 2012). Thus the unipolar (one dominant power), bipolar (two powers) and multipolar 
(many powers) systems are different from each other with different paths to war, and radically different 
challenges to peace. For other realists the only real transformation of the system is one from an anarchical 
system (one of many sovereign states) to a hierarchical system (one of a dominant sovereign polity) 
(Mearsheimer 1994/1995, 2003; Gray 1999).  
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Both of these are not useful as concepts of transformation. The change in the number of major 
powers may have an impact on some paths to war and peace but it does not necessarily mean that the 
behavior of states will change. The fact that war outcomes may change depending on polarity is not the 
same as a change in the incidence of war, though as I explain later destructive wars may help bring about 
the change in ideas and behaviors by states that may lead to peace-inducing regimes. Only if the new 
power structure leads to new behaviors concerning the onset of the use of military force can we speak of a 
transformation from a war-inducing system to peace-inducing system (Gilpin 1981; Braumoeller 2012). 
That such a change will be fostered by the new powers is not predetermined, but a question of choice. 
They may be content with the old rules of the system and just make some adjustment rather than a 
wholesale transformation.  Only through careful study of the behaviors the new powers foster and 
sanction can one really say if a transformation is happening or not.  
To put it in clear terms, whether unipolarity, bipolarity or multipolarity constitute different 
systems is an empirical, not theoretical question based on the behavior of states which can be better 
ascertained by looking at regimes states created to guide their social interaction. Polarity transformation 
may transform the system if it leads to new regimes that indicate a change in the behavior of states. 
The anarchy to hierarchy idea has been masterfully attacked by Ashley and Alker in the past and 
there is little that the author needs to add (Ashley 1983, 1984; Alker 1996). The problem of this concept is 
its paucity. It is correct as far as it focuses on the general principles that guide state interaction, anarchy or 
hierarchy, but it is too abstract to be useful for explaining international relations. Anarchy and hierarchy 
encompass a net of regimes that in different configurations may induce quite different behaviors by states 
or polities that share the same overarching principle of social organization. One must unpack what 
anarchy or hierarchy means each time in order to be able to locate real transformation. 
In the previous chapter I discussed Randle’s idea that a system transforms when the issues at 
stake around which state behavior revolves change. As noted before, this is not necessary the case. As 
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long as old regimes can accommodate new issues, states do not need to create new regimes to guide novel 
behavior, or to address novel issues. Since I am interested in the behavior of states, a change in issues will 
only bring a behavioral change if new behaviors are exhibited in pursuit of this issue, and those behaviors 
become institutionalized in regimes.  A transformation can happen when new regimes are added to pre-
existing ones, or with the wholesale replacement of old regimes by new. Both cases are transformations 
but of different magnitude. A cornucopia of choices may transform behavior as much as a change in the 
nature of a narrow set of choices.  
A soft transformation happens when a set of new regimes are added to the corpus of existing 
regimes without replacing them. In this case all that happens is that states create new regimes to 
accommodate novel behavior, but these are seen as alternatives, and not replacements for older regimes. 
Since older regimes are not replaced this type of transformation should be easy and might just require a 
sufficient number of states taking up the behavior for it to become an established one. States invested in 
the older regimes have nothing to lose and are probably not going to resist a change. An example of this is 
the addition of third party arbitration as a conflict management regime to bilateral bargaining in the 19th 
century. For example the 1890s Treaty between Chile and Argentina over their territorial dispute included 
a clause for taking any issue to arbitration by the British Crown or the US President. Both regimes coexist 
without one making the other obsolete.   
The fact that this is “soft” should not blind the reader to thinking the status quo has remained the 
same. Instead while elements of the status quo are left alone, and the perception may be that the status 
quo did not change, the new regimes may gradually shift behavior. An example of this is the creation of 
the Red Cross and its impact on the regime of war. The Red Cross was tolerated by states only because 
they saw it as not altering the status quo. It was not seen as changing war, or a radical change. Yet by 
1870 the existence of the Red Cross had radically altered belligerent behavior forcing armies to take 
logistical measures to take care of prisoners of war.  
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A hard transformation happens when the set of new regimes are put forward as explicit 
replacements of old regimes. In this case the new behavior is explicitly radical and opposed to older 
modes of behavior, and thus against established regimes. Because the new regimes are proposed in 
opposition and as replacements, rather than as alternatives of old regimes, they are bound to become 
issues of conflict between radical and traditionalist states. It must always be kept in mind that norms and 
regimes rise because they provide a functional solution to an issue that had increasingly under-performing 
past solutions. Even if the issue is resolved and the regimes survive as relics, states are notoriously 
resistant to the loss of once useful regimes. Consequently, hard transformations require the support of 
powerful states that can overcome resistance and impose the new regimes. An example of a hard 
transformation was the replacement of the 19th century norm of use of military force to coerce states to 
repay defaulted loans by adjudication in the 20th century (Finnemore 1996).  
Consequently we can see that a war-inducing system can become peace-inducing and the reverse 
either by the accumulation of many soft transformations, or by powerful hard transformations. The 
transformation which this project is centered on, that brought about by the regime of major power 
managerial coordination, was a case of hard transformation.  The regime replaced a number of preexisting 
regimes, even as it left others alone. Exactly because it was a hard transformation, it was also an act that 
required major power coordination and a dominant preference for change. I shall now look more closely 
at what this regime entailed, what it replaced and why it is peace inducing. 
 MAJOR POWER MANAGERIAL COORDINATION 
 
In this section I will discuss major power managerial coordination, what it is and what it does to 
make international relations more pacific. Before that I am going to explaining why I have used the word 
coordination instead of cooperation in this text.   
60 
 
Most of the researchers focusing on the possible pacific effects of major power behavior use the 
term cooperation to denote behavior that is pacific. I think that using that term may be premature and 
raises the specter of tautology. Cooperation usually is the upper level result of a lower level process in 
which parties try to align their preferences and coordinate their actions. Cooperation is the result of 
successful coordination, not the process itself. Cooperation entails that the coordination of parties has 
reached such a level that some very serious issues of trust and confidence have been resolved. To put it 
simply the word cooperation entails a level of trust and confidence that already makes conflict extremely 
unlikely. 
Coordination on the other hand indicates a process that may or may not lead to cooperation. The 
attempt by parties to align preferences and make their activity mutually acceptable does no guarantee a 
cooperative result. One needs not look further than the failure of the negotiations during the Crimean 
Crisis before the Crimean War or the July Crisis before World War 1, and the current worsening situation 
in East Asian waters. However if cooperation is to be had, there must first be coordination. Essentially, I 
am making the case that attempts by the major powers to coordinate on a managerial basis should have a 
pacific effect on international relations, even if that coordination does not always lead to cooperation. 
Cooperation is the result of coordination, not the same act. It is a mistake to look at major power 
cooperation as cause of peace because major power cooperation already entails that the powers are in a 
condition of peace. Coordination because it can fail is a much more interesting concept, and much more 
fruitful as a possible correlate of peace. This is why I use the term coordination. 
This is a different use of the words than the one in the formal theory literature. In most formal 
theory literature coordination and cooperation are not necessarily tied. Coordination is a process for 
revealing intentions, while cooperation is a process for creating surplus. There are multiple processes or 
“games” that can lead to cooperation (for an example of this discussion see Lisa L. Martin, 1992). Indeed 
coordination need not be of a form that has the goal of helping players reach an agreement. The idea of 
adversarial or antagonistic coordination in this dissertation does reflect that use of the word.  But the 
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connection between coordination and cooperation in the form of a process towards a possible goal diverts 
from the use of the concepts and terms in formal theory.   
What does major power coordination look like? The regime of major power managerial 
coordination entails a certain type of behavior by major powers. This behavior is made up of the elements 
of consultation, multilateralism, and the avoidance of antagonistic coordination by major powers. The 
primary goal of the regime is to help the major powers avoid major power war. However, because major 
powers can end up in war between themselves due to intervention in minor power conflicts, the regime 
also aims to manage minor power conflicts with the goal of either pacifying them or isolating them from 
the major powers, and thus inhibiting a diffusion of the conflict. This does mean that a coordination 
regime will not succeed in producing cooperation and reducing conflict when some of the major powers 
are primarily driven by goals that threaten the existence or security of other major powers. In realist terms 
it requires at least the majority of major powers to prefer the “status quo”, or not to prefer military force 
as a tool for bringing change to the status quo (Glaser 1994/5).17 Later I provide a story of how the 
majority of major powers can prefer the “status quo” due to recent historical events. This in turn gives 
coordination for cooperation a chance to work.  
Consultation is the effort of the major powers to reveal private information to each other not 
through costly military signaling, but by regular diplomatic interaction and exchange of ideas. The idea of 
consultation is that major powers expect to and regularly consult with each other in order to reveal private 
information and understand each other’s preferences on an issue. The regular character of consultation 
decreases the incentives for lying, as it can adversely affect future consultation or lead to termination of 
the process. The expectation of consultation forces major powers to divulge something if they value 
consultation and brands a refusal to partake into it as a signal of rogue preferences. An example of a 
consultation was the Congress of Vienna system. 
                                                          
17 A coordination system will not succeed in producing cooperation for long between major powers whose primary 
goal is to harm other major powers. Franco-German and Austro-Russian enmity undermined the success of the 
considerable coordination attempts during the Bismarckian era of European politics.  
62 
 
Because private information can feed escalation, major powers that engage in consultation will 
have an incentive to stick to it. It is not necessary that major powers tell all if even the revelation of some 
private information changes the marginal possibility of war. A tit for tat in consultation can be the basis 
for a tit for tat in pacific conflict management (Axelrod 1984). One attractive element of a consultation 
regime is that because major powers are smaller in number than the total number of states it is easier for 
them to initiate such a regime even in an international environment that is adverse to coordination.  As 
Barry Steiner found major powers try to carefully manage their interactions even if they know any 
agreement is temporary (1993:193) 
Regularized consultation is part of a major power managerial coordination regime, and we should 
expect it to be the most common form of major power coordination. Nonetheless, there is a limit to how 
pacific a system can become if major powers still prefer to act unilaterally. Unilateralism still leaves an 
opening for misunderstanding, betrayal, and un-anticipated action. Furthermore, the pacific management 
of linked issues is hard by unilateral means due to the number of actors involved. Escalation is still a 
possible result, especially if events move faster than a consultation regime can keep up with, since it is 
easier for minor and major powers to take unilateral action than to coordinate to an agreed plan for the 
management of the issue. This was the case with the unilateral actions of the three major powers caught in 
the Crimean Crisis and the Vienna System. While the powers talked and then acted, after a point the 
action-reaction “game” became so rapid that diplomacy could not catch up.  
A preference for multilateralism is the second element of major power managerial coordination 
and the result of consultation. This preference entails that major powers coordinate their activity to 
resolve issues in a way that avoids the possibility of major power military conflict. It does not necessarily 
mean that all powers act at the same time, but that all powers act according to an agreed plan and avoid 
any abrupt unilateral change to the plan. Such an element is required for the launching of multilateral 
interventions in order to manage outstanding issue of international politics. James Richardson noted in his 
comparative case study of crisis diplomacy that whenever the major European states coordinated their 
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policy, war was almost always averted (1994:228-230). An example of major power multilateralism was 
the Quadruple Alliance of 1818 to 1822.  
It should be noted that the use of the term here is different from the usual use of the term in 
international relations which refers to a preference for using multilateral institutions to resolve issues. In a 
sense my use is in the spirit of that concept, as I use the term for the element of managerial coordination 
that create the institutions that have a specific role in engaging in multilateral activity. Managerial 
alliances like the quadruple alliance have a specific mulitatleral activity agenda, while consultation 
regimes like the Congress System are more targeted towards helping the major powers decide how to deal 
with an issue. This might be through a multilateral institution like the Quadruple alliance, or it may be 
through a decision to tolerate unilateral activity, as was the case with Austrian intervention in Naples in 
the 1820s. This is why I co-opted the term for this concept, so that I differentiate with technically 
multilateral institutions that are not though created to engage in multilateral activity.   
The logical result of a strong consultation and multilateralism regime is the prescription of 
antagonistic unilateral action by states and especially of major power antagonistic coordination.18 Because 
coordination is not cooperation the coexistence of coordination activity that seeks to result in managerial 
cooperation with coordination activity that seeks to make gains in antagonism can be toxic. The pacific 
gains towards cooperation by consultation and multilateralism are undermined by the fear of a subset of 
major powers, or combinations of major powers and minor powers engaging in unilateral activity. While 
such a possibility always exists the evident coordination of states around antagonistic lines negates any 
gains from managerial coordination. As a result major powers that are investing in multilateralism and 
consultation have an incentive, in order to not see their investments nullified, to put restrictions on the 
overt expression of antagonism.  
                                                          
18 The term “unilateral” is used here in the sense of an action by one or more states that is done against the norms of 
consultation and multilateralism, and not necessarily is the sense of an action by one state.  
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This may take the form of avoiding adversarial alliances, in which major powers ally to target 
other major powers or the avoidance of other types of unilateral behavior by major powers. A managerial 
coordination system cannot function without this element because the possibility of states taking 
antagonistic unilateral action that could upturn an ongoing multilateral project, or undermine the results of 
that project may negatively affect the willingness of major powers to engage in a multilateral project. An 
example of the major powers strenuously trying to present a unified front and discourage unilateral 
activity was during the confrontations with Greece and the Ottoman Empire over the Cretan issue in the 
1880-1900 period. 
How bad can antagonistic unilateralism undermine the gains from consultation and 
multilateralism? Antagonistic unilateralism fosters brinkmanship in crises, the pursuit of fait accompli, 
and diminishes bargaining ranges making escalation and military conflict the dominant strategy available. 
For other disputes, major powers acting unilaterally can support in diplomatic or material terms the 
escalation of state behavior to military conflict in order to overpower an opponent rather than to 
compromise. In turn those opponents will have to seek out major power patrons to counter their worse 
situation. The presence of major power allies in a dispute is associated with its escalation to war. 
Additionally, domestic groups that are opposed to the pacific resolutions of disputes can use major power 
interveners to upset any peace process. Moreover, the shadow of possible unilateral major power 
intervention can make states unwilling to commit to a serious peace process due to uncertainty about its 
stability in the face of third party spoilage.  
Finally, major powers in disputes with each other can use their surplus military capability in order 
to bring minor power allies into the dispute leading to dispute clusters prone to igniting multilateral wars. 
For any system to be peace inducing, unilateralism must be restrained. An example of the negative 
consequences of rampant antagonistic unilateralism is the violent resolution of the Balkan issues in the 
1900-1912 period, compared to the more pacific resolution of the Franco-Belgian issues of the 1830s and 
1840s when the major powers were more cooperative. 
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HOW DOES MANAGERIAL COORDINATION FOSTER PEACE? 
 
The consultative and multilateral character of major power managerial coordination provides 
incentives for the pacific resolution of symmetrical, and asymmetrical state dyad disputes. It also 
mitigates the negative effects of antagonistic unilateralism, acting as a restraint. The end result is the 
pacification of international relations by two mechanisms I have hinted at but have not explicitly named. 
These are denial and discouragement. 
 Denial involves the major powers refusing to provide each other or minor powers the diplomatic 
and material support that could make military conflict a viable policy. This can range from acts as simple 
as refusing to veto a Security Council decision inimical to the state in question, to a refusal to provide 
military assistance to an ally that wishes to go to war as France did twice in the 1770s with Spain during 
Anglo-Spanish disputes. For most states, engaging in interstate military conflict is a costly and risky 
endeavor and the unwillingness of a major power patron to assist may make it prohibitive. A managerial 
coordination system that has a pacific effect should be associated with a decrease in the support of major 
powers for unilateral major power and minor power behavior.  
Discouragement works in different way. Discouragement entails the major powers creating an 
environment where states engaging in unilateral activity can expect to be censured or punished for that 
activity. The avoidance by major powers of antagonistic coordination and their commitment to 
managerial coordination may discourage states from unilateral activity just because states may want to 
avoid a policy avoided by system leaders. More importantly there are many policies that major powers 
engaged in managerial coordination can take that will discourage unilateral activity from other states. At 
the more extreme level of activity, major powers could initiate a managerial intervention in which they 
collectively engage in military action to stop a state from initiating a military conflict or to force it to 
terminate it. This was the fate of Iraq’s attempt in 1997 to end the UN nuclear weapons inspection system, 
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when the UN SC authorized US-UK military treats to Iraq to comply.  Such interventions may discourage 
bystanders from replicating the behavior that brought about the major power activity due to fear of 
receiving the same treatment.  
Another option the major powers have is that of intervening to negate the consequences of a 
victory from a unilateral action. In this case the major powers intervene after the fact in order to deny the 
offending power the fruits of its military activity. This discourages military activity because even if a state 
wins there is no guarantee the victory will bring in the benefits the state thought when it embarked on 
military conflict. Such cases are the intervention of the major powers after the 1897 Ottoman victory over 
Greece, the Triple Intervention after the 1895 Japanese victory over the Qin Chinese Empire, and of 
course the Kuwait Gulf War. Lastly, major powers can guarantee peace agreements and discourage 
attempts to revise them unilaterally. That makes peace agreements more robust, as the dissatisfied side 
may be less willing to break them.  
Let us now consider how major power managerial coordination fosters peace in the context of the 
rationalist explanation of war, and the territorial steps to war. As far as the rationalist explanation for war, 
the dampening of third party spoilage due to major power intervention, or the possibility of major power 
intervention helps increase the shadow of the future for bargains between disputants. It also reduces the 
commitment problem created by the possibility of external influences changing the facts on the ground 
that helped a bargain being reached. This means that the parties of a bargain can be sure that any bargain 
will be observed for a significant amount of time. That said, major power intervention is not the only way 
to change those facts, as many other states can find the resources to assist disputants (for example Iran 
and Saudi Arabia in Syria,).  
Furthermore, the expectation that a bargain will be robust in the future may make it harder for the 
disputants to reach it as this creates incentives to escalate their activity in trying to force a bargain on their 
opponent (Axelrod 1984; Fearon 1998; Powell 2006). Because they expect the status-quo reflected in any 
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bargain to last for a significant period of time due to the protection of the major powers, the disputants 
have a powerful incentive to refuse to bragian until they are sure that the facts on the ground are as close 
to their ideal position as possible. This creates a contradictory effect in which managerial coordination 
assured the robustness of peace agreements, but makes it harder to reach them.  
 In response to this I argue that the conflict-dampening activity of the coordinating major powers 
is sufficiently strong to overcome the contradiction. Even if it becomes harder for the minor powers to 
reach a bargain due to the long shadow of the future, the major powers when engaged in managerial 
coordination will not permit them to use force, out of fear that this may spread to their own interactions 
and increase the possibility of major power war.  
The major power managerial coordination regime mitigates these two possibilities as follows. 
Spoilage by third party minor powers is rendered a dangerous policy by the clear communication of major 
power preferences through participation in a managerial coordination regime. In pursuit of the stability of 
the major power managerial regime the major powers will actively promote its elements of 
multilateralism, consultation, and avoidance of antagonistic action towards minor states. This is because 
they wish to minimize the possibility that minor state action may lead to a major power dispute. This can 
happen as the action of a minor power ally or client of a major power may force another major power’s 
ally to intervene, thus linking the two major powers in a conflict of which they were not initial or even 
direct participants. Consequently the major powers will be adverse to permitting minor powers to follow 
the opportunistic behavior prescribed by the regime.  
A long shadow of the future creates escalatory pressures due to the fact that states can expect that 
any result of their bargaining will be hard to change due to major power managerial activity. This 
increases their willingness to fight now in order to increase their gains in any subsequent bargain. These 
escalatory pressures are moderated by the limited capabilities minor powers have in persecuting 
increasingly escalatory policies or war without major power support or third party support, which is 
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restrained by managerial coordination.  While it is true that minor states can provide material, funds, and 
political support to disputants, just like major powers can, if the disputants fear a major power 
intervention the support of such minor powers if dwarfed by the far superior capabilities of the major 
powers.  
Weaker disputants also have an incentive to request major power managerial intervention in order 
to gain a bargain that will not be solely determined by the distribution of military capability between the 
two disputing states. This may lead them to try and comply with the behaviors required by the major 
power managerial regime in order to paint themselves as “exemplary” system members facing pariahs. 
Indeed even the stronger side has an incentive to try and gain a moderate bargain rather than pursue 
escalation with the goal of imposing a maximalist resolution. This is because an escalatory pattern of 
activity may bring the major powers into managing the conflict in order to avoid diffusion to neighboring 
states or the possibility of unilateral major power intervention. In this case any result will probably reflect 
more major power interests rather than disputant interests.  
From the view of the territorial steps to war, major power managerial coordination fosters peace 
by providing a possible credible alternative to war for managing and resolving a dispute in the form of 
major power coordinated mediation.19 The alternative is credible because the cooperative character of the 
mediation mitigates the possibility of future unilateral action by major powers to upend a pacific 
agreement. Also, because their interests were taken into consideration in the management of the issue due 
to the consultation element the incentive for major power unilateral intervention is mitigated. It is also 
credible because any groups opposed to the management or settlement must avoid overt and radical 
challenges to the solution brokered by the united major powers. Alternatively they can wait for the united 
                                                          
19 The steps to war is conceptual model for explain war developed by John Vasquez and Paul Senese. The main 
components are issues and policies and the argument is that states do not go to war from peace immediately but are 
drawn to war as specific military policies are used to resolve specific issues that tend to be harder to resolve 
pacifically. It is a multi-causal concept of the causes of war. (Senese and Vasquez 2008).  
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major power front to break, a process that may take time adding to the longevity of an agreement and 
reinforcing its “stickiness”.  
Major power managerial coordination also undermines two points on the steps to war due to the 
denial mechanism, arms races and adversarial alliances (Singer and Small 1966; Siverson and King 1980; 
Leeds 2005; Senese and Vasquez 2008; Wallace 1982; Diehl 1983; Sample 1997, 1998; Diehl and 
Crescenzki 1998; Glaser 2004; Rider et al 2011). Arms races are undermined because it is harder for 
minor states to engage in them without outside financial support which is less likely in a major power 
managerial coordination regime for the reasons explained in the part referring to the rationalist 
explanations of war. Their link to conflict is also undermined because escalatory measures in reaction to 
arms races are less likely to be taken due to the threat of major power managerial intervention. Arms 
races that get detached from the possibility of war are not as dangerous.  
Discussing alliances, the consultation, multilateralism, and avoidance of antagonistic coordination 
elements of the regime undermine unilateral minor power and major power-minor power alliances. As 
long as the major powers are signaling their membership in the regime by avoiding antagonistic 
coordination, minor power-minor power alliances are not worth as much because of their inability to 
match the capabilities of the united major powers. The danger that alliances pose for dragging major 
powers into minor power conflicts is mitigated by the consultation element of the regime. This permits 
major powers to pinpoint dangerous situations and coordinate to resolve an issue without increasing the 
danger of their allies’ conflicts diffusing to them.  
THE INDIRECT EFFECTS 
 
The discussion above concerned the direct ways in which the regime of major power managerial 
coordination fosters a peace-inducing environment. Realist authors would retort that this only happens as 
long as the major powers are invested in the regime and that a) they do not have strong incentives to do 
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so, and b) once they break the regime the system will become war-inducing. The counterargument to this 
proposition is twofold. I will explain why major powers create and invest in such a regime in the next 
section. Because of why it is created it is not as easy as some authors would think to overthrow such a 
regime. Second, the regime has a further pacific influence in the form of other pacific regimes it fosters 
into existence. In detail, I will explain how major power managerial coordination can indirectly foster a 
peace inducing system that lasts even after the regime is broken. This is done by fostering the process of 
democratization within states that is the basis of the dyadic democratic peace, and by permitting the 
creation of intergovernmental organizations. 
The process of democratization is a complex process primarily driven by domestic variables. 
However an international system that fosters conflict may adversely affect democratization as indicated 
by the findings of Douglas Gibler on the relationship between the pacific resolution of territorial issues 
and democratization (2007). First, domestic groups that oppose democratization may seek external 
supporters against groups promoting democratization.  In a system that is conflict prone the scramble for 
allies, supporters, and for denying gains to opponents creates a ready pool of minor power and major 
power interveners who will answer such calls. They may intervene to put future allies into power, they 
may intervene to keep future opponents from gaining power, or just in order to keep a strategically 
important area in flux. Because major powers are more powerful than minor powers, domestic disputants 
seeking external support will prefer to gain major power support because of the expectation of a higher 
probability of success for the endeavor.  
History is replete with such cases of domestic groups requesting external major power support in 
their conflict with forces pushing for democratization. In the 18th century the Dutch Orangist party, 
representing conservative forces in the Dutch Republic sought external forces to support it in its conflict 
with the domestically more powerful Patriot party that sought reforms that would have made the Dutch 
political system more democratic. That search culminated in the armed intervention of Prussia against the 
Patriots after French support for the Patriots defeated a Swedish plan to intervene. Prussia, a major power, 
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ignored French war threats and destroyed the Patriot movement. In turn the Patriots would come back to 
power on the bayonets of French revolutionary troops. 
A conflict prone system also imposes its demands on the domestic organization of states. War and 
the threat of war have been found by scholars to adversely affect elements of democratization (Coser 
1956; Hutchison & Gibler 2007; Wright 2013). External dangers have led to limits to the freedom of 
expression and political organization. They have led to centralization which fosters top-down planning 
and authoritarianism. They have led to the promulgation by states of political ideologies that undermine 
tolerance of dissent among citizens.  For example, the Ottoman Empire committed most of its massacres 
during eras of external war or expectation of external war. Wars have been accompanied by various rules 
and statues in the United States that limited freedom of expression, freedom of movement, or even 
freedom of the body. The near extinction of democracy in 1930s Europe was associated with the 
increasing expectation of war due to Soviet, Italian, and German foreign policy. For example the 
overthrow of the interwar republics in the Baltic States was fueled by expectations of war.  
By fostering peace in the international system, major power managerial coordination fosters the 
process of democratization. The three elements of consultation, multilateralism, and avoidance of 
antagonistic coordination undermine the propensity of major and minor powers to intervene in support of 
the losers of a democratization process. While domestic groups may still request the mercy of a major 
power, the issue created is not one of unilateral intervention but of a managerial intervention. This is 
enacted by the major powers with the goal or resolving the issue in a way that does not lead to an 
expansion of the conflict, or major power war. Accordingly, the major powers will either strive to isolate 
the conflict, or to resolve it pacifically.  
Minor power interveners will be unwilling to intervene if they expect coordinated major power 
activity on the issue. In turn these expectations will pressure the two sides of the domestic conflict to 
moderate their demands and avoid military conflict. While this process of bargaining under the shadow of 
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termination if certain actions are taken due to major power intervention will not lead to democracy, it may 
lead to reforms that foster democratization.  
The pacification of international relations also helps avert those demands a state of war makes on 
domestic political organization that undermine elements of democratization. Centralization, limits on the 
freedom of expression and other social restrictions are harder to defend, and intolerant propaganda from 
the state finds a less receptive audience.  
It must be stressed that this fostering effect should hold even when part of the major powers in a 
managerial coordination regime are opponents of democracy, like in 19th century Europe. Even if the 
powers are adverse to the final result of democratization, it is wrong to assume that they will be adverse to 
specific elements of the democratization process. Major powers in a managerial coordination system 
wishing to avoid the diffusion risks of internationalized domestic conflict will not be adverse to specific 
reforms that avert the threat of violence. While democratic major powers will be more willing to bring 
about such reforms either due to liberal imperialism (Doyle 1983) or class interests (Narinzy 2007), one 
must not assume that non-democratic major powers will not have an interest in pacifying reforms.  If 
democratic reforms will help avert a domestic destabilization in a key country that may lead to major 
power antagonism and increase the danger of a great war, then even un-democratic major powers will 
support such reform as long as they wish to avoid a great power war.  
Reforms such a constitutionalism (limits to arbitrary rule), the creation of some representative 
institutions, and press liberalization have been pursued by authoritarian regimes faced with the danger of 
civil war or revolution. If the reforms stabilize the regime and avert the threat of war major powers 
engaged in managerial coordination may support them. What is more, major powers are seldom 
monolithic in their position towards democratic reforms.  Thanks to the the three elements of the major 
power managerial cooperation regime, major power action on this issue will regress to the mean of the 
major power preferences on this question, which means some reforms that makes democratization more 
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possible in a future date. As Paul Schroeder pointed out, the legitimist reforms proposed by Alexander I 
of Russia and championed by Britain and Austria during the Vienna system, such as constitutionalism, a 
reduction of the power of the church, and press reform, created some of the foundations for the later 
democratization of European states (1994).  
The other indirect pacific effect of major power managerial coordination is that it fosters the 
creation of intergovernmental organizations that provide alternatives to military conflict for resolving 
issues. One part of this effect are the elements of consultation and multilateralism of the major power 
managerial regime. Since the consultation element requires regular meetings and forums for consultation 
it gives an incentive for the creation of intergovernmental cooperative structures among the major powers 
to facilitate communication. The more important effect is on the creation of intergovernmental 
organizations between other states.  
The social interaction of states creates powerful incentives for the creation of regularized forums 
for cooperation and consultation. The need to overcome information asymmetries and to mitigate the 
problems created by private information creates an incentive to form intergovernmental organizations. 
Conversely, that same interaction creates roadblocks to intergovernmental organization creation.  The fear 
of being “tied” down to agreements that may limit freedom of action in the future, and distrust of the 
motives of other organization members stand as roadblocks to the creation of intergovernmental 
organizations. Nonetheless, these fears are always present in international politics and states have been 
able to overcome them in order to cooperate. States can manipulate the form and rules of 
intergovernmental institutions at inception, and later in their life to adjust to the roadblocks mentioned 
above. Yet, these roadblocks can become insurmountable if there is third party spoilage from parties 
outside the prospective members of the organization. 
Third party intervention can upend the delicate balance between road-blocks and incentives that 
permit states to agree to regularize their interaction in a permanent forum. It reinforces the fear that any 
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agreement made today will be revoked in the future, as external third parties can provide states with the 
assistance that would decrease the costs of reneging. Domestic groups opposed to the creation of the 
intergovernmental organization would be able to find patrons and supporters for undermining their state’s 
adherence to it. More importantly, third parties may be unwilling to permit the creation of viable 
alternatives to conflict. They may do this because it decreases their ability to gain influence as allies of 
regime members in the case of conflict because of the existence of an alternative to conflict. If the 
members of the inter-governmental organization can resolve their issues via the new regime what use do 
they have of external allies? They may also do this because they fear that the new organization might be 
used by their opponents in order to erode their influence and limit their policy options among member 
states. Witness the worry that the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization created among 
the US foreign policy establishment.  
Of all the third party interlopers, major powers are the most dangerous because of their superior 
resources and surplus military capability. Major powers have a higher incentive than other third parties to 
see attempts at the creation of cooperative regimes as a threat to their influence, especially if those 
attempts are headed by a rival or enemy. Major power influence in a war-prone world is based on their 
ability to assist other states in their conflicts. If states find credible alternatives to conflict, that undercuts 
their ability to influence the behavior of other states. It is no accident that many of the first regional 
attempts at intergovernmental organizations in South America had an anti-major power philosophy. More 
importantly, major powers will intervene against regional attempts to create viable alternatives to conflict 
if they see those attempts as the handiwork of their major power opponents. In a war inducing system any 
cooperative endeavor by states is seen as suspicious by major powers at a state of war, preparing for war, 
or recovering from war.  
Major power managerial coordination mitigates those incentives to intervene and fosters the 
creation of intergovernmental organizations. First of all, the regularized interaction of the major powers is 
generally safe from third party interlopers because the major powers are the most powerful states in the 
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system. There is precious little that minor powers can offer to persuade major powers to defect. Any 
defections are due to changes in the major power valuation of cooperation, not outside influences.  Major 
power coordination thus provides an example of a viable cooperative regime that is an alternative to 
conflict. Furthermore, because of the three elements of major power cooperation antagonistic third party 
intervention by a lone major power against an attempt by some states to create an intergovernmental 
organization is harder. Finally, as elements of the regime withstand the test of time and become more 
regularized the major powers may set up interstate organizations to manage specific issues of 
international relations. The time has now come to ask why would major powers create such a regime and 
remain part of it in the long run. 
WAR WARINESS AND THE DOMESTIC ORIGINS OF MAJOR POWER 
MANAGERIAL COORDINATION  
 
Major powers, like all states, engage in interstate interaction because of the quest of government 
elites to satisfy the demands of domestic groups that make policy demands on them. Some of this 
interstate activity manages the consequences of cross-border non-state interaction, like international trade. 
Other times, interstate interaction is initiated at the express demand of a domestic group, as when a 
domestic national group pressures its state to demand protection for a minority in another state, like Greek 
nationalists did for Greek governments in the 19th  and 20th century concerning the Macedonian Issue.20 
The results of this foreign policy activity can determine the stance of domestic groups towards the 
continued rule of government elites. 
When domestic groups demand foreign policy action by the state with the goal of advancing 
stakes in an issue that are adversarial to domestic groups of another state, the result of state action is an 
                                                          
20 I assume that government elites seek to satisfy the demands of domestic groups because they wish to retain their 
hold on power.  I am agnostic as to why those elites wish to do so. I am also agnostic as to who are the domestic 
groups. This is because I focus on the broad effect that responsibility to domestic groups has on causing major 
power managerial coordination. Also note that the story told also applies to foreign policy activity that is 
endogenous to the government elites.  
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international conflict (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981).21 The engagement of major powers in international 
conflict is dangerous when it comes to the pacific resolution of issues. First, because of their increased 
material capability, major powers find military coercion cheaper than pacific alternatives. This is because 
a pacific resolution of issues requires higher levels of coordination compared to military coercion.  
Antagonistic Major powers are more apt to use military force against minor power opponents that 
do not accommodate preemptively. Major powers facing major power opponents are more willing to use 
military actions to signal resolve, since they are cheap for them. They will also seek to negate stalemate 
inducing distributions of military capabilities through un-anticipated activity which feeds escalation 
dynamics by fostering paranoia or narrowing the window for a diplomatic solution, such as surprise 
attacks or radical changes in alliance patterns (Van Evera 1999: 35-69; Copeland 2000).  
Second, antagonistic major powers can intervene in the conflicts of other states. Both the fact as 
well as the possibility of major power intervention has a negative effect on the pacific resolution of an 
issue. Major powers intervene in major-major conflicts to damage the interests of a rival or win an ally. 
They intervene in minor-major and minor-minor power conflicts either as part of a policy of mutual 
assistance with another power, or in order to gain a major power patron of a minor power as an ally. For 
example the rationale of Austria’s alliance with Saxony is the later stages of the War of Austrian 
succession, was to gain a Russian entry to the war, since Russia was allied to Saxony. They may also do 
so because of domestic demands for that intervention (i.e. pro-Israeli groups and US policy in the Israeli-
Arab conflict).22 Even unilateral interventions that have the goal of bringing about peace by pushing for 
settlements or for providing extended deterrence, things that one would normally say are peace-inducing, 
only help link disputes to each other in a world of antagonistic major powers.  
                                                          
21 I assume here that the environment in which interaction happens is inimical to interstate coordination which 
increases the possibility of issues becoming contentious. Of course this is a variable in real life and states can set up 
regimes that make coordination more facile. However, since this paper is interested on exactly such a regime, major 
power coordination, it is sensible to assume that the initial conditions of interstate relation s are problematic for 
coordination. 
22 These motivations for helping minor states make more sense than the belief that a minor state can contribute 
decisively to a major power’s struggle with another major power.  
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As explained in the previous section, intervention in all of these cases has a negative effect on the 
possibility of pacific management. Peace is made harder to keep, and harder to reach after it has been 
broken. Peace agreements become frail and conflict recurrence is likely.  Escalation also becomes more 
likely and hardliners become stronger domestically. Finally intervention can lead to counter intervention 
and the creation of large issue linkages that make a general breakdown of peace more likely and make 
harder item by item issue management. (Waltz 1979; Vasquez 1993). Pacific regimes that could help 
manage the issues, like international organizations, may be rendered impotent by major power 
antagonists. An example of this is the protection major powers have provided to pariah allies from UNSC 
resolutions.  
The preceding tells us how major power conflict participation fans the fires of military conflict in 
the system. It is within this result that the kernels of major power coordination lie. Major power elites 
may in time become war wary, afraid of becoming entangled in militarized conflict, and thus try to create 
credible alternatives to it.  Major powers may be strong states but they can be defeated in war, especially 
by other major powers. A victorious war may leave a major power bankrupt and with its economic and 
social system under strain. Either of these results can be dangerous for the continuous hold to power of 
major power governmental elites. A victorious power may enact social and political change on the 
defeated one, as the Allies did to Germany after 1945. Dissatisfied sections of the population may take 
advantage of defeat to rebel, as was the case of the 1905 Russian revolution. Even a victorious power is 
not safe as a costly war may lead to social and political unrest, as the War of American Independence did 
for 18th century France, or the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 for Russia.  Consequently the more a major 
power engages in antagonistic policies in a system dominated by war-inducing regimes, the more the 
possibility of such results increases. Depending on the luck of a regime that engages in repeated conflict, 
it may be spared these costs and thus never become war wary. Yet others will experience these dangers 
and indeed become war wary.  
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If only one major power becomes war wary the result may not be system affecting. But if a 
number of them become so, either due to direct experience, or wariness created by witnessing the 
domestic consequences of war for another major power, those powers can become advocates and agents 
for the enactment of elements of a major power managerial coordination regime. Other major powers 
might join for more cynical reasons (although avoiding the loss of domestic power is quite cynical), but 
their membership reinforces rather than weakens the regime. 23 This process of course is probabilistic, not 
deterministic, and may very well fail many times before succeeding (as an example see Schroeder’s 
description of Austria’s attempts to escape the war inducing system before 1816). It also interacts with 
other variables of international relations noted by scholars, such as ideological conformity (Morgenthau 
1948; Bull 1979), or war weariness (Toynbee 1954). 
Accordingly, military coercion as a way to resolve issues, seemingly the cheap alternative to 
coordination demanding pacific alternatives, can end up being very costly for states. Reshuffled alliances 
can partly compensate for loses but only at the cost of increasing the conflict linkages, making issue 
management harder, and increasing the possibility of escalation to multilateral war.  The cure may be 
worse than the disease because it does not address the real problem, which is the danger major powers 
pose for each other in the case of war. Consequently, major powers have a powerful incentive to manage 
international relations in such a way that the possibility of major power war decreases. This leads to the 
accumulation of the three elements, consultation, multilateralism, anti-unilateralism, that constitute the 
managerial coordination regime.  
As to the question of why major powers would remain loyal to such a regime here are some 
reasons. First, since such regimes are hard to create major power governing elites may be loath to destroy 
them expect if that is seen as the only way to maintain power. Second, the management of the system 
                                                          
23 I will not take into consideration here the case of major powers that explicitly seek major power war with the goal 
of eradicating other major powers, like Nazi Germany. This is because they tend to be rare. Their ruthlessness and 
willingness to cause the escalation of multiple disputes creates alliances of attacked states, possible victims and even 
third parties that try to stop the rogue power.  
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creates groups within the elites, such a bureaucracies as well as domestic constituencies that have invested 
time and effort in their role as the state’s managers of its part of the managerial system. These 
constituencies add another element that elites may want to consider when breaking with a major power 
managerial cooperation system. Third, if the major power seeking to break the system is alone, it may be 
unwilling to do so even if the system is costly for it right now because of the fear of isolation or 
concentrated future action against it by the major powers that remain in the system. Therefore, for the 
system to break down concentrated action between more than two members is required. This in turn adds 
coordination issues. If we remember that these are attempts in a process that has the goal of destroying a 
regime of trust and consultation, issues of trust will also be paramount among the “conspirators”.  A 
major power managerial coordination system, once established, has staying power. To break it requires 
almost as hard a process as is required to make it.  
I have presented a story of why regimes are important for explain the behavior of states, why a 
system is better conceptualized as a set of regimes, and how regimes can foster war or peace. I also 
looked at what a major power managerial coordination regime is in the abstract. I provided a story of why 
one should expect the regime to foster peace. Furthermore, I provided a story of why major powers create 
the regime and why would they remain within it. The time has now come to present the theoretical 
propositions that result from the above discussion.  
PROPOSITIONS 
Figure 3.1, presents a summary of the explanatory story presented in this chapter. Major power 
wars, the result of the war-inducing regimes, create a threat for the governing elites of major powers since 
defeats and costly victories can undermine the trust and tolerance of domestic groups for the government 
elites.  To avoid major power war as result of the management of international issues, major powers 
engage in consultation with each other. Consultation leads to multilateral action in the form of managerial 
interventions. Major power multilateralism leads to the creation of major power cooperative organizations 
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to facilitate coordination. These organizations extend to minor powers or become the blueprints for minor 
power IGOs.  
To avoid the undermining of the pacific resolutions of issues created by major power consultation 
and multilateralism, major powers will avoid antagonistic coordination and also engage in signaling to 
deter minor powers from engaging in antagonistic activity through denial and discouragement 
mechanisms. The restriction of spoilage coming from the three elements of major power managerial 
coordination fosters democratization and the diffusion of intergovernmental organizations in the system. 
These result in a peace-inducing system. 
Figure 3.1 Schematic Representation of the Explanatory Story 
 
 
In this dissertation I am only interested in the later 3/4ths of the model in Figure 3.1. I 
conceptualize and provide a measurement instrument for major power behavior within the three 
overlapping circles that represent the three elements of managerial coordination. I evaluate hypothesis 
about the association of the overlapping space of the three circles on the avoidance of military conflict. I 
also evaluate some hypothesis about the denial and discouragement mechanisms through which one could 
explain that association. I finally evaluate how by fostering peace, managerial coordination fosters 
domestic democratization and international organizations. I do not evaluate the first fourth of the figure, 
how war-wariness comes from wars and how it is associated to managerial coordination.  
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From that explanation the following sets of propositions can be extracted. First there is the 
possible explanation for the initiation of the process for creating a managerial coordination regime.  
The creation proposition-systemic 
The accumulation of a history of recent destructive or costly major power wars will be associated with 
increased efforts by major powers to enact the three elements of major power managerial coordination. 
One can stipulate from the story presented in this chapter that the impetus for such a regime will 
follow the participation of the major powers in a number of wars that either led to defeat, or costly 
victories. Furthermore those defeats should be accompanied by some combination of territorial losses, 
occupation by foreign powers, or economic problems. Victories should be accompanied by economic 
problems or demands for political representation. The key is that participating major powers should 
experience a questioning of legitimacy due to the consequences of the war. The more wars that bring 
about such consequences and the closer they are in time, the higher the possibility of attempts at major 
power coordination. 
It should be noted here that there are many variables that can reinforce or mitigate the incentive 
for enacting policies for major power managerial coordination. A series of costly victories or costly 
defeats is only part of the story. Indeed the almost continuous state of war in Europe during the 17th 
century failed to produce an attempt at managerial coordination, unlike the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars. Domestic issues, and changes in the way people may view the world may also affect 
the propensity of state elites to “think outside the box”. Such a change is the transformation in the view of 
time and the individual’s and society’s place in past, present and future between the 18th and 19th century. 
And it is not necessary that a power that becomes war wary finds solace in managerial coordination. 
Sometimes they might just bandwagon with a stronger major power, as Prussia did with Russia in the 
period from 1812 to roughly 1856. The above reservations should not be taken as an admission that the 
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story presented of why we get major power managerial coordination is not important. They are 
accommodations of the fact that it is part of a larger process.  
The proposition for the creation will not be evaluated in this manuscript, since in and itself it is a 
project. The discussion was done in order to provide some context and a basis from which to discuss the 
effects of major power managerial coordination. The following propositions represent those effects. 
The association proposition. 
As the three elements of major power managerial coordination are increasingly used concurrently by the 
major powers there should be a decrease in the use of military force in the international system. 
This proposition represents the main argument made in this project. As major powers engage in 
consultation, multilateralism and avoidance of antagonistic coordination the ability of states to use 
military force will be curtailed, and more alternatives to military force for resolving issues will become 
available. Consequently the use of force in interstate relations should go down. Since it was noted that the 
main ways in which major powers abate the use of force in the system is through their support for other 
states, we should expect that if the explanatory story presented is true then some specific forms of major 
power support for other states will become rare in a system that has major power managerial 
coordination. This is the denial mechanism. These are alliances between major powers and minor power 
states, and the support in material by major powers for other powers, both major and minor, which tends 
to be expressed in the ability of those states to enact arms races. 
Denial Mechanisms: 
A major power managerial coordination system is associated with a decrease in the creation of major 
power alliances, which exclude some major powers, with minor powers. 
A major power managerial coordination system is associated with a decrease in the initiation of arms 
races among system members.  
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At the same time the explanatory story stressed the role that major power managerial coordination 
plays in discouraging unilateral antagonistic activity by other states. Especially the threat of major power 
managerial interventions or the actuality of said intervention should decrease the propensity of states to 
use military force. Such intervention should be more possible under a managerial coordination system 
than in a more antagonistic political environment. 
Discouragement Mechanisms:  
A major power managerial coordination system is associated with an increase of major power 
multilateral managerial interventions. 
Major power managerial interventions should be associated with a decrease in the propensity of states to 
engage in military conflict in the period immediately after the intervention. 
A major power managerial coordination system is associated with a decrease in military intervention by 
minor powers in existing conflicts. 
Lastly, I posited that the pacific effect of major power managerial coordination goes far beyond 
the direct effects and can outlast the regime itself. This is through the fostering effect that major power 
managerial coordination can have on the creation of international organizations, an alternative issue 
management regime to the use of force. These indirect pacific effects are also through the fostering of 
reforms that make democratization more likely, and thus help spread the foundations for the pacific 
effects of democracy. 
Indirect effects: 
A major power managerial coordination system is associated with an increase in the number and 
membership of intergovernmental organizations in the system. 
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A major power managerial coordination system is associated with the democratization of domestic 
political systems of system members.  
The next section explains the research design that will create hypotheses from the propositions 
about the direct and indirect effects.  Those evaluations will then be conducted in chapter 5, 6 and 7. 
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C H A P T E R  4 :  R E S E A R C H  D E S I G N  
INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter presented the explanatory story for why one should expect major power 
managerial coordination to have a transformative effect on international politics, rendering a war-
inducing system to a peace-inducing system. In the end a number of theoretical propositions were 
presented. In this chapter, I look at the research design that will transform those theoretical propositions to 
hypotheses, and the methods that will be used to evaluate those hypotheses. These evaluations will take 
place in three empirical chapters. Each empirical chapter will serve a specific purpose. Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6 will evaluate the hypotheses for the 1816-2001 period showing us the state of interstate 
relations in the system during and after a major power managerial coordination regime. Chapter 7 will 
showcase the state of interstate relations in the 1715-1815 period, a system before a major power 
managerial coordination regime.  Chapter 8 will present the effect of major power managerial 
coordination across the 1715-2001 period, and thus across almost all of modernity.  
The first two empirical chapters will begin with a short description of the historical context of the 
period noting the various peace-inducing and war-inducing regimes in the period, why one or the other 
predominated, and discussing the dynamics of change. This is required to counter some of the unfortunate 
but necessary ahistoricism of a quantitative study. After this introductory part the results of the 
quantitative evaluations are presented and discussed. 
 The chapter that follows focuses on the quantitative methods that will be used to evaluate 
whether there are indicators that would be supportive of the explanatory story presented in this project.  It 
begins with presenting a novel measurement instrument of major power interaction, the scale of major 
power coordination intensity, that will be used to indicate the quality and intensity of major power 
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managerial coordination efforts. The scale ranges from war-inducing antagonistic coordination to peace-
inducing managerial coordination, with two additional levels in between. Other independent variables are 
discussed after it. Following the independent variables is the discussion of the various dependent 
variables used. A presentation of the novel dataset of Militarized Disputes in the 1715-1815 period 
follows, necessary for chapter 6. The unit of analysis and models that will be used for the evaluations are 
the presented together with the hypotheses. Finally control variables are discussed.  
TEMPORAL DOMAIN  
 
The temporal domain of this study is the modern interstate system from 1715 to 2001. With the 
term modern I mean the totality of the states affected by what historians call modernity as expressed in 
the nexus of the concepts of enlightenment-rationalism-capitalism. To put it simply I care about the 
victims and victors of Western Civilization. This means that I do not look at the relations between polities 
in a pre-modern state (inter-African tribe relations, the Chinese international system before 1850), or 
those between polities of modernity and polities in a pre-modern state (early European relations with local 
polities in Asia, South America and Africa). I am interested in the political interaction and behavior of 
polities that are part of the modern state system, or with pre-modern societies in transition to modernity 
that are grappling with the challenges of the modern interstate system.  
Our actors thus are populating either the early core of the modern interstate system, namely 
Europe, or are being dragged into it, like post-colonial states or states that avoided colonialism but had to 
adjust to the challenge of modernity.  For the 1715-1815 period they are populated using Gibler’s list of 
interstate members (Gibler 1999). For the 1816-2001 period the Correlates of War interstate system 
membership nicely captures this dynamic. States enter it either as pre-existing members of the European 
core of the modern interstate system, or as they are facing the internal challenges posed by interaction 
with modernity. While the list is not a proper list of polities, it is an adequate list of when a polity became 
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part of the modern interstate system, as opposed to being part of a per-modern local international system.  
 
 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
 
a. The Scale of Major Power Coordination Intensity 
The main variable of interest in this project is the quality and intensity of major power 
interaction. What is needed is a measure that can capture whether major power interaction is characterized 
by policies in pursuit of antagonism or by attempts at managerial coordination for facilitating cooperation. 
It must also capture if those attempts at managerial coordination are more or less intense compared to 
each other. Intensity here means how many elements of managerial coordination the major powers are 
pursuing. 
Extant measures used to capture the quality of major power interaction are problematic. They 
either are not measures of major power behavior, they do not vary sufficiently to be possible explanations 
for the variation of militarized conflict and peace, or they are not replicable. Wallensteen’s measure of 
“universalism” and “particularism” varies enough to be useful as part of an explanation of the variation in 
the militarized behavior of dyads. It also represents a behavioral measure operationalized as it is by major 
power diplomatic activity. However, it is a measure too dependent on historical opinion about the general 
behavior of the major powers as opposed to measures of that behavior (1984:244-246). Consequently if 
one does not accept the view of the historians he relies on, one cannot replicate his measure.   
Furthermore the measure, while varying on a temporal level sufficiently to explain variation, is 
not discriminating enough between levels of universalism and particularism. Is major power 
particularistic behavior dominated by adversarial major power alliance networks equally pernicious as 
system of relatively indifferent but particularistic major powers? Is universalism evoked in the form of 
shared international organization membership by major powers equally beneficial as a congress system? 
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These are gradations that Wallensteen’s measure does not capture. A good measure can always be made 
better and the scale presented in this paper should be seen as a natural evolution of Wallensteen’s 
measure. 
The measures used by Huth, Gelpi and Bennet (1992) are not behavioral. Alliance tightness 
varies enough to make sense as possible explanation for the variation in the incidence of conflict in 
international relations, but by itself it does not tell us a lot about major power interaction. Are managerial 
alliances like the post-1816 major power alliances the same as antagonistic alliances (like the Triple 
Entente)? How are the signals sent out by alliances mediated by other major power interaction like joint 
membership in intergovernmental organizations and pacific regimes? Alliance tightness by itself cannot 
answer these questions.  
Measures such as number of major powers do not vary enough and are not behavioral enough to 
serve as good explanations of the variation in conflict (Huth et al 1992:496-498). They may explain 
crucial behaviors that affect that variation, but are not directly tied to the decisions about military conflict.  
The various measures used by Geller (1992) based on the distribution of power among all the 
major powers are easily replicable and sufficiently vary, being continuous, to make sense as explanations 
of the variation in the incidence of conflict. But they are not behavioral measures. The distribution of 
capabilities among the major powers may affect major power behavior but there is no deterministic 
relationship. Major Powers may cooperate more under a hegemonic system, or may do so less.24 They 
may initiate multipolar congress systems like Vienna, or create antagonistic alliances. While power 
concentration among the major powers tends to be associated with peace, there is no story about what 
behaviors exactly that are produced by it are associated with peace. There are no mechanisms, to put it in 
other words. 
                                                          
24 Some interpretations of the Congress system see it as a British Hegemony. An example of hegemony with discord 
could be taken from major power relations during those periods in which Napoleonic France dominated continental 
Europe. 
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 Consequently, as part of this project, a new measurement instrument is created to capture major 
power engagement in consultation, multilateralism and antagonistic coordination. Major power 
coordination can vary in strength depending on whether the positive elements and negative element are 
present or absent (consultation, multilateralism, antagonistic coordination). The effect should also be 
conditioned by the sensitivity states exhibit to major power activity, which is how often states or their 
neighborhood are targets of major power foreign policy activities. 
I conceptualize consultation as the shared membership of all or the majority of major powers in 
intergovernmental organizations that have a security mandate, like the United Nations, or in large 
congresses that try to resolve many issues and create informal regimes and norms, like the Berlin 
Congresses of the 19th century. Membership in such regimes is a clear behavioral indicator that the major 
powers prefer consultation to simple unilateralism as the basic systemic principle for resolving conflicts. 
The justification for this is found in Randle (1987). Large multilateral congresses, in which the majority 
of major powers take part form the constitutions of the international system as they resolve issues, 
delineate norms ,declare behaviors permitted or proscribed, and create institutions and regimes for 
managing new issues. Membership in a congress or institution is also membership in the regimes created 
or crystallized by that congress or institution.25 
Multilateralism is operationalized as the shared membership of the majority of major powers in 
alliances that do not target a non-member major power. Examples of such alliances are the Quadruple 
Alliance of the Vienna Congress system after France became a de-facto member.26 The existence of such 
major power alliances creates a signal of major power managerial coordination to other states, as well as a 
ready forum for major power multilateral action.  
                                                          
25 In reality this relationship is not deterministic. But for the purpose of this paper and for the population of major 
powers it is not a erroneous assumption to make. 
26 While the Quadruple Alliance had an anti-French clause, France was made aware of it by agreement of the allies 
when the treaty was signed. Furthermore, France until 1818 when it was offered the option to adhere to the Vienna 
System was under occupation. For more about the political interactions see Schroeder (1994). 
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Membership in such an alliance is a powerful indicator of the preference of major powers for 
consultation, but also for coordinated action in resolving conflicts. This is because inclusive major power 
alliances tend to be hard to create, and are costly in the sense that foreign policy must become more 
accommodative to allied interests. Major power allies are not as easily ignored as minor power allies.27 If 
the goal is consultation, looser and less restrictive alternative regimes exist. Consequently, the existence 
of this regime indicates major power intent to act multilaterally.  
The presence of the negative element of antagonistic coordination is operationalized by the 
existence in the system of any alliance between two or more major powers that openly targets a non-
member major power. The existence of such adversarial alliances is a clear indicator of enmity, a 
preference for resolving conflicts through coercion, and a preference for unilateralism. Examples of 
adversarial alliances were the major power alliances that end up fighting in World War I.28 
I assume that each one of the three elements is equal in its effect to each other. To create a scale 
of major power coordination intensity I code whether every year in the international system had present 
any of the elements, with the managerial elements each adding 1 to the scale, and the antagonistic element 
subtracting 1. A system year that had no elements present, either cooperative or antagonistic, is coded 
with a major power managerial coordination of 0, and can be considered the null category of the scale. If 
both one cooperative element and the antagonistic element are present, this also ends up being point 0. 
Are these two situations comparable? I argue that they are from the point of view of other states. When 
major power interaction is constituted by neither overt attempts at managerial or antagonistic 
coordination, states should have a hard time perceiving what the preferences of the major powers are. 
This should lead to a policy of wait and see. When the major powers are engaged in both managerial and 
                                                          
27 Napoleon’s penchant to ignore the interests of his allies contributed to both the war with Prussia in 1806 and the 
escalating disputes that led to the Russian campaign of 1812. The Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s was partly fueled by 
Chinese perceptions that Moscow ignored Chinese interests.  
28 Once more reality is more complicated than theory. The antagonistic major powers of 1914 were able to cooperate 
against China in 1901. However the existence of these overt (or de jure secret but de facto overt) antagonistic 
alliances was seen by the Balkan states as an opening for their own opportunistic politics of aggression against the 
Ottoman Empire and each other. 
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antagonistic coordination the contradiction should bring about a similar stance by states. Consequently, I 
assume that the behavioral results of these two states of major power interaction are identical and can be 
represented by the same code. 
 As written above, the two elements indicating positive coordination, consultation and 
multilateralism, add 1 to the scale when each is present. From the theoretical discussion I argue that these 
two elements, operationalized as major power managerial alliances and major power joint membership in 
intergovernmental organizations, are also complementary. This happens both in the sense that the signals 
of major power managerial coordination are amplified, as well as in the proliferation of credible 
alternatives to military force. Therefore, a system year which has both a major power managerial alliance 
and joint membership in inter-governmental organizations is the most structured pacific system, a major 
power managerial system and is scored a 2.The presence of major power adversarial alliances; the signal 
of antagonistic coordination, in the system subtracts 1 from the scale.  
We have thus a scale that takes the values 2, 1, 0 and -1 depending on the presence or absence of 
the three elements. Table 1, summarizes the possible combinations. The higher the number in the scale is 
the more intense the managerial coordination among major powers. To facilitate statistical work I add a 2 
to each result so that the scale has a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 4. 
This four point scale is a direct result of the assumption that the three elements have a similar 
effect. An argument could be made that this assumption shoe-horns different things in similar categories, 
and thus decreases the external validity of the measure.  I make this assumption for three reasons. First, in 
a project that could be seen already as too expansive exploring theoretically the interaction of the three 
elements, in order to ascertain if one or the other has a different magnitude, would easily add another 100 
pages. I have decided to err on the side of simplicity, leaving this important task for a future project. 
Second, I would argue that creating a more varied scale (9 instead of 4 points for example) that 
could account for differences in the influence of each element is not going to engender a big difference in 
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findings between the 4 point scale and the 9 point scale. The new points that arise from the more 
cooperative points of the old scale will not have a different influence on the onset of military conflict, 
than the cooperative points of the four-point scale. This is because some of the new combinations are 
going to be very rare in the period of interest. Breaking down the scale thus to more points on the 
assumption that each element has a positive influence of different magnitude, will not change the result 
that accumulations of the three elements have a positive association with the avoidance of military 
conflict.  
Third, absent empirical indicators or theory that can guide us to how the influence of each 
element differs from the others, and whether some are perquisites for the others, there is no none-arbitrary 
way to decide how to place the elements in the hierarchy of cooperative points. Is the avoidance of 
adversarial coordination less or more cooperative than the engagement of consultation? Is such a 
relationship always set, or do different eras see a different magnitude of effect? The answer to these 
questions is necessary for creating a more diverse scale. And a more diverse scale could be readily made 
from the scale presented on Table 4.1. But absent a reason for doing this, I would argue that the 
assumption of equality is adequate for the goals of this project and legitimate. That said I fully encourage 
the creation of a more diverse scale for future research and an exploration in the relationship of the three 
elements.  
A score of 2 on the scale (4 in the adjusted version) most closely approximates the coordination 
that took place during the Vienna system from 1816 to 1822.29A score of 1 (3 in the adjusted version) on 
the scale most closely approximates the Vienna System between 1841 and 1848, when the alliance 
element was absent, or the Cold War when major power antagonism was constrained by joint IO 
membership. (Miller 1995: 36, 80-87). A 0 score (2 in the adjusted version) is most closely approximated 
by the unclear politics of the 1932-1934 period, before German and Italian foreign policy goals became 
                                                          
29 Because it was occupied, France was not a major power in that period up to 1818. Afterwards it became a de facto 
member of the Quadruple alliance until 1822. See Schroeder, 1994 for details. 
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explicitly clear. A -1 score (a 1 in the adjusted version) is approximated by periods of major power 
warfare and preparation for war, like 1935-1945. 
Table 4.1  Scale of major power coordination intensity combinations. 
 
Intensity of 
Major Power 
Coordination 
Score 
 
Major Power 
Managerial Alliance 
(Multilateralism) 
  
Major Power Shared 
Membership in International 
Pacific Institutions and 
Regimes 
(Consultation) 
 
 
Major Power Adversarial 
Alliances 
(antagonistic coordination) 
 
 
2 
“managerial 
coordination” 
 
Present 
 
And 
 
Present 
 
Absent 
     
1 Present       Or  Present Absent 
1 Present And Present Present 
0 Absent  Absent Absent 
     
0 Present Or Present Present 
     
-1 
“antagonistic 
coordination” 
Absent  Absent Present 
 
 
To operationalize each element of the scale in this period the following procedure is used. Major 
power status is taken from the Correlates of War Major Power dataset (COW Major2008.1).30 The 
information from the major power dataset was then combined with the Alliance Participant dataset of the 
Alliance Treaty Obligations Provision project (ATOP.3). This gives us all the alliances that had at least 
one major power member (332 of 648 alliances for 1816-2003). Using that information as well as the 
ATOP documentation, those alliances are then divided into three categories. Major power unilateral 
alliances, which are alliances that have one to a minority of the major powers as members and do not 
                                                          
30Correlates of War Project. 2008. “State System Membership List, v2008.1.” Online, http://correlatesofwar.org. 
There is one significant change I make. COW lists France in 1816-1818 and 1871-1873 as a major power. But that is 
a fallacy because large areas of France were occupied during the period as a result of the 100 Days Campaign and 
the Franco-Prussian War. Since COW does not list France as a major power in 1941-1944 when it was occupied, or 
Germany from 1918 to 1925, when the same happens, I see no justification for not doing the same for France 1816-
1818 and 1871-1873.  
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explicitly target a non-member major power (286 of 648 alliances).Major power adversarial alliances, 
whose presence is the operationalization of the negative element of antagonistic coordination, that have at 
least two major power members and explicitly target a non-member major power (23 of 648 alliances).31 
And major power managerial alliances, the operationalization of multilateralism, that have at least a 
majority of major powers as members and do not target a non-member major power (8 of 648).32 
The second element of the scale is shared major power membership in intergovernmental 
institutions, the operationalization of consultation. This was compiled using the Multilateral Treaties of 
Pacific Settlement (MTOP) dataset v1.4 created by Paul Hensel ( 2005; 2001).33 Because of the 
stipulations in the explanatory section, only those intergovernmental institutions that have a security 
mandate and have at some point in their history acted on that security mandate are included. This is 
because major power membership in intergovernmental institutions that have no mandate on political-
security issues does not give any signal about major power de-jure adherence to the norms and regimes 
for managing and resolving political and security issues in a pacific manner. Membership in inactive 
institutions also provides no signal, since membership is not costly.   
I locate active institutions by using the lists of active institutions in the papers by Hansen, 
Mitchell and Nementh (2008) and Bercovitch and Schneider (2000). This produces a list of 20 active 
peace institutions in the system in the 1816-2001 periods, which can be found in Table 4.2. I then 
                                                          
31 The ATOP id numbers for adversarial alliances are 1065,1160, 1165, 1170,1180,1190,1215, 1265,1270, 1295, 
1300, 1350, 1365, 2025,2040, 2130, 2350,2355,2360, 2395, 2535, 2540,2550,2555. There is one alliance in the 
Alliance Treaty Obligation Provisions (ATOP) dataset that is used to find alliances, that has explicit major power 
targets, has more than one major power member, and is not coded as adversarial. This is the alliance with ATOP id. 
Number 2310. The reason is that the explicit targets (France, Germany) are also members of the alliance. The 
alliance was a non-aggression treaty with a defensive clause concerning Belgium. It lasted from 1925 to 1937. Three 
ATOP alliances that have at least two major power members do not have explicit major power targets but are coded 
as adversarial are the 1856 alliance for guaranteeing the Paris Treaty that ended the Crimean War, which implicitly 
targets Russia as the only excluded power (ATOP id. 1195), the 1914 agreement among the entente powers not to 
sign individual peace treaties with the Central Powers(ATOP id. 2015), and NATO before 1990. 
32 The ATOP id numbers for the managerial alliances are 1005,1035,1045,1110,1315,2095,3460,3740 
33 Available online at http://data.icow.org 
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determine the membership of a major power in each institution using MTOP, and see which ones saw 
shared major power membership in the institution.  
Table 4.2 Active International Peace Organizations 1816-2001. 
Institution Life 
United Nations 1946-Present 
European Union  1958-present 
League of Nations 1920-1946 
Central Commission of Navigation on the Rhine 1815-present  
Organization of African Unity (African Union) 1963-present 
Arab League 1945-Present 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 1922-1946 
International Court of Justice 1946-Present 
Permanent Court of Arbitration  1899-Present 
Inter-American Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration 1929-Present 
Central American Court of Justice 1907-1918 
ODED (Organization for Democracy and Economic Development 2001-Present 
Baltic Assembly 1994-Present  
Commonwealth and Judicial Council of the Imperial Privy Council 1931-Present 
NATO (only from 1990) 1949-Present 
OPEC 1961-Pesent 
Islamic Conference Organization ICO 1973-Present  
OEEC 1946-1961 
Arab Maghreb Union 1989-Present 
Organization of American States (OAS) 1951-present  
 
Beyond membership in intergovernmental institutions, major powers can also signal an adherence 
to common regimes by taking part in large scale multilateral international congresses and peace treaties 
(like Westphalia in 1648). A major power is considered a member of such an informal institution if it took 
part in its inaugurating meeting, or in subsequent meetings and for a ten year period after the last meeting. 
I base this membership criterion on Randle’s argument that the member states of peace treaties or 
international congresses are members of the constitution of regimes created by the treaty (1987:32, 35, 
59-61). The ten year rule accounts for the weakening of regimes that lack institutionalized form due to the 
passage of time.   
The treaties and congresses that meet the above requirements are presented in Table 4.3. 
Membership info for the Congress of Europe, London Conference and Berlin system is extracted from the 
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Britannica Encyclopedia 15th edition (1985) and Langer’s The Encyclopedia of World History 5th edition 
(1986). The membership of the Hague System was compiled from the website of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (www.pca-cpa.org/), and the MTOP dataset. Information about the membership of the Pan-
American Meetings and the Congress of Panama was compiled from the OAS website 
(http://www.oas.org/en/default.asp). 
Table 4.3 Informal Peace and Institutions and Congresses 1816-2001. 
Institution Period of activity (in parentheses last meeting) 
 
The Congress of Europe 1815-1858(1848) 
The Congress of Panama 1826-1836(1826) 
Pan-American Meetings 1847-1874 (1864) 
The London Conference 1867-1877(1867) 
The Berlin System 1878-1894(1884) 
The Hague System 1899-1917(1907) 
  
 
 Using the above operationalization I note the following distribution of system years among the 
points of the scale of major power managerial coordination intensity. Major power interaction reached 
Point 2 of the scale, the highest level of managerial coordination, in 25 years of the 1816-2001 period.34 It 
reached Point 1 in 58 years of the period.35 Point 0was reached by 60 years in the period.36 Point -1 was 
reached by major power coordination in 43 years of the 1816-2001 period.37The distribution for the 1816-
2001 period  is graphically presented in Figure 4.1. 
The scale is replicable. Anybody following the procedures described above and using the sources 
used will come to the same results. The scale is more objective compared to past efforts, in the sense that 
whether major power interaction in a year reaches a specific point is not something based on a subjective 
decision of what the historical opinion tell us, unavoidable as it is , but on what the datasets indicate was 
                                                          
34 These are the periods between 1816-1822, 1827-1829, 1990-2001 and 1840,1878,and 1921. 
35 These are the periods between 1823-1826, 1830-1832,1841-1853,1873-1877, 1879-1881,1919-1920,1922-1931, 
1946-1948, and 1975-1989. 
36 These were 1833-1839,1854-1858,1867-1872,1882-1894,1899-1918,1932-1934,1971-1974 and 1940, 1949. 
37 These were 1859-1866,1895-1898,1935-1939,1941-1945,1950-1970. 
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the behavior. Finally, because of the annual unit of measurement, it provides a richer and more varied 
picture of major power coordination. 
Figure 4.1 Scale of Major Power Coordination in the 1816-2001 period 
 
That said the scale presents some information that on a first reading may not be persuasive. 
Specifically the period around World War I (1899-1919) indicate attempts at major power coordination 
that are at a higher level of the scale (point 2) than the period around World War II (1929-1946), which 
tend to be at a lower level of the scale (point 1). This could be argued to count against the external 
validity of the scale. There are three arguments I would make in defense of the measurement.  
First, there is always a tension between the external validity and the internal consistency of any 
measure. According to the scale of major power coordination, while the major powers in the pre-WWI 
period were engaged in adversarial alliances, they also shared common membership in the norms of the 
Hague Conventions. In the case of the period before World War 2, with the exit of Germany, Italy, Japan 
and the Soviet Union from the League of Nations no such common forum existed.  The instrument 
captures this difference, but this does not mean that substance wise there is an empirical difference. 
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However, making arbitrary decisions to correct the instrument towards a view of empirical reality would 
destroy the internal consistency of the instrument, rendering it less useful. Sometimes external validity 
must be sacrificed in the name of logic.  
Second, on a substantive point the period before and after World War I was less contentious than 
that of World War II. Looking at the management of issues during the 1899-1914 period, the major 
powers were able to resolve in a pacific manner a number of serious issues, and to avoid entanglements in 
the minor power wars of the period (Balkan Wars, Italian-Ottoman War). Even during the July crisis, the 
belief among the crisis managers was that this was another major power issue that would have been 
resolved in peace like Agadir, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Balkans etc. While all expected a war to happen 
at some point in a general sense, no one thought that it need happen due to the current crisis. In the case of 
World War 2 after the failure of the Munch agreement in 1938, the expectation of elites was the war was 
imminent. There was no great attempt to resolve the Polish-German question by major power diplomacy 
comparable to the activity during the July crisis. The resolution of the wars also differed. The defeated 
powers of WWI were quickly reinter-grated in the international system. On the other hand the defeated 
powers of World War II remained under occupation for close to decade after the war.  
Finally, I ran some of the main models of Chapter 4 with the years between 1899 and 1919 that 
were coded as two, coded instead as a one in the scale. I can report that there was no major difference in 
results between the models in which major power interaction in 1899-1919 was coded as at point 1 of the 
scale with the models in which it is coded as at point 2 of the scale.  
How does the new measurement instrument compare to previous measures of major power 
behavior, mainly Wallensteen’s universalism-particularism dichotomy, polarity, and capability 
concentration. Table 4.4 presents cross-tabulations between Wallensteen’s measure, polarity, and the 
scale of major power coordination intensity. 
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Table 4.4 Three measures of major power activity. 
Scale of Major 
Power Coordination 
Intensity 
Universalism Particularism  Multipolar Bipolar 
2 13 0 13 0 
1 36 8 40 18 
0 27 33 55 5 
-1 9 34 22 21 
 
There is a good overlap between Wallensteen’s and the new measurement instrument. The system 
years that reach the more cooperative points (2 and 1) tend to fall within the category of universalism. 
The less cooperative tend to fall within particularism. That said there are system years that Wallensteen 
codes as universalistic or particularistic that are not so clear-cut according to the more behavioral criteria 
of the new scale. Both bipolarity and multipolarity tend to be associated with more antagonistic major 
power relations, a powerful indicator of the harshness of international politics. However managerial 
coordination requires a multipolar world, an indicator that David Earnest’s large-n coordination argument 
has empirical traction (2008).As far as capability concentration, there is a negative correlation between 
increasing concentration and increasing managerial coordination (-0.1969).  
To further evaluate the validity of the measure I ran a number of logit regressions with variables 
that are highly associated with conflict. These were the presence of rivalry (Klein et al, 2006), the 
presence of a territorial dispute (Sense and Vasquez, 2008), and the escalation of a MID to war within 5 
years of MID onset (Senese and Vasquez, 2008). In all three cases increasing managerial coordination as 
captured by the scale had a statistically significant association with the variable of interests. The fact that 
the scale has a negative association with variables that are positively associated with conflict and war 
does lend some confidence in its validity.  
A further evaluation focuses on the validity of each point of the scale. Table 4.5 presents a cross-
tabulation of the points of the scale with the number of dyad years in the 1816-2001 period that saw 
rivalry, , and the escalation of MIDs to war within 5 years, and the number of system years that saw the 
onset of a territorial issue. 
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Table 4.5 Cross-Tabulations of Scale of Major Power Coordination with variable associated with 
conflict  
Scale Rivalries Territorial Issues MID escalated to war 
within 5 years 
2 829 (4%) 6(23%) 36 (8%) 
1 1654 (6%) 17(29%) 92 (14%) 
0 1339 (7%) 22 (36%) 142 (27.4%) 
-1 1557 (7.5%) 11(25%) 238 (27%) 
In Parentheses percentage from total dyad-years, system years for territorial issues 
 
The table indicates that generally speaking there is a declining ratio of conflict-associated 
phenomena and the progression from the points of the scale representing the least managerial 
coordination among the major powers to the most managerial coordination of the major powers. The only 
association that partly breaks that mold is that of territorial issues, where point -1 is less associated with 
their onset compared to point 1. This maybe attributed though to the still incomplete status of the ICOW 
data on territorial issues. These findings should provide some more external validity to the scale 
instrument.  
This scale of major power coordination intensity is going to be the independent variable for all 
hypotheses expect for those focusing on the role that major power managerial interventions play in 
conveying the effect of managerial coordination to other states. I wish to remind that in order to simplify 
statistical manipulation we add a 2 to every point of the scale thus going from -1, 0, 1, and 2 to 1,2,3,4.  
b. Managerial Interventions 
The second independent variable in this project is major power managerial interventions. These 
are defined as threats of the use of military force, or the use of military force by the majority of the major 
powers in the international system against a minor power state. For an intervention to truly be an example 
of a managerial coordination regime, or of lower intensity managerial cooperation between the major 
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powers, it should be done by at least the majority of major powers in the system, and they should all 
participate in the acts that make up the intervention, whether in the decision process or implementation 
process. Furthermore, an intervention that targets a major power cannot be considered managerial by 
minor powers but is a signal of major power antagonistic coordination. Thus for a major power 
multilateral intervention to signal to system members that the major powers are coordinating their activity 
in a managerial manner and not for antagonistic reasons it must target a minor power. 
To locate major power managerial interventions in the 1816-2001 period I use the Correlates of 
War Militarized Interstate Dispute datasets (v.3.10). I use MID A , the MID unit of analysis dataset to 
locate multiparty MIDs. I then locate which multiparty MIDs had parties that were not originators but 
joiners using MID B, the MID participant unit of analysis dataset. I then use the Major Power dataset of 
COW to locate which joiners were major powers and which originators were major powers. After that I 
look if the major power joiners all joined on the same side, or if there was one or more major power 
originator if the other major powers joined it in the dispute. If the number of major power joiners and 
originators joining the same side is the majority of the major powers in the system, and the other side was 
not a major power, then the MID is a major power managerial intervention. In the 1816-2001 period that 
gives six MIDs (dispute numbers 89, 141, 2208, 4137, 3975, 4273) that fit the conceptualization of 
managerial intervention. There were no such interventions in the 1715-1815 period.  
When considering the effect that major power managerial intervention would have on the 
behavior of states one would expect it to be stronger the closer in time to the current system year it 
happened. To capture that effect I create a binary variable that takes the value of 1 for every year, 10 
years after a managerial intervention, including the year of the intervention. This gives us 60 years of 
major power intervention in the 1816-2001 period. Otherwise it takes the value of 0. I then include a 
decaying function in the decade that takes the value of 10 in order to account for the erosion of the 
interventions influence due to the passage of time.  This is the independent variable for the propositions 
that focus on the effect of managerial interventions as a tool of major power managerial coordination.  
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DEPENDENT VARIABLES (IN PARENTHESES PERIODS IN WHICH THEY 
WILL BE USED) 
 
(a) War and MID onset (1715-1815, 1816-2001, 1715-2001) 
The dependent variables of the direct association propositions are the onset of a Militarized 
Interstate Dispute and the onset of War. The focus is on onset rather than initiation because I wish to look 
at the general effect of major power managerial coordination on the interaction of disputing states.  When 
it comes to conflict onset I look at initial disputes between originators, or originators and joiners, but not 
at disputes between joiners. This is because the pacific effect of major power managerial coordination has 
already failed if there was one outside intervention in a dispute, let alone another one, which is required 
for a joiner dispute. I also focus on onset rather than duration because in the current project I am 
interested in military conflict avoidance rather than conflict termination. The variable takes the value of 0 
if a MID or War did not take place, and 1 if it did. 
Concerning the definition of war and militarized interstate disputes this project adheres to the 
Correlates of War definition of a reciprocated use of military force between two states that causes at least 
1000 fatalities. Because of the existence in the Correlates of War dataset of some problematic cases, I use 
the Maoz Dyadic Dispute dataset to locate cases of MID and War onset for the 1816-2001 era. For the 
1715-1815 period the new dataset on MIDs created by the author is used. This shall be presented later in 
this chapter. Using the Maoz dataset in the 1816-2001 period I find 2491 dyadic MID onsets and 220 
dyadic war onsets. In the 1715-1815 period I have 154 dyadic War onsets and 101 dyadic MID onsets. 
These basic binary variables are the dependent variables for all hypotheses that will evaluate the 
direct pacific association of major power managerial coordination. I will also use it to build counts of 
wars and MIDs per period when I conduct the evaluations using the dyad-period unit of analysis. 
(b) Mutual Military buildups (1817-2000) 
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One of the explanatory propositions posits that one of the pacific results of major power 
managerial coordination is the denial of resources to states that could be used to fuel a militarized foreign 
policy. One logical consequence of this that can be evaluated is that ceteris paribus we should expect 
pairs of states to find it harder to engage in what Paul Diehl calls mutual military buildups. Since mutual 
military buildups and arms races are one of the steps to war, their avoidance can have a peace-inducing 
effect.  To evaluate this I use the variables from the research design used by Rider, Finely and Diehl 2011 
article for the 1817-2000 period. The authors found 485 dyadic mutual military buildup onsets in the era. 
The onset of a mutual armed buildup will be coded 1 while the absence of such an onset 0.  
(c) Minor Power intervention in ongoing conflict (1715-1815,1816-2001,1715-2001) 
One of the theoretical propositions put forward the argument that major powers acting in a 
managerial coordination system will dissuade third party interventions in ongoing disputes. This is 
because those third parties can act as “spoilers” of a peace process or lead to the diffusion and escalation 
of the conflict. To evaluate this variable I rely on the COW MID dataset to note each case of an 
intervention by a minor power in a conflict as a joiner. Unlike onset here I am interested in initiation by 
the joiner states. The variable takes the value of 1 if a minor state intervened in at least one ongoing 
conflict in a country year and 0 if it did not.  From 13045 country years in the 1816-2001 period, 535 saw 
at least one intervention in an ongoing conflict.  
(d) Constitutionalism (1789-1815,1816-2001,1789-2001) 
One of the postulated indirect results of major power managerial coordination is that the 
pacification of international relations brought about by the regime fosters the democratization of domestic 
politics. One of the many elements of the path towards democracy is constitutionalism, the promulgation 
of a written constitution. The main importance is that constitutionalism is seen as a check on arbitrary 
power as even a hitherto absolute monarch is restrained by the written law. As Paul Schroeder showed, 
the Vienna system powers while absolutist were keen on legitimism and the promulgation of constitutions 
as an answer to popular demands for the rule of law. Constitutionalism is not democracy of course. But 
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the status of a constitution as a check on the arbitrary power of a monarch is a spring point for calls for 
further checks and ultimately popular rule.  
To evaluate the association between increasingly intense major power managerial coordination 
and constitutionalism as a part of the democratization process I use the Comparative Constitutions Project 
(1.1) to locate every constitutional event in the 1789-2001 period. I code the variable 1 if a state saw the 
enactment or reinstatement of a constitution in a year, and for each such case, and 0 if it did not. From 
13045 country years (1816-2001) there were 606 that saw the onset or reinstatement of a constitution.  
(e) Polity Score Change towards increased participation, competitiveness and executive 
constraints (1800-1815, 1816-2001, 1800-2001) 
Another way to try and capture the progress of a society towards democratization is via changes 
in their Polity score from the Polity IV dataset. The score captures how democratic or authoritarian a 
polity is at any point of time. While not a perfect proxy for reality it is adequate. To code it we use the 
Regime Transition variable (REGTRANS) of Polity IV. This variable indicates major changes in the 
polity score of a country during a given year and taking into consideration if it was part of a longer trend. 
Increases indicate an increase in participation, competitiveness and executive constraints. While none of 
these things means a democracy, increases in these do contribute to making a political system closer to 
democracy or broadening an already democratic system. The dependent variable is coded as 1 if the 
regime transition variable indicates a 1 point or larger positive change in the state polity score towards 
increased participation, competitiveness and executive constraints. Otherwise it is coded 0. From the 
13045 country years in 1816-2001, 436 saw such positive movements to democracy. 
(f) International Organization membership (1816-2001) 
The other main indirect pacific effect of major power managerial coordination is the facilitation 
of the creation of International Organizations. To best assess the effect of major power managerial 
coordination on the life of IOs the focus is on the decision of states to become members of such 
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organizations. Using the MTOPv.14 dataset I can see whether states operating in a system characterized 
by increasingly intense managerial coordination regime are more apt to join and create international 
organizations than when major power are antagonistic.  The variable takes the value of 1 if a state in a 
given year joined at least one IOs, and 0 if it did not or if it left an IO.  
THE 1715-1815 DATASETS 
 
At this point I will discuss the 1715-1815 Militarized Interstate Disputes Dataset Project. This 
will be used to furnish the dependent and control variables for those hypotheses that are evaluated in the 
1715-1815 period. The project is made up of four datasets. One dataset is the Alliance Dataset based on 
Douglas Gibler’s work on alliances between 1648-1815 (Gibler 2012). This dataset has alliance, alliance 
dyad, and alliance dyadic year versions. The second dataset is a System Membership dataset, based on the 
Correlates of War format and Gibler’s 1999 article, for the 1715-1815 period. The main dataset is a 
Dyadic Dispute Dataset containing 86 militarized disputes disaggregated to their dyadic components, 
giving 259 dyadic militarized disputes.  This contains military conflicts of the 1715-1815 period, that are 
well known and documented in the past, such as major power against major power wars, but also minor 
power-major power wars and minor power-minor power wars, that have seen less study in international 
relations. Crucially it contains also militarized disputes at a level lower than war, which have not been 
studied or compiled in past war datasets.  The final dataset contains information on three sets of annual 
national military capabilities for the system members in the 1715-1815 period. These are population size, 
size of military establishment, and size of navy. 
Of the four datasets, the System Membership and Alliance dataset are ready and available for use. 
The MID dataset has been compiled, but requires some work for replication and reliability checks. The 
Military Capabilities dataset is still in its infancy and requires much work still. In general the project is an 
ongoing work in progress. However, enough has been done that some tentative use can be made in the 
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confines of this manuscript. Readers should be warned that this has been to date a one-person project, and 
consequently there are reliability issues. The majority of the sources are secondary sources and most are 
in English. Nevertheless, every possible step has been taken to provide readers and users with as much 
information on sources, exact pages, and descriptions of the events detailed, so that anyone who wishes 
can replicate the data collection process. As the project continues, primary sources and more coders and 
collaborators should resolve the reliability issue. All the elements used in this paper from the project are 
going to be provided with full replication guidelines.  
UNITS OF ANALYSIS AND EVALUATIONS, HYPOTHESES 
 
Having detailed the dependent and independent variables I can now discuss the units of analysis 
and produce hypotheses from the propositions. The basic unit of analysis that will be used is the non-
directed politically relevant dyad year. This is because I am interested in the onset of events within a dyad 
rather than on who took which action. I look at politically relevant dyads (defined as dyads of directly 
contiguous states and dyads with one or more major power members) , because it is these dyads that are 
more apt to have the type of international relations that will create a requirement for using political or 
military regimes to resolve issues. 
The “system” will be used as the unit of analysis when the dependent variable is the count of 
certain events and comparison between the pre-regime system (1715-1815), the transformation period 
(1816-1849), the post-regime system (1850-1945), the Cold War (1946-1990), and the post-Cold War 
period (1991-2001).  
The dyad-period will be used for evaluations of the count of military events a dyad had in each of 
the five periods noted above. This will only be used in the full 1715-2001 period. 
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The country-year will be used when the variable of interest is the onset of events within a country 
,or when it is the activity of a country as a single actor. 
The dispute year unit of analysis will be used when I am focusing on changes in a dispute due to 
external activity. The main interest here is whether a dispute crosses the war threshold or not. 
For those dependent variables that are binary, taking the value 1 or 0 logistic regression will be 
used. For those that are counts either cross-tabulations with chi square significance tests will be used, or 
ordinary least squares regression, or negative binomial regression. This will be noted before the 
description of the findings of a model in each chapter. Predicted probabilities will be used to gauge the 
substantive effect if the findings do not falsify the hypothesis. 
The time has come to transform explanatory propositions to evaluation hypotheses. I start with 
the direct association proposition. 
As the three elements of major power managerial coordination accumulate there should be a decrease in 
the use of military force in the international system. 
This proposition produces the following hypotheses 
H1: Increasing managerial major power coordination should be negatively associated with the onset of 
originator Militarized Disputes in a politically relevant dyad year in the 1816-2001(1715-1815,1715-
2001) period. 
This hypothesis compares politically relevant dyad years based on the variation in the intensity of 
major power coordination as captured by the major power coordination intensity scale and the proclivity 
of that same political relevant dyad year to experience the onset of militarized disputes.  The model used 
is a logistical model for the statistical effect, and predicted probabilities for the substantive effect.  There 
are 86197 politically relevant dyad years in the 1816-2001 period. There are 2491 dyadic MID onsets. 
Remember that I exclude joiner vs. joiner dyads. 
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H2: If a politically relevant dyad experienced a dyadic militarized dispute onset, increasing managerial 
major power coordination should be negatively associated with a dispute escalating to war in the 1816-
2001(1715-1815,1715-2001) period. 
This hypothesis compares dyadic disputes that remained lower level MIDs at their onset to dyadic 
disputes that became wars at their onset. Since all wars begin as lower level MIDs, this compares MIDs 
that did not escalate to war to those that did.  The model used is a logistical model for the statistical effect, 
and predicted probabilities for the substantive effect. There are 2491 dyadic disputes onsets in the 1816-
2001 period, of which 220 are wars.  
H3: Increasing antagonistic major power coordination should be positively associated with the onset of 
militarized interstate disputes in a politically relevant dyad year in the 1715-1815 period. 
This hypothesis evaluates the reverse of H1 for the 1715-1815 period that never saw a managerial 
coordination regime. I expect that international relations in that period are conflict inducing with the more 
antagonistic periods of major power interaction fueling the fires of war. The hypothesis compares 
politically relevant dyad years on the basis of whether major power interaction was simply adversarial or 
reached antagonistic coordination. The model used is a logistic model for the statistical effect and 
predicted probabilities for the substantive effect. There are 257 originator dyadic disputes in the 1715-
1815period. There are also 9897 politically relevant dyad years in the 1715-1816 period. 
H4: Politically Relevant Dyads should  had experienced more disputes in the 1715-1815 period 
compared to the 1850-1945 period, in which they should had more disputes than in the 1946-1990, in 
which they should had more disputes than in the 1991-2001 period, in which they should had more 
disputes than in the 1816-1849 period. 
This hypothesis compares politically relevant dyads situated in different periods of the 1715-2001 
temporal space, based on the volume of disputes they experienced. There are 160 politically relevant 
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dyads in the 1715-1815 period, There are 1857 such dyads in the 1816-2001period for a total of 2017 
dyads in the whole 1715-2001 period. 
The periods are ranked according to the general quality of major power interaction that 
historically is associated with them, and the theoretical expectations of how that affected the proclivity of 
states in the period for conflict. 1715-1815, a time of little pacific regimes thus is expected to have dyads 
that experienced more conflict than the 1850-1945 period that saw pacific regimes even though it did not 
see managerial coordination. In that period in turn I expect dyads to have more disputes than in the 1946-
1990 period due to the Waltzian expectation that a multipolar system will be more conflict prone than a 
bipolar system. In turn, I expect the dyads of the 1946-1990 period to see more disputes than 1991-2001 
because of the proliferation of pacific regimes in the post-Cold War period, and the supposed pacific 
effects of hegemony. However, I expect that the managerial coordination regime of the 1816-1849 period 
will be more pacific than the post-cold war period due to the fact that while the system is hegemonic or 
unipolar that hegemony has not been accompanied by close major power coordination, as was the case in 
the Vienna congress. The models used to evaluate this hypothesis will be a cross tabulations and ordinary 
least square regressions. This hypothesis , as will be explained in chapter 8, also evaluates whether the 
usual periodization of international history used by scholars biases results due to it being based, may 
times without prior knowledge of this, on the intensity of major power managerial coordination.  
The above hypotheses evaluate the direct association argument about the pacifism of major power 
managerial coordination. The next hypotheses are extracted from the theoretical propositions that posit 
possible mechanisms for those direct effects.   
A major power managerial coordination system is associated with a decrease in the creation of 
major power unilateral alliances. 
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One of the mechanisms that I posit may explain a pacific association between managerial 
coordination and conflict onset is the curbing of antagonistic unilateralism by the major powers. This is 
evaluated through the following hypothesis 
H5: Increasing managerial major power coordination should be negatively associated with any major 
power initiating membership in at least one unilateral alliance with a minor power in a given major 
power country year in the 1816-2001(1715-1815,1715-2001) period. 
This is a hypothesis evaluating the denial mechanism for explain the pacific association of major 
power managerial coordination. The major powers deny their diplomatic and military support to minor 
states in the form of alliances. The expectation is that this should make it harder for states to engage in 
military conflict, compared to when they are offered that support.  
This hypothesis compares major power country years based on the intensity of major power 
coordination during that year and whether a major power joined or created at least one alliance with 
minor powers. This excludes alliances in which all or the majority of major powers were also members, 
and also alliances which had two or more major power members and targeted another major power. There 
are 286 (out of 648) such alliances in the 1816-2001 period and 44 such alliances (out of 90) in the 1715-
1815 period, for a total of 330 alliances of interest. The model will be a logistical regression for the 
statistical effect and predicted probabilities for the substantive effect.   
The next direct proposition had to do with the discouragement mechanism of major power 
managerial coordination when it comes to the diffusion of conflict.  
A major power managerial coordination system is associated with a decrease in intervention by 
minor powers in existing conflicts. 
From it I extract the following hypothesis. 
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H6: Increasing managerial major power coordination should be negatively associated with a minor 
power entering one or more ongoing bilateral conflict in a given year in the 1816-2001(1715-1815, 
1715-2001) period.  
This hypothesis evaluates the discouragement mechanism for explaining the pacific effect of 
major power managerial coordination. Minor powers are discouraged by major power coordination, and 
their avoidance of unilateral activity from entering ongoing conflicts.  
This hypothesis compares the decision of a minor state to enter an ongoing bilateral conflict 
based on the variation in major power managerial coordination intensity. The unit of analysis is the 
dispute intervention opportunity country year, which is made up of the years that a country has an 
opportunity to intervene in an ongoing military dispute where a politically relevant state for that country 
is already a member. The model used for the evaluation is a negative binomial regression model as the 
dependent variable is the number of ongoing disputes a state joins. In the 1816-2001 period according to 
the Maoz Dyadic Dispute dataset there were 1798 dyadic disputes where one of the disputants was a 
joiner.  
The final mechanism concerns the effect of major power denial of military and financial support 
on the ability of minor states to accumulate the military capability required for a militarized foreign 
policy. The explanatory proposition stated,  
A major power managerial coordination system is associated with a decrease in the initiation of arms 
races among system members.  
From this proposition I extract the following hypothesis, 
H7: Increasing managerial major power coordination is negatively associated with the onset of mutual 
military buildups in a dyad year in the 1816-2001 period.  
This hypothesis evaluates the denial mechanism for explaining major power managerial 
coordination. The major powers avoid funding the military endeavors of other states in order to avoid 
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unilateral activity. This is a proxy hypothesis. A true evaluation would require looking at the association 
between the variation of major power military and economic support towards other states and the military 
procurement policies of said states. Since I wish to keep the general 1715-2001 theme of this paper, and 
since this kind of information is not readily available for the pre-1945 period, in this project I conduct a 
proxy evaluation.  
Essentially, I assume that among the many factors that drive mutual military buildups, a liberal 
major power policy of support is an important one. I assume that major powers engaged in managerial 
coordination will be more circumspect in the giving of their “gifts”. While states have access to varied 
resources for fueling military buildups, the previous existence of liberal major power support that then is 
curtailed should have a negative association with states engaging in military buildups. Consequently this 
hypothesis is more one of finding indicators in support of a relationship, rather than an exact evaluation, 
which will have to wait for the requisite data collection. 
 This hypothesis compares dyad years based on the variation of the intensity of major power 
coordination and whether the dyad members engaged in a mutual military buildup in that dyad year. The 
model used is a logistic regression for statistical effect and predicted probabilities for substantive effect.  
The next propositions focused on direct multilateral action by the major powers and its effect on 
minor power behavior. It was posited that major power managerial interventions, by acting as a tangible 
example of major power coordinated action to punish pariahs or contain conflicts, will make states less 
willing to engage in conflict out of fear of bringing such an intervention unto them. 
 A major power managerial coordination system is associated with an increase of major power 
multilateral managerial interventions. 
Major power managerial interventions should be associated with a decrease in the propensity of 
states to engage in military conflict. 
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From these two propositions I extract the following hypotheses.  
H8: Increasing managerial major power coordination should be positively associated with the onset of 
major power managerial interventions in the 1816-2001 period. 
This hypothesis compares system years on the basis of the intensity of major power managerial 
coordination and the number of managerial interventions begun in each year. The model used will be a 
cross tabulation with chi square significance test.  This hypothesis acts as a face-validity test of the scale 
of major power managerial coordination intensity. Something as complicated and demanding as a 
multilateral managerial intervention by a group of major powers should only be possible under high levels 
of coordination (point 3 and 4 of the scale). 
H9: The onset of a major power managerial intervention within the last decade should be negatively 
associated with the onset of militarized disputes by a dyad in the 1816-2001 period. 
This hypothesis evaluates the discouragement mechanism for explaining any pacific effect by 
major power managerial coordination. States should be less willing to engage in military conflict when 
they have recent experience of the major powers intervening as a group in order to resolve a dispute as 
they see fit. 
This hypothesis compares directed politically relevant dyad years on the basis of whether or not a 
major power managerial intervention had taken place in the system within the prior decade and whether 
or not any state initiated a MID against the other dyad member. The model used is logistic regression for 
the statistical effect and predicted probabilities for the substantive effect.  
Hypothesis 9 ends the hypotheses focusing on the theoretical propositions about the direct 
association of major power managerial coordination with peace. The next hypotheses focus on the two 
theoretical propositions that relate to the indirect, fostering pacific associations of major power 
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managerial coordination. These are the associations with the process of democratization within states, and 
the fostering of international organizations. 
The proposition about the fostering association with the trend towards democracy states,  
A major power managerial coordination system is associated with the democratization of 
domestic political systems of system members.  
From it, I extract the following hypotheses, 
H10: Increasing managerial major power coordination has a positive association with increased 
participation, competitiveness and executive constraints within a polity in the 1800-2001 period. 
This hypothesis compares country years based on the variation in the intensity of major power 
managerial coordination, and whether the country experienced a significant political change towards 
democratization as operationalized using polity scores. The model used is a logistic regression for the 
statistical effect and predicted probabilities for the substantive effect. The form of the hypotheses is due to 
the use of the Polity IV data in order to capture the dependent effect. While usually scholars assume that  
polity scores show democracy the reality is that Polity measures three elements of political behavior; 
participation, competiveness and executive constraints, that are not necessarily the same thing as 
democracy. That said increases in these three elements make a political system closer to the liberal 
democratic ideal.  
H11: Increasing managerial major power coordination has a positive association with the enactment 
of a constitution within a given country year in the 1789-2001 period. 
This hypothesis compares country years based on the variation in the intensity of major power 
managerial coordination and whether a country saw the onset of a constitution in the country year. The 
model used is a logistic regression for the statistical effect and predicted probabilities for the substantive 
effect. Just as in the case of the previous hypothesis, the dependent variable is not necessarily democratic. 
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However, the enactment of written constitutions denotes an important point in the path towards 
democracy as an early form of limits on the arbitrary power of rulers. More importantly Schroeder argues 
that the Vienna System had a positive effect on democracy due to the constitution-granting bias of the 
legitimist rulers. I wish to evaluate that argument. 
The final hypothesis operationalizes the proposition about the relationship between major power 
managerial coordination and the creation of IGOs. The proposition reads 
A major power managerial coordination system is associated with an increase in the number and 
membership of intergovernmental organizations in the system. 
From it I extract the following hypothesis  
H12: Increasing managerial major power coordination should be positively associated with the 
possibility of a state entering an IGO either as a founding or subsequent member in a given year in the 
1816-2001 period.  
This hypothesis compares country years based on the variation in major power managerial 
coordination intensity and the decision of a state to take part in the creation of an IGO in a given year, or 
to become a member of a preexisting IGO. State membership in IGOs is taken from MTOPs. From 13045 
country years, 1250 saw ascension to at least one IGO membership. 
The above hypothesis completes the transformation of the theoretical propositions of chapter 3 to 
testable hypotheses. However for proper evaluations there is a need for controlling for a bevy of factors 
that may condition or cause the pacific associations I am trying to evaluate. The next section looks at 
control variables. 
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CONTROL VARIABLES, RELIABILITY MEASURES 
 
Each part of this section covers a control variable. In parentheses next to the variable name is the 
name of the dependent variables it is used for. It is usual in political science to cite Achen’s  “Rule of 
three” (or ART) stipulation against too many control variables in any one model (Achen 2002: 446). 
While I am sympathetic to the issues raised against the inclusion of too many control variables, I will not 
be following that rule in this project. First of all, the rule of three cautions at throwing into models 
variables that are associated with the dependent variables but not also with the independent variables. 
Only those variables that could have a causal effect on both the dependent and independent variable need 
to be controlled for. For each variable used I try to explain why it may have such an effect. That said, it 
should be understood that because most models in the project evaluate the effect of a “structural” variable 
on dyadic outcomes, the models will have to include both possible alternative “structural” variables but 
also dyadic level controls. While in the case of the first category I can obey the stipulation that the 
variable must affect both the dependent and independent variable, this is impossible for many of the 
exclusively dyadic variables. This is an unavoidable result of the “mixed” level of analysis research 
design used. 
Second, the purpose of this paper is not to “prove” that major power managerial coordination is 
the cause of peace. Instead I wish to find indications that support the argument that major power 
managerial coordination is an important component of any explanation for peace in international 
relations. More important at this point is to show that any association of major power managerial 
coordination with peace is not spurious or caused by other variables. Because of that the more precise 
statistical evaluations that Achen calls for are not the goal. Instead a model with multiple confounding 
variables is more useful in order to evaluate if indications exist that major power managerial coordination 
has a possible positive association with peace. Once that is done, then one must focus on more specific, 
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precise, and sophisticated research designs for the specific causal relationships. I do make sure not to 
include highly correlated variables in the same model (the issue only arose once as explained later). 
Finally one control variable, sensitivity, serves an important role in harmonizing the “systemic” 
independent variable with the mostly dyadic dependent variables. I begin my discussion of control 
variables with it.38 
Monadic and Dyadic Sensitivity to major power activity (MID onset; War onset; Increases in 
participation, competitiveness, executive constraints; Constitutionalism; Mutual Military Buildups; 
Alliance Ascension; Ongoing Dispute Joiner; IGO ascension; Number of Wars-MIDs in dyad period) 
In the literature review I noted that one issue that limited research on the pacific influence of 
major power managerial coordination was the problem of integrating a system level variable in a dyadic 
research design. This is a problem because for two reasons the dyad is the proper unit of analysis for 
evaluating the effect of systemic variables on conflict. First, the dyad of states is the minimum unit in 
which interstate military interaction takes place. It is states that fight wars and militarized disputes, not 
systems, and they fight them against each other (Pollins 1996). To say that a variable, systemic or dyadic, 
has a positive influence on peace it must be shown that it has that effect on the locus of the decision for 
war and peace, the dyad. Second, a system level research design runs into the issue of a small sample size, 
a n of 186 observations for the 1816-2001 period, far too few for robust econometric or statistical 
analysis. 
Despite the above, there still remains a technical issue that must be surmounted when trying to 
use systemic variables in a dyadic research design. This is the fact that systemic variables are generated 
by a different process than dyadic variables. Systemic variables, under the conception of the system in 
this paper, are the production of a network of states. Dyadic outcomes are typically the production of the 
                                                          
38 There are many other possible problems with linear models like the ones used in this project, many detailed in 
Schrodt 2010. The author apologizes for not being able to address all of them in this project. 
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activity of two states. What is needed is a way to “transform”, to use electrician language, the process by 
which the system variable influences international relations at the structural level, to the dyadic setting. 
In this paper the key to this transformation is the sensitivity to major power activity variable. This 
variable rests on the assumption that a state, or dyad of states, will be more sensitive to system variables 
that are generated by major power activity the more sensitive they are to the general activity of those 
major powers. The closer to the loci of major power activity a state is the more it will be influenced by 
system variables produced by major power activity even if that activity is not directly targeted at them. 
The reverse also holds. 
To create the sensitivity variable I look at whether a state scores at least 1 in each of the following 
categories of possible relationship with a major power, weighted for importance in the sense that some 
relationships force states to be more attentive to major power activity compared to others. These are; a 
state has a major power neighbor (1), the state had been in a MID with a major power in the last five 
years (1), a neighbor of the state had been in a MID with a major power in the last five years (0.75), the 
state was an ally of a major power in the last five years (0.50), a neighbor of the state was an ally of a 
major power in the last five years (0.25).  
Depending on the dependent variable of interest, I add the score of those categories that are not in 
danger of being collinear to the dependent variable together and the resulting number is the sensitivity of 
a state to major power activity.39 The higher the number, the more sensitive a state is to major power 
activity and the more it will be influenced by systemic variables generated by major power activity. To 
create a measure for the sensitivity of a dyad I average the monadic sensitivity scores of the two dyad 
members. To “transform” a system variable to a dyadic research design all that is needed is to interact it 
with the sensitivity variable of the dyad. That measure is then lagged 1 year. I use the graphs developed 
by Frederick Boehmke in order to interpret the interactions created by this procedure (2008).  
                                                          
39 For example if I am interested in the effect of major power sensitivity on the decision of states to enter alliances I 
live out the “allied to major power” score.  
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Dyadic Democracy (MID onset; War onset; Mutual Military Buildups; Number of Wars-MIDs in dyad 
period) 
Democratic politics pose an alternative argument both at the systemic and dyadic level. On the 
dyadic level, dyadic democracy has been found to have a powerful pacific effect on MID onset and the 
escalation of disputes to war. I control for it via a binary variable that takes the value 1 if dyadic 
democracy existed and 0 if it did not. A state is considered a democracy in a system year if it has a polity 
score of 6 and above according to the Polity IV dataset (Marshall & Jaggers 2010). While the Polity score 
threshold of 6 is arbitrary, it is the one customarily used to indicate the advent of democracy. Unlike other 
variables this one cannot be considered as having a causal effect on major power managerial coordination.  
However, because of the towering stature it has in the study of conflict, controlling for its effect is 
necessary at this basic level where I primarily wish to show that managerial coordination has a pacific 
association with dependent variables irrespective of other pacific variables. From 86197 politically 
relevant dyad years ,12193 are dyadic democracy years. 
Proportion of major powers that are democratic (MID onset; War onset; Increases in participation, 
competitiveness, executive constraints; Constitutionalism; Mutual Military Buildups; Alliance 
Ascension; Ongoing Dispute Joiner; IGO ascension; Number of Wars-MIDs in dyad period)  
On a systemic level there is an argument that as the number of major powers that are democracies 
increases, international relations become more peace inducing as those major powers either promote 
democratization (Narizny 2012), pacific norms and regimes (Mitchell 2002; Maoz 2004), or are more able 
to deter aggressors (Russet and Starr 2000:112-113; Biddle and Long 2004). In this case the variable 
could be producing both managerial coordination since one may argue that democratic major powers will 
be better able to coordinate, and the dependent variable. To control for this I use the previous variable to 
create a proportion of democratic major powers to all major powers variable. This variable ranges from 0 
to .75 in the 1816 to 2001 period. As a structural variable I interact it with sensitivity.  
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Monadic Democracy (Dispute entry; Alliance Ascension; Ongoing Dispute Joiner; IGO ascension) 
A dummy variable created by the states Polity score which takes the value of 0 if the state is not a 
democracy and takes the value 1 if it is. Of 13045 country years in the 1816-2001 period, 3250 meet this 
condition. 
Dyadic Military Capability Distribution (MID onset; War onset; Mutual Military Buildups; Number of 
Wars-MIDs in dyad period) 
On a dyadic level there have been multiple indicators that capability ratio parity may have an 
adverse effect on peace (Bremer 1992; Geller 1993 ;Kugler and Lemke 1996; Colaresi 2001). To control 
for that I use the lagged ratio of national capabilities between the two states of a dyad.40 This variable 
ranges from 0 to 11.7 in the 1816-2001 period. This variable is not one that can be considered as having a 
causal effect on managerial coordination.  
Preponderance (MID onset; War onset; Mutual Military Buildups; Number of Wars-MIDs in dyad 
period) 
This is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ratio of a dyadic military capability is 
equal to or greater than 0.33 which indicates a one to three preponderance in capabilities by one dyad 
member over the other. Since the 1 to 3 ratio is considered as the usual ratio for a successful attack, I 
consider it as a sign of military preponderance by a state in a dyad. Preponderance is generally considered 
as a peace inducing characteristics, even if under some conditions it can be quite war inducing. Of 86197 
politically relevant dyad years in the 1816-2001 period, 51882 saw one member of the dyad being 
preponderant over the other. Because this and the previous control variables are highly correlated they are 
not used together in a model. 
Capability Concentration (MID onset; War onset; Mutual Military Buildups) 
                                                          
40 Created using the National Military Capabilities Dataset of COW for the 1816-2001 period and the new 1715-
1815 NMC dataset for the 1715-1815 era.  
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The level of concentration of the distribution capabilities in major powers, how tight or loose the 
“balance of power” is, has been found to be associated with the variation in the onset of war within a 
system (Geller 1992). It can also be argued that it could influence the quality of managerial coordination 
as certain distributions of capability may be more conducive to coordination. To control for that effect I 
use the capability concentration variable produced by EUgene v.3203 (Bennett and Stam 2000). In the 
1816-2001 period this variable ranges from .22084 to .419246. 
Shared Alliance (MID onset; War onset; Mutual Military Buildups; Number of Wars-MIDs in dyad 
period) 
This is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the two states are allied in the year and 0 if 
they are not. It can also be lagged a year. This variable controls for the possibility of shared alliances 
causing war between the member states (Ray 1990). One view, championed by Vasquez, sees shared 
alliances as indications of groups of states that have an increased probability of engaging in conflict. The 
alliance is either a “grouping” strategy, used to restrict the other state’s foreign policy or an attempt at 
appeasement. What is important is that the alliance indicates a pair of state that has active interstate 
relations and thus issues at contention. This variable cannot be seen as affecting managerial coordination, 
expect for major power dyads. 
In the 1816-2001 period I use the ATOP dataset to locate alliance memberships. In the 1715-1815 
period I use a dataset created on the basis of Gibler’s work (1999,2010). In the 1816-2001 period of 
86197 politically relevant dyad years, 18873 saw at least one shared alliance between dyad members.  
Number of Outside Alliances in dyad period (Number of Wars-MIDs in dyad period) 
The number of alliances the dyad members had in each period of the dyads existence. This is 
compiled using ATOP for 1816-2001, and the 1715-1815 Alliance dataset for the pre-1815 period. In the 
1816-2001 period this variable ranges from 0 to 42. The argument is that the existence of third parties 
may negatively affect the pacific resolution of issues in a dyadic relationship. The more outside alliances 
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the members of a dyad have the higher the possibility of issues becoming intractable due to issue linkages 
or unwillingness to compromise due to expected allied support. This variable cannot be argued to have an 
effect on managerial coordination. 
At least one outside alliance or non-aggression pact (MID onset; War onset; Mutual Military 
Buildups; Number of Wars-MIDs in dyad period) 
This is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if any of the two states of a dyad have at least 
one alliance with a state outside the dyad. This variable captures the deterrent, or war inducing effects of 
outside alliances. Reliable alliances tend to deter war (Smith 1996), but at the same time they increase the 
possibility of conflict by encouraging allied brinkmanship. The other view expressed by Alistair Smith is 
that alliances, especially those with casus foederis clauses, are more apt to lead an ally to join its 
confederate in war, and also help manage their issues (Leeds, Long and Mitchell 2000). In general 
depending on their context, Leeds et al found that alliances can have a deterring and war-inducing effect. 
Gibler and Vasquez found that major power alliances are among the most war-inducing types (1998).  
To control for the effect of outside alliances in the 1816-2001 period I use the ATOP dataset to 
differentiate between non-aggression packs (a generally soft and thus not very reliable form of alliance) 
and offensive/defensive alliances. I then code two binary variables, one for the presence of at least one 
outside non-aggression pact and one for the presence of at least one outside offensive/defensive alliance 
in the dyad. Another variable will control for whether there is at least one major power outside alliance, a 
strong war inducing factor (Gibler and Vasquez 1998). In the 1816-2001 period of 86197 politically 
relevant dyad years there are 79060 years with at least one outside alliance (excluding non-aggression 
pacts), 1559 with at least one outside alliance of the non-aggression pact type, and 47329 years were 
those alliances were with third party major powers. The outside major power alliance variable can be 
argued to have an effect on managerial coordination, as multiple unilateral major power alliances can 
undermine any managerial endeavors by the major powers. 
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Number of ongoing conflicts with third parties (alliance ascension; ongoing dispute joiner) 
This variable is a count variable of the number of ongoing conflicts a state has in a given year. It 
is a control variable for the decision of a state to enter an alliance. More militant states may also be more 
apt to find themselves engaged in new disputes. The number is coded using the Maoz Dyadic Dispute 
Dataset for the 1816-2001 period.   
Number of Shared IGO membership (MID onset; War onset; Mutual Military Buildups) 
This is a count variable of the number of shared memberships in IGOs the states of a dyad share. 
It is expected that the more IGO memberships dyad members share the more pacific their relationship will 
be (Maoz et al 2006). The information is taken from the MTOPs dataset. In the 1816-2001 period, of 
86197 politically relevant dyad years, 65446 saw at least one shared dyad membership in a MTOPs IGO. 
The existence of shared IGO membership can be argued to affect managerial coordination in that an 
institutions rich international environment may make coordination more likely.  
Peace Years and Splines (MID onset; War onset; Increases in participation, competitiveness, executive 
constraints; Constitutionalism; Mutual Military Buildups; Alliance Ascension; Ongoing Dispute 
Joiner) 
This variable controls for temporal autocorrelation. See Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998) for 
justification. Beyond the peace years version, I also create similar variables for binary dependent 
variables were past instances of an event may affect the future instance of an event.  
Preponderant Power Sea Power- Preponderant Sea Power Year (MID onset; War onset; Mutual 
Military Buildups; Alliance Ascension; Ongoing Dispute Joiner; IGO ascension; Number of Wars-
MIDs in dyad period) 
This variable captures the pacific effect that may be derived from a situation where the strongest 
major power in the system is a sea power .According to Levy and Thompson (2011), other major powers 
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are less threatened by a preponderant sea power as opposed to a land power. This may make it easier for 
such major powers to initiate or support managerial activity. It can also lead to more pacific outcomes 
since a preponderant sea-power may use its non-threatening strength to help resolve issues among dyads 
of states. The variable takes the value of 1 if a sea power predominated according to Levy and Thompson 
using their 50% lead threshold ( 2011: 27). Otherwise it takes the value of 0. In the 1715-2001 period 
those periods are 1720-1724 (UK), 1810-1834 (UK), 1855-1859 (UK) and 1945-2001 (US). In the 1816-
2001 period of 86197 politically relevant dyads years, 55949 where during periods where there was a 
preponderant sea power, and 20950 politically relevant dyad years saw one member being a preponderant 
sea power. 
Territorial Dispute (War Onset) 
This denotes that the militarized dispute was over territory. Huth (1996), Vasquez (1993) and 
others have long stipulated that territorial disputes are more prone to become wars, compared to other 
issues. When looking at the effect of managerial coordination on war onset, I control for the negative 
effect of territorial disputes. I do so by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the dispute is over 
territory and 0 if it is not. For the 1816-2001 period I rely on the revision type variable form the Maoz 
Dyadic Dispute dataset. For the 1715-1815 period I rely on the issue variable of the 1715-1815 MID 
dataset. In the 1816-2001 period there were 1017 MID onsets that were territorial disputes. In the 1715-
1815 period there were 124. 
Dyadic Nuclear Arms (MID onset; War onset; Mutual Military Buildups; Number of Wars-MIDs in 
dyad period) 
The ownership by both sides of nuclear weapons is a powerful condition for the avoidance of 
war. However it may also be a dispute inducing condition if one accepts the stability-instability paradox 
argument (Kapur 2005). To control for this effect a binary variable is used. It takes the value of 1 if both 
states in the dyad have nuclear weapons and 0 if they do not. The list of nuclear armed states is taken 
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from public sources. In the 1816-2001 period, 731 politically relevant dyad years saw both dyad members 
being nuclear states. This variable cannot be argued as having an effect on managerial coordination. 
Monadic Nuclear Arms (MID onset; War onset; Mutual Military Buildups; Alliance Ascension; 
Ongoing Dispute Joiner; Number of Wars-MIDs in dyad period) 
The ownership of nuclear arms by only one member of a dyad can be a conflict inducing variable. 
The nuclear armed state may use its nuclear weapons as a shield from the repercussions of a militarized 
policy towards the non-nuclear dyad member. The non-nuclear member may try to balance the nuclear 
acquisition by seeking an outside ally which is a war-inducing choice. This variable controls for these 
conflict inducing effects. It takes the value of 1 if only one member of a dyad has nuclear weapons and 0 
otherwise. In the 1816-2001 period, 34286 politically relevant dyad years saw only one dyad member 
having nuclear weapons. This variable cannot be argued to have an effect on managerial coordination. 
Rivalry (Mutual Military Buildups) 
This variable captures the effect of a conflict dominated relationship between two states on the 
initiation of arms races. Diehl and Goertz (2000) and Klein et al (2006) have showed that most wars 
happen in a rivalry condition. The variables takes the value of 1 if by the Klein et al (2006) categorization 
two states were rivals and 0 if they were not for the 1816-2001 period. Since there is no rivalry data for 
the 1715-1815 period I instead code the variable as 1 if two states in that period had 3 or more militarized 
disputes within a 30 year period. In the 1816-2001 period, there are 5613 dyad years that were also rivalry 
years. This variable cannot be considered as having an effect on managerial coordination. 
Strategic Rivalry (MID onset; War onset; Mutual Military Buildups; Number of Wars-MIDs in dyad 
period) 
This variable captures the effect of a protected sate of enmity between two states on the 
possibility of conflict initiation and arms race initiation, as argued by Colaresi et al (2008). It takes the 
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value of 1 if two states were strategic rivals according to Thompson and Dreyer (2012) and a value of 0 if 
they were not. This variable is coded for the whole 1715-2001 period. In the 1816-1999 period there are 
6060 politically relevant dyad years that were also strategic rivalry years. This variable cannot be argued 
of having an effect on managerial coordination. 
Logged energy consumption (Increases in participation, competitiveness, executive constraints; 
Constitutionalism) 
This is a proxy variable for the economic development of a country which positively affects 
democratization (Pickering and Peceny 2006). It is used to control for the influence of economic 
development when evaluating the effect of managerial coordination on increases in participation, 
competiveness, and executive constraints within a state. This variable is taken from the COW NMC 
dataset. It is a count variable coded for the 1816-2001 period. This varies from a minimum of .10 to a 
maximum 15.5. This variable cannot be considered as having an effect on managerial coordination.  
State Age (Increases in participation, competitiveness, executive constraints; Constitutionalism; IGO 
ascension) 
States that have existed for a long time may be more able to transition to democracy or 
constitutionalism than states that are relatively young. Social and political institutions have had the 
chance to mature and the elites of a state may have found a modus vivendi based on long tradition that 
makes political competition less deadly and permits contemplating opening a system.  This variable is 
coded as a count of years a state existed in the system starting from 1648. This information is taken from 
the COW state membership dataset for the 1816-2001 period and Gibler’s dataset for state membership 
between 1648-1815. States that existed before 1816 are given an initial age based on their state age in the 
1715-1815 period. For the 1816-2001 period this varies from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 285.  
Civil War (Increases in participation, competitiveness, executive constraints; Constitutionalism; IGO 
ascension) 
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This variable captures the negative effect of an ongoing civil war on a country’s ability to 
democratize. It is coded 1 if a country year was a civial war year and 0 if it was not. It is coded using the 
COW intrastate conflict dataset for the 1816-2001 period. In the 1816-2001 period of 13045 country 
years, 883 saw civil wars. 
Number Preexistent International Organization in Region (IGO ascension) 
I expect states that are in regions where international organizations exist and a state does not need 
to create it, to be more willing to accede to the organization than if it would need to be a founding 
member.  To code this I use the MTOP dataset.  
Absolute Volume of Trade (IGO ascension) 
States with considerable economic international activity should be more willing to accede to 
international organizations. To code this information we use the COW Trade Data (v.30) for the 1870-
2001 period. 
Number of Ongoing Disputes in a states politically relevant neighborhood (ongoing dispute joiner) 
A state that has more disputes going on in its politically relevant neighborhood has a larger pool 
of possible MIDs to join, which increases the possibility that it will join an ongoing MID. This is a 
control for opportunity.  It is coded using the Maoz Dyadic Dispute Dataset.  
Major Power Dyad/State is Major Power (War Onset; MID Onset; Number of MIDs and Wars in 
Dyad Period, Mutual Military Buildups) 
Major powers are among the main war-fighters of international history. This variable controls for 
that fact. It also permits me to see if the effect of managerial coordination on the participating major 
powers is different from that on other states of the international system. For the 1816-2001 period I used 
the COW Major Power list, and for 1715-1815 Gibler’s list (1999) 
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By Dyad Clustered Standard Errors 
To control for panel autocorrelation I used clustered standard errors for all tests using a dyadic 
year unit of analysis. 
Selection Model 
A point that must be addressed is possible endogeniety due to the link between MID onset and 
war escalation. The issue here is that the factors that cause militarized disputes can also cause them to go 
to war. Thus, the absence of war may be due to the absence of factors that cause militarized disputes 
instead of the amelioration of the factors that cause war by major power managerial coordination. The 
rarity of endogeniety in the study of military conflict has been partly addressed by previous studies 
(Braithwaite and Lemke 2011; Senese  2005). To make sure this project is not an exception I ran a probit 
two stage selection model, in which the first stage is MID onset and the second state is war onset. The 
findings do not indicate selection. 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter I presented the research design for the empirical evaluations that will be conducted 
in this project. The novel scale of major power managerial coordination intensity is the tool that will 
permit me to evaluate the relationship between managerial coordination and peace. Twelve testable 
hypotheses were extracted from the explanatory proposition. Some of them evaluate the direct association 
between major power managerial coordination and military conflict. Others evaluate potential 
mechanisms for explaining any negative association, based on the denial and discouragement concepts. 
Finally, a set of hypothesis evaluate the possible association of managerial coordination with other 
pacifying factors in international relations.  
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Because of the mixed level research design used in this project, where a structural variable is 
evaluated for its effect on dyadic and monadic variables, a large number of control variables are 
presented. While this is not optimal it is necessary and I defended my decision to include them.  I also 
briefly discussed the new 1715-1815 Militarized Dispute Dataset that permits me to evaluate the 
argument of this paper across the 1715-2001 period.  That said each chapter that follows may contain 
further discussions of research design issues where those are needed. This is especially the case with the 
evaluation of Hypothesis 4 due to the dyad-period design used. 
 In the next two chapters, I present the empirical evaluations for those hypotheses that are 
pertinent to the 1816-2001 period. Chapter 5 presents the evaluations of the basic relationship between 
increasing major power managerial coordination and the onset of war and MIDs. Chapter 6 presents the 
evaluations of the hypotheses concerning the mechanisms that could explain any relationship found in the 
evaluations presented in Chapter 5. It also presents the evaluations of the indirect influence of managerial 
coordination in international relations. 
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C H A P T E R  5 :  T H E  T R A N S F O R ME D  S Y S T E M ,  1 8 1 6 - 2 0 0 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
From November 1814 to June 1815 the representatives and heads of states of the four major 
powers of Europe that had defeated Napoleonic France; the United Kingdom, Russia, Prussia and Austria, 
forged a new regime for the management of European international relations. Founded on consultation 
through the regular Vienna system congresses, multilateralism in the form of the Quadruple Alliance 
(later to indirectly include Royalist France), and an avoidance after 1818 of antagonistic major power 
alliances, the Vienna system was an attempt to transform European politics. The goal, as Paul Schroeder 
explains, was a very egoistical one; to avoid the dangers that the Napoleonic wars had created for the elite 
power structures of the European states (1994). Contrary to popular opinion, those dangers were not just 
seen as the result of jacobin radicalism.  War itself, once a “simple” tool for princes, was now conceived 
as a dangerous tool (Esdaile 2007). Consequently the diplomatic leaders of the four major powers came to 
Vienna with the goal of making the world safe for their monarchs. And that demanded a limit on the use 
of war as a tool for resolving issues.  
The Vienna system worked admirably. For the 30 years that the system was active, the major 
powers avoided a war between themselves. The military actions of the era: the Anglo- Franco-Austrian 
interventions of 1820-1822 in Spain, Portugal, and Italy against regimes that had come to power by 
violence, the Belgian War of Independence of 1830, the interventions against  Mohamed Ali in the near 
east, where all actions coordinated between the major powers. At the same time the system fostered the 
beginnings of the institutionalization of international politics in the form of the Rhine Commission.  
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More importantly, despite its illiberal character, the system did advance the idea of responsible 
government through the ideology of legitimism which argued that government is justified by its 
efficiency and lack of arbitrariness rather than divine right, an idea typically enshrined in a monarch 
bestowed constitution. This is not to claim that absolutist monarchs did not seek to circumvent the 
stipulations of legitimist constitutions especially after the ascension to the Russian throne of Nicholas I. 
But it would be a fallacy to ignore that British and Austrian tolerance, and at times support for peaceful 
reforms, and the limits that the concert system put on Nichola’s I rabid anti-liberalism, helped provide the 
foundations for the liberal revival in Europe after the 1850s. These effects helped form a more peaceful 
system after 1816, elements of which survived the bloody fields of Crimea. This chapter will focus on the 
long-standing pacific influence of the attempts of major powers to engage in transformative managerial 
coordination from 1816 to 2001.  
The chapter is organized as follows. I present the findings from the empirical evaluations of those 
hypotheses for the1816-2001 period. In this chapter I present the evaluation of hypotheses 1 and 2, 
whether increasing major power managerial coordination has a negative association with the onset of 
interstate military conflict, whether in the form of war or militarized interstate disputes. For each 
hypothesis I will be presenting models including the dependent and independent variables by themselves, 
with interactions, and a final full model with all those control variables that remained significant after 
being included by themselves in a model with the independent variable and all interactions. For models 
showing the behavior of control variables outside of full multivariate models please refer to the Statistical 
Appendix. A discussion of the general behavior of all control variables will be provided in footnotes, 
beyond the discussion of their behavior in the models presented in the chapter.  I will also be presenting 
predicted probabilities based on the full models to better capture the potency of the variables.  
Some clarification of terms is needed here. When I refer to the term increasing managerial major 
power coordination in the hypothesis, I mean the increasing accumulation of major power engagement in 
consultation, multilateralism and the avoidance of adversarial alliances in pursuit of cooperation. As these 
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behaviors accumulate major power coordination reaches higher points on the intensity scale. The four 
points of the scale should be seen as thresholds which are reached when enough major powers partake in 
activities that bring about the existence of one or more of the three elements. Thus the distance between 
the points contains attempts at major power coordination that either due to a lack of numbers or lack of 
activity has not yet reached the next threshold. When I write of increasing major power managerial 
coordination I mean the upward trend of major power behavior that passes higher thresholds on the scale. 
I do not mean just specific points on the scale.  
The word level and point level on scale the scale of major power managerial coordination 
intensity is used interchangeably.  
THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN MAJOR POWER MANAGERIAL 
COORDINATION AND PEACE  
 
The first thing that must be established is whether there is indeed an association between 
increasing managerial major power coordination and a decrease in the onset of military conflict. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 focus on this question. Hypothesis 1 argues that increasing managerial major power 
coordination should have a statistically significant negative association with the onset of militarized 
interstate disputes between politically relevant dyads in the 1816-2001 period. Hypothesis 2 makes the 
same argument of a negative association but with the likelihood that a dyadic dispute will be a war.   
Hypothesis 1: Increasing managerial major power coordination should be negatively associated with 
the onset of originator Militarized Disputes in a politically relevant dyad year in the 1816-2001 period. 
I begin with some very simple evaluations. The correlation between the scale of major power 
managerial coordination and mid onset is negative (-0.04). When I cross tabulate the points of the scale 
with the number of politically relevant dyad years with MID onsets per point, I get the results of table 5.1. 
 
133 
 
Table 5.1 Cross-Tabulation of Scale of Major Power Managerial Coordination and politically relevant 
dyad years with MID Onset, 1816-2001 
Scale Point Number of Years with MID onset 
(% of total per point)) 
Total Number of Politically 
Relevant Dyad Years in Point. 
4 431 (2.2)% 19,787 
3 518 (2.5%) 26,211 
2 518(2.7%) 19,380 
1 881(4, 2%) 20,819 
Pearson chi2(3) = 190.8133   Pr = 0.000 
 
The results of the table indicate that as major power managerial coordination reaches higher 
points of the scale this is associated with a smaller percentage of the politically relevant dyad years that 
fall within that point being years of mid onset. Prima facie this provides some indications that hypothesis 
1 is not falsified. 
 More robust indicators are provided by the findings of the logistic regression. The evaluations of 
hypothesis 1 failed to falsify the hypothesis. Increasing managerial major power coordination has a 
negative and statistically significant association with MID onset. In Table 5.2 below, I present the models 
showing the effect of increasing major power managerial coordination when included by it-self, with 
controls for the sensitivity of dyads to major power activity, interacted with sensitivity and with peace 
years. Considering that this is one of the first quantitative evaluations of the relationship between major 
power managerial coordination and MID onset, this is novel information about international politics. 
The results of the evaluations indicate the following. An increasing managerial coordination 
between the major powers is negatively associated with MID onset. This negative association holds 
whether a dyad has high sensitivity to major power activity or low sensitivity to major power activity, as 
shown by the behavior of the scale variable and the interaction variable (Model III and V). 
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Table 5.2 Logit Model of Major Power Managerial Coordination on MID Onset 1816-2001 
MID Onset 1816-
2001 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
Scale of -0.233 -0.236 -0.174 -0.186 -0.101 
Major Power (0.031)*** (0.032)*** (0.058)** (0.026)*** (0.044)* 
Coordination      
      
Lagged  -0.085 0.171  0.359 
Dyadic  (0.154) (0.242)  (0.174)* 
Sensitivity      
 
Scale*   -0.113  -0.139 
Sensitivity   (0.085)  (0.063)* 
      
Peace    -0.325 -0.399 
Years    (0.017)*** (0.019)*** 
      
_cons -2.964 -2.905 -3.048 -1.393 -1.304 
 (0.093)*** (0.130)*** (0.178)*** (0.100)*** (0.152)*** 
      
N 86,197 83,926 83,926 86,197 83,926 
Ll -11,149.13 -10,893.51 -10,890.79 -9,946.47 -9,515.49 
Chi2 55.23 53.70 56.90 977.77 1,185.16 
R2_P 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.13 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: Standard Errors Clustered by Dyad; Splines used but not shown41 
 
I remind the reader that sensitivity is how much major power activity a state, or its politically 
relevant neighborhood, has experienced in the last five year period. It captures how sensitive states are to 
major power decisions, and thus how likely they are to be influenced by major power behavior.  The 
behavior of the interaction variable reinforces the relationship between sensitivity and coordination with 
MID onset. Figure 5.1 displays the marginal effect of increasing managerial major power coordination on 
MID onset for various values of sensitivity.  
Figure 5.1 indicates that for all values of sensitivity, increasing managerial major power 
coordination has a negative marginal effect on mid onset. This effect becomes stronger as sensitivity 
                                                          
41 As a robustness check I also ran the models with peace years squared and cubed instead of splines. The results did 
not show significant differences. The main difference is that in the models with the interaction the p-value for the 
scale variable went from 0.023 to 0.080 and that 120 failures and 0 successes were determined.  
135 
 
increases, which means that as dyads are closer to the foci of major power activity the negative 
association of managerial coordination and MID onset becomes stronger. However, even relatively 
insulated states may not be able to avoid any possible pacific influence of managerial coordination on 
MID onset. 
Figure 5.1 The interaction of major power managerial coordination and sensitivity 
 
This negative and statistically significant association remains despite the inclusion of control 
variables. Table 5.3 presents four models that contain all the control variables that remained significant 
after been included individually in models with the scale of major power managerial coordination 
variable, sensitivity variable, interaction of scale and sensitivity variable, and peace years control.  One 
set of models are with the preponderance variable, while the other with the lagged relative power variable. 
These are kept separate due to high correlation. One model in each set is with interactions for structural 
variables for sensitivity, while the other is without. Because the data on strategic rivalry goes only to 1999 
the models are only for the 1816-1999 period, that said running the models without strategic rivalry did 
not change the results. 
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Table 5.3 Logit of Major power managerial coordination on MID Onset with control variables, 1816-1999 
MID Onset 1816-1999 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Scale of mjr. 
power coordination 
 
-0.206 
(0.026)*** 
-0.136 
(0.044)** 
-0.210 
(0.026)*** 
-0.140 
(0.044)** 
 
    
Lagged dyadic 
Sensitivity 
0.230 
(0.087)** 
0.074 
(0.207) 
0.268 
(0.088)** 
0.130 
(0.206) 
 
    
Proportion of 
mjr.powers that are 
democracies 
 
0.764 
(0.179)*** 
0.162 
(0.330) 
0.719 
(0.175)*** 
0.146 
(0.330) 
 
    
Lagged relative -0.168 
(0.024)*** 
-0.170 
(0.024)*** 
  
Power     
     
Dyad 
members are 
nuclear powers 
 
0.443 
(0.245) 
0.417 
(0.246) 
0.493 
(0.252) 
0.470 
(0.254) 
    
    
One member 
has nuclear 
weapons 
 
-0.158 
(0.112) 
-0.155 
(0.111) 
-0.273 
(0.110)* 
-0.269 
(0.109)* 
    
    
Allied to each -0.087 
(0.074) 
-0.079 
(0.074) 
-0.058 
(0.074) 
-0.049 
(0.075) 
Other     
     
At least one 
outside ally non 
aggression pact 
0.331 
(0.227) 
0.337 
(0.227) 
0.374 
(0.232) 
0.380 
(0.232) 
 
    
     
Shared IGO 0.067 
(0.021)** 
0.072 
(0.021)*** 
0.077 
(0.019)*** 
0.082 
(0.020)*** 
membership     
     
Strategic 1.271 
(0.098)*** 
1.270 
(0.098)*** 
1.394 
(0.094)*** 
1.397 
(0.095)*** 
Rivalry     
     
Peace 
Years 
-0.299 
(0.016)*** 
-0.298 
(0.016)*** 
-0.301 
(0.016)*** 
-0.301 
(0.016)*** 
    
     
Scale*  -0.116  -0.115 
Sensitivity  (0.059)*  (0.060) 
     
Proportion*  0.852  0.814 
Sensitivity  (0.361)*  (0.361)* 
     
Preponderance   -0.444 -0.446 
   (0.096)*** (0.096)*** 
     
_cons -1.788 -1.649 -2.080 -1.959 
 (0.166)*** (0.205)*** (0.155)*** (0.197)*** 
     
N 80,651 80,651 80,810 80,810 
Ll  -8,611.47 -8,604.76 -8,662.44 -8,656.25 
Chi2 2,308.13 2,390.74 2,364.69 2,454.86 
R2_P 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: Standard Errors clustered by dyad; Splines used but not shown 
 
The models of Table 5.3 do not falsify the hypothesis. Despite the large number of control 
variables that survived the evaluation process in order to be included in the final models, increasing 
managerial major power coordination continues to have a statistically significant negative association 
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with MID onset.42 If one was to study the graphs for the marginal effect of major power managerial 
coordination on mid onset for the various values of sensitivity, the behavior of the interaction is identical 
to that of Figure 5.1 (graphs not shown). 
What is the substantive effect? In Figure 5.2 I present the behavior of the predicted probabilities 
of mid onset under different treatments of the managerial coordination variable. The model this is based 
on is Model 4 of Table 5.3. The base predicted probability is based on a scenario where managerial 
coordination is set to point 1 of the scale and where all binary variables are set to median and all 
continuous to mean.43 
The figure indicates that as managerial coordination by the major powers reaches higher points on 
the scale the predicted probability of MID onset decreases. Indeed going from point 1 to point 4 decreases 
the predicted probability of MID onset by .0078 from .0172 to .0094 ( by about  45%). 
 
 
                                                          
42 Of the control variable the following can be said (in parentheses the table in the statistical appendix where the 
evaluation process for this variable is presented): An increasing proportion of democratic major powers has a 
statistically significant positive association with MID onset. This is a robust relationship (2).It may be explained by 
the tensions created in a system populated by increasingly powerful democratic states and non-democratic states. As 
the value of the Lagged-Relative Power increases (i.e as a dyad becomes more asymmetric) this has a negative 
association with MID Onset. This is a robust relationship (5). If a dyad has a distribution of capabilities that gives a 
member a 3-1 advantage, or preponderance, that has a statistically significant negative association with MID onset. 
This a robust relationship (6). If both states have nuclear weapons this has an insignificant positive association with 
MID onset. This relationship is due to the presence of other control variables (6). If only one member of a dyad has 
nuclear weapons this has a tenuous statistically significant negative association with MID onset. This relationship is 
stronger when other control variables are absent (7).  Being allied to each other has a statistically insignificant 
negative association with MID onset. This is due to the presence of the other control variables (7). Having at least 
one outside alliance that is a non-aggression pact has a statistically insignificant positive association with MID 
onset. This is due to the other control variables (9).  Shared IGO membership has a positive statistically significant 
association with MID onset. This is a robust association (10). This may be due to selection in that states that tend to 
have disputes will also be states that enter international organizations in order to find alternative conflict resolutions 
mechanisms. Strategic Rivalry has a positive and statistically significant association with MID onset. This is a 
robust relationship (10). The following variables did not have a robust statistically significant effect during the 
evaluation process and were not included in Table 3: Sea Power year (4), System Concentration (3), Dyadic 
Democracy (5), At least one outside ally (any type) (8), At least one outside ally (excluding non-aggression 
pacts)(8), Outside Major Power ally (9), Dyad Member is a preponderant sea power (11). 
43 The values of the variables are as follows: Proportion of Democratic Major Powers= .497, Proportion of 
Democratic Major Powers * Dyadic Sensitivity=  .2599, Lagged Dyadic Sensitivity=.5612876, Preponderance=1, 
Nuclear Weapons Dyad=0, One member of dyad has nuclear weapons=0, Allied to each other =0, At least one 
outside alliance-non-aggression pact =0, Shared IGO membership =1, Strategic Rivalry=1, Peace Years=27.41. 
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Figure 5.2 Predicted Probability of MID Onset 1816-1999 
 
For comparison going from a preponderant capability distribution to non-preponderant capability 
distribution in a dyad decreases the predicted probability of MID onset by .0098 from .0267 to .0172, a 
comparable amount. 
Conclusion for Hypothesis 1 
The empirical evaluation reported above failed to falsify the hypothesis that increasing major 
power managerial coordination is negatively associated with MID onset. While this does not prove 
causation (we have to wait for the mechanism hypothesis to speak of the possibility of that), it does 
indicate that peace is more probable when the major powers are actively coordinating their polices with 
the goal of fostering cooperation. More importantly of all the systemic variables presented major power 
managerial coordination had the clearest and most robust association even when taking into consideration 
the sensitivity of dyads to major power activity. This evaluation should have shown the wisdom of taking 
into consideration the way in which systemic variables affect states when looking at the effect of those 
variables. The effect of the systemic variables changed depending on how sensitive dyads of states were 
to major power activity, something that tells us that the effect on states of variables such as polarity, 
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major power promotion of ideologies and so on can be conditioned by how easy it is for major powers to 
reach and influence a state, as opposed to having a generally equidistant effect.  
The next hypothesis looks at is the association between increasing managerial major power 
coordination and war onset. The argument is that such an association will be negative. 
Hypothesis 2: If a politically relevant dyad experienced a dyadic militarized dispute, increasing 
managerial major power coordination should be negatively associated with the escalation of a MID to 
war in the 1816-2001 period. 
This hypothesis argued that there should be a negative statistically significant association between 
increasing managerial major power coordination and war onset. This is a relationship long argued and 
various measures of major power behavior, like Wallensteen’s particularism-universalism, have been 
negatively associated with war onset. However, as noted in the literature review, those previous measures 
had some problems that the scale of major power managerial coordination hopefully avoids. Let me begin 
with some simple statistics. War onset and the scale of major power managerial coordination have a 
negative correlation (-0.1086). Table 5.4 presents the cross tabulation of dyadic disputes that were war 
onsets with the points of the scale of major power managerial coordination.  
The results of Table 5.4 indicate an interesting dynamic. From point 2 to point 4 the behavior of 
the cross tabulations indicate a negative association between increases in managerial coordination and 
war onset. But point 1, the lowest and most adversarial kind of major power coordination is less 
associated with war-onset than point 2 (which still is not cooperative). I am at a loss of explaining this. 
But whether it will actually lead to the falsification of the hypothesis is a question best left for more 
sophisticated analysis. 
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Table 5.4 Cross Tabulation of Dyadic Disputes that escalated to War with the Scale of Major 
Power Managerial Coordination 
Scale Dyadic Disputes that escalated to 
War (% of total) 
Total Dyadic Disputes 
4 16(3.8%) 431 
3 34(5.3%) 645 
2 72(14%) 518 
1 96(11%) 881 
Pearson chi2(3) =  45.4811   Pr = 0.000 
 
The results of Table 5.5 present logistic regression of the behavior of the scale variable when it is 
included by itself and with the control variables for sensitivity and temporal autocorrelation.   
Table 5.5 Logit of Major Power Managerial Coordination on War Onset 1816-2001 
War Onset Mode I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Scale of  -0.369 -0.367 -0.094 -0.355 -0.060 
major power 
coordination
. 
 
(0.062)*** (0.067)*** (0.135) (0.065)*** (0.136) 
Lagged   1.013 1.801  1.876 
dyadic 
sensitivity 
 (0.196)*** (0.426)***  (0.429)*** 
      
Scale*   -0.395  -0.439 
Sensitivity   (0.167)*  (0.170)** 
      
Peace years    -0.081 -0.058 
    (0.024)*** (0.025)* 
      
_cons -1.574 -2.337 -2.902 -1.267 -2.711 
 (0.147)*** (0.190)*** (0.347)*** (0.162)*** (0.354)*** 
      
N 2,475 2,421 2,421 2,475 2,421 
Ll  -722.51 -645.27 -642.54 -711.94 -637.48 
Chi2 34.83 47.05 60.32 54.52 73.48 
R2_P 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.06 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: Standard Errors Clustered by Dyad;Splines used but not presented 
 
141 
 
The findings in the table indicate that increasing managerial major power coordination has a 
statistically significant negative association with war onset.44 However, Models 3 and 5 indicate that 
when we take dyad sensitivity to major power activity into account the negative association does not hold 
for the 20 % of dyadic disputes that were in dyads that have zero sensitivity to major power activity. 
Unlike MID onset where sensitivity did not have a decisive impact, in the case of war onset how close or 
far a dyad is from the foci of major power activity is important. Figure 5.3 presents the graph showing the 
marginal effect of increases in the scale of major power managerial coordination on war onset for the 
various values of sensitivity. 
Figure 5.3 Marginal Effect of Major Power Managerial Coordination on War Onset for values of 
sensitivity, 1816-2001 
 
The figure tells the same story as the table. For sensitivity taking the value of 0 the marginal 
effect of increasing managerial major power coordination is 0. As sensitivity increases that marginal 
                                                          
44 As a robustness check I ran Model 5 with peace years squared and cubed instead of splines. The results were not 
different.  
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effect becomes more powerful. Since only a minority of dyadic disputes took place in dyads that had 0 
sensitivity, I would argue that the findings do not falsify the hypothesis. 
Table 5.6 presents the findings when I include control variables. The first Model contains all 
control variables that survived the evaluation process. Because of the limited data on strategic rivalries 
this model only covers the 1816-1999 period.    
Table 5.6 Logistic Regression of Increasing Managerial Major Power Coordination on War Onset 
War Onset Model I Model II Model III 
Scale of major power -0.353 -0.318 -0.014 
Coordination (0.088)*** (0.083)*** (0.162) 
 
Lagged dyadic 0.657 0.657 0.345 
Sensitivity (0.208)** (0.200)** (2.233) 
 
Proportion of major -1.675 -1.604 -0.135 
powers  that are democracies 
 
(0.457)*** (0.456)*** (0.837) 
 
System  1.223 0.402 -0.863 
Concentration (2.881) (2.816) (4.667) 
 
Lagged relative -0.067 -0.097 -0.073 
Power (0.057) (0.049)* (0.059) 
 
System year with  -0.936 -0.989 -1.081 
preponderant sea power  (0.217)*** (0.220)*** (0.230)*** 
 
One member -0.296 -0.021 -0.054 
has nuclear weapons (0.358) (0.329) (0.349) 
 
Democratic -0.493 -0.568 -0.439 
Dyad (0.409) (0.402) (0.410) 
 
Territorial 1.422 1.424 1.406 
Dispute (0.339)*** (0.337)*** (0.341)*** 
 
Strategic 0.134  0.153 
Rivalry (0.206)  (0.212) 
 
Shared 0.019 0.008 -0.040 
IGO  membership (0.055) (0.054) (0.061) 
 
Peace years -0.045 -0.049 -0.043 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.028) 
 
Scale*Sensitivity   -0.567 
   (0.204)** 
 
System Concentration*   6.376 
Sensitivity   (6.316) 
 
Proportion of M.P. that    -1.959 
are Dem.*Sensitivity   (0.957)* 
 
_cons -2.328 -1.994 -2.825 
 (1.135)* (1.119) (1.819) 
N 2,352 2,419 2,352 
Ll -561.49 -578.09 -552.36 
Chi2 125.33 132.58 140.89 
R2_P 0.15 0.15 0.17 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: Standard Errors clustered by dyad; Splines used but not presented 
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The second model drops that variable in order to expand to the whole 1816-2001 period.  There 
are no major differences between it and the previous model. The final model includes the interactions 
with sensitivity for the structural variables for the 1816-1999 period.45 
The findings presented in the table are encouraging. Increasing managerial major power 
coordination has a negative association with war onset. This holds for all dyadic disputes except for those 
between dyads that have zero sensitivity to major power activity (20% of dyadic disputes were between 
such dyads). This does not falsify the hypothesis. Increasing Managerial major power coordination has a 
negative association with war onset for most dyads in the system.46 More importantly including this 
structural variables in a model wipes out any statistically significant association between dyadic 
democracy and war onset, which questions the democratic peace and gives some credence to scholars like 
Kevin Narizny who attribute it to structural factors like major power action (2012). 
What of the substantive effect? I calculate predicted probabilities based on the Model III of Table 
6, for the 1816-1999 period. Figure 5.4 presents the behavior of the predicted probability of war onset 
under different treatments of the scale variable. The base scenario is based on coordination set to point 1, 
all binary variables at their median and all continuous at their mean.47 The figure shows a decreasing 
predicted probability for war onset as the scale of major power managerial coordination increases. Going 
                                                          
45 For robustness reasons I ran this model also using peace years squared and cubed instead of splines. There were 
no significant differences in results.  
46 When it comes to the control variables the following can be said: An increasing proportion of major powers that 
are democratic states has a statistically significant negative association with war onset. This is a robust relationship 
(13), Increasing System Concentration does not have a statistically significant effect of war onset. This is due to the 
other control variables (13),  increasing disparity in the lagged relative power of a dyad has a tenuous negative 
association with war onset. This is due to the presence of the other control variables (14). Having a preponderant sea 
power present in a system has a statistically significant negative association with war onset (14). One dyad member 
having nuclear weapons does not have a statistically significant association with war onset. This is due to the other 
control variables (16). Being a democratic dyad does not have a statistically significant association with war onset. 
This is due to the other control variables (16). Being a territorial dispute has a statistically significant positive 
association with war onset. This is a robust relationship (17). Strategic Rivalry does not have a statistically 
significant association with war onset. This is due to the other control variables (20). Shared IGO membership does 
not have a statistically significant association with war onset. This is due to the other control variables (19). The 
following variables failed to pass the evaluation process and thus be included in the final model: Preponderance 
(15), allied to each other (17), at least one outside alliance (17), at least one outside ally excluding non-aggression 
pacts (18), at least one outside ally is a major power (19), preponderant sea power dyad member (20). 
47 The variables take these values, Lagged Dyadic Sensitivity= .561, Proportion of Democratic Major Power=.500, 
System Concentration=.300, lagged relative power=2.15, Preponderant Sea Power Year =1,  One dyad member has 
nukes= 0, Dyadic Democracy=1, Territorial Disputes=1, Strategic Rivalry= 0, Shared IGO=1. 
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from point 1 of the scale to point 2 decreases the predicted probability of war onset by .0351 from .0586 
to .0217 (by about 62%). For comparison going from the absence of dyadic democracy to the presence of 
dyadic democracy decreases the predicted probability of war onset by .0212 from .0586 to .0374. 
 
Figure 5.4 Predicted Probability of War Onset 1816-1999 
 
Conclusion to hypothesis 2 
The findings presented in the previous figures and tables indicate that there is a non-trivial 
association between increasing major power managerial coordination and dyadic disputes not being wars. 
This is not as clear or as strong a relationship as that between major power managerial coordination and 
MID onset and is more conditioned on the sensitivity of states to major power activity, but it is a 
significant one. Furthermore the variable outperforms important dyadic pacific variables like dyadic 
democracy. Indeed the structural variables outperform dyadic variables when it comes to explaining the 
avoidance of war. 
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The evaluation of the two hypotheses, 1 and 2, indicate that there is indeed an association 
between increasing managerial major power coordination and peace in the 1816-2001 period. Whether 
there is a causal element to this association may only be ascertained by hypotheses evaluating possible 
mechanisms through which major power managerial coordination pacifies state relations. The next 
section of this chapter tackles those hypotheses for the 1816-2001 period. 
CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER 5  
In this chapter I presented the findings from the evaluation of hypotheses 1 and 2 in the 1816-
2001 period. This is the period during and after the transformation of international politics brought about 
by major power managerial coordination. The two hypotheses evaluated the basic relationship between 
increasing managerial coordination and the onset of interstate war and militarized interstate disputes. The 
following were determined: 
• Increasing Managerial Major Power Coordination has a robust negative association with 
MID and War onset among dyads in the 1816-2001 period. 
• Controlling for sensitivity to major power activity is paramount when looking at the 
effect of structural variables produced by major power interaction.   
The above findings bode well for major power managerial coordination as a building block for a 
more peaceful world. However, the question arises of how exactly does managerial coordination affect 
the willingness of states and dyads of state to use military force? In the next chapter I evaluate the two 
primary mechanisms suggested as possible explanations for this negative relationship between managerial 
coordination and interstate military conflict onset. These are the denial and discouragement. 
Furthermore if the only influence of managerial coordination is one of pacification, then the 
transformation thesis is not as radical as argued. Consequently I also look at whether major power 
managerial coordination has an influence on the process that leads states to becoming democracies, and 
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the creation of international organizations. Both of these phenomena are elements of modernity, and a 
positive influence of managerial coordination on them, would provide further indicators for the validity of 
the transformation thesis.  
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C H A P T E R  6 :  M E C H A N I S M S  A N D  B R O A D E R  I N F L U E N C E ,  1 8 1 6 - 2 0 0 1   
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I present the findings on the mechanisms hypotheses, those that evaluate possible 
relationships that can explain the associations of hypotheses 1 and 2. Those mechanisms fall either into 
the category of denial, in which major powers deny other states their diplomatic or material support for 
the actions the lead to violence onset, or discouragement in which case major powers try to dissuade 
states from taking some action. Hypotheses 5 and 7 fit the denial category, while hypotheses 6, 8 and 9 fit 
the discouragement category. Finally, I will present and discuss the evaluations of the indirect fostering 
hypotheses, those that look at the fostering effect of major power managerial coordination on pacific 
variables such as constitutionalism, political changes towards democracy and international organization 
memberships. These are hypotheses 10, 11 and 12. 
For each hypothesis I will be presenting models including the dependent and independent 
variables by themselves, with interactions, and a final full model with all those control variables that 
remained significant after being included by themselves in a model with the independent variable and all 
interactions. For models showing the behavior of control variables outside of full multivariate models 
please refer to the Statistical Appendix. A discussion of the general behavior of all control variables 
during the evaluation process will be provided in footnotes, beyond the discussion of their behavior in the 
models presented in the chapter.  I will also be presenting predicted probabilities based on the full models 
to better capture the subjective effects of the variables.  
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THE MECHANISMS THROUGH WHICH MANAGERIAL COORDINATION 
FOSTERS PEACE 
   
This section focuses on those hypotheses that provide arguments for the mechanisms through 
which major power managerial coordination has the negative association with conflict onset that was 
established in the previous section. The hypotheses can be grouped into two broad groups. One group 
represents the denial argument in which increasing major power managerial coordination is associated 
with major powers avoiding actions, such as alliances or arms transfers, that provide states with material 
and diplomatic support that makes the use of military force a preferred option for resolving issues. 
Hypotheses 5 and 7 fit this category. The other group of hypotheses evaluates the discouragement 
argument in which certain actions taken by the major powers deter minor powers from taking conflict 
inducing actions. Hypotheses 6, 8 and 9, belong to this group.  
Hypothesis 5: Increasing managerial major power coordination should be negatively associated with 
major power initiating membership in at least one unilateral alliance with a minor power in a given 
major power country year in the 1816-2001 period. 
This hypothesis presents the argument that one of the main ways in which high major power 
coordination fosters peace is by denying states the support of major powers in the form of alliances. More 
specifically, the argument is that increasing major power managerial coordination will see major powers 
less willing to enter unilateral alliances with minor powers. These are alliances by a minority of major 
powers or between a major power and minor powers. They are unilateral in that they exclude the majority 
of major powers from membership. In the 1816-2001 period there are 272 alliances that fit this definition. 
Table 6.1 shows the findings of the base models that evaluate the relationship without control variables 
beyond the monadic version of sensitivity. I remind the reader that in this hypothesis the unit of analysis 
is the major power country year.  
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The Models of Table 1 indicate the following. Increasing managerial major power coordination 
has a negative and statistically significant association with the ascension of major powers into unilateral 
alliances. 
Table 6.1 Major Power Managerial Coordination and Ascension to Unilateral Alliances 
Major Power Unilateral 
Alliance Ascension 1816-
2001 
Model I Model II Model III 
Scale of major power 
coordination 
-0.205 
(0.080)* 
-0.185 
(0.082)* 
-0.854 
(0.236)*** 
    
Monadic sensitivity  0.302 -0.456 
  (0.106)** (0.265) 
    
Scale*Sensitivity   0.346 
   (0.112)** 
    
_cons -0.931 -1.554 -0.083 
 (0.193)*** (0.297)*** (0.549) 
    
N 1,085 1,080 1,080 
Log-Likelihood -536.82 -530.11 -525.25 
LR chi2 6.67 15.08 24.81 
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
Model III indicates that when monadic sensitivity of a major power to other major power activity 
is 0 there is a negative and statistically significant association with alliance ascension (this is a very rare 
situation but not an impossible one. 9 out of 1085 major power country years exhibit such sensitivity). To 
interpret the behavior of the of the interaction variable I create a graphical representation of the marginal 
effect of increasing managerial major power coordination on major power ascension to unilateral 
alliances. Figure 6.1 has the graph. 
The graph indicates that in general increasing managerial major power coordination is negatively 
associated with unilateral alliance ascension. Yet, the marginal effect becomes weaker as major power 
sensitivity to the activity of other major powers increases. Indeed at high levels of sensitivity it may even 
become tenuously positive. This means the following. Major powers that are more sensitive to the activity 
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of other major powers, essentially the European major powers, are more prone to creating unilateral 
alliances compared to major powers, like Japan and the US, that are less sensitive to the activity of other 
major powers. That said this does not negate the negative influence of increasing managerial coordination 
on unilateral alliance ascension. 
Figure 6.1 Marginal Effect of Increasing Managerial Major Power Coordination on Major Power 
ascension to unilateral alliances under different levels of sensitivity. 
 
When I include other control variables the relationship remains the same. Table 6.2 represents the 
model with those control variables that remained statistically significant during the evaluation process. 
The model in the table indicates that increasing major power managerial coordination has a statistically 
significant negative association with major power ascension to unilateral alliances when monadic 
sensitivity to major power activity is 0 (a rare situation).48 Graphing the marginal effect does not produce 
                                                          
 
48  the following is indicated for control varaibles: Being a nuclear power has a tenuous positive association with the 
major power ascension. This is a relationship weakened by the other control variables (43). Being a democratic 
major power does not have a statistically significant association with the dependent variable. This is due to the other 
control variables (41). Increasing system concentration does not have statistically significant association with the 
dependent variable. This is due to the other control variables (40).  
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a different story from that of Figure 6.1. These findings indicate that the evaluations fail to falsify 
hypothesis 5, however noting that the effect may be severely conditioned on sensitivity.  
Table 6.2 Logit of Major Power Coordination on Major Power Unilateral Alliance Ascension 
Major Power 
Unilateral Alliance 
Ascension 1816-2001 
Model IV 
Scale of major power 
coordination 
-0.609 
(0.238)* 
 
Nuclear power 0.441 
 (0.226)1 
  
Monadic sensitivity 1.743 
 (1.014) 
  
Scale* Sensitivity 0.174 
(0.119)  
Monadic democracy 0.251 
 (0.167) 
  
System concentration  9.296 
 (6.043) 
 
  
System Con*Sensitivity -5.825 
(2.834)*  
Table 6.2 (cont.) 
 
 
  
_cons -3.783 
 (2.135) 
 
N 1,080 
Log Likelihood -515.40 
LR Chi2 44.50 
Pseudo R2 0.04 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: (1) p-value is 0.051 
 
What of the substantive effect? Figure 6.2 presents the graph of the behavior of the predicted 
probability of unilateral alliance ascension by a major power. The base scenario is where the scale of 
major power managerial coordination is set to 1, all continuous variables are set to the mean and all 
dummy variables are set to median.49 
                                                          
49 The variables take the following values: Lagged Monadic Sensitivity .8919647, Nuclear Power =0, Monadic 
Democracy=1, System Concetration=.58836021. 
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The figure indicates that as major power managerial coordination increases the predicted 
probability of major power unilateral alliance ascension decreases. Reaching level 4 of coordination when 
all else is equal, reduces the predicted probability of alliance ascension, compared to when it is 1, by 
.0383 from .0522 to  .0139 (by about 73%) . 
Figure 6.2 Predicted Probabilities of Major Power Unilateral Alliance Ascension, 1816-2001 
 
Note: The 0 is used in CI because Stata 10 provides predicted probabilities below 0. Now this is impossible in reality and the result of the 
inability of State to provide numbers between 0 and 1. That said exactly for the reason, overlapping issues are not as serious in Stata as in other 
methods of getting predicted probabilities. 
Compare the above result to the reduction caused when I go from the state of interest being a 
nuclear power to not being a nuclear power. This nets a .0111 decrease from .0522 to .0411. This 
indicates that there is substance to the negative association between increasing managerial major power 
coordination and major power ascension to a unilateral alliance.  
Conclusion on Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 5 which evaluates the argument that major power managerial coordination is 
negatively associated with major power ascension to unilateral alliances has not been falsified. This is the 
first mechanism hypothesis and it indicates that the explanatory focus on the unwillingness of major 
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powers to break the consultation and multilateralism elements of major power managerial coordination is 
one of the ways in which the negative association between major power managerial coordination and 
interstate militarized conflict can be accounted for.   
By denying minor powers their support via alliances major powers deny them a resource that 
could make military action a more appealing course of action. This is based on the positive association 
found by many scholars between alliances with major powers and interstate conflict, as well as qualitative 
work that has shown cases where a major power alliance played a role in a country’s decision to go to 
war.  That said this does not prove causation. By itself this mechanism is not enough to sustain the 
association between major power managerial coordination and the avoidance of military conflict.  
Hypothesis 6: Increasing managerial major power coordination should be negatively associated with 
minor power entering an ongoing bilateral conflict in a given year in the 1816-2001 period. 
Hypothesis 6 takes the argument of hypothesis 5 but now focuses it on minor powers and their 
activity. One of the arguments made in the explanatory section is that by engaging in major power 
managerial coordination the major powers are providing states with indicators of a preference for the 
pacific management of international issues, preferably under the auspices of the major powers, and minor 
powers react to those incentives by avoiding the use of military force in international relations.  
Since war onset and mid onset were variables in previous hypothesis, here I test a logical 
implication of this which is that minor powers avoid entering ongoing MIDs. This is not captured by the 
war onset and MID onset variable because I excluded joiner dyads from those variables. In this case the 
focus is on minor states becoming joiners in ongoing conflicts. If the hypothesis is not falsified this means 
that minor powers do tend to avoid engaging in conflict when he major powers are engaging in increasing 
managerial coordination. I remind readers that the unit of analysis is the opportunity to join ongoing 
MIDs minor power country year, which is all those country years of minor powers when a neighboring 
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state was engaged in a MID. The dependent variable is the number of times a country did join MIDs. 
Thus I use a negative binomial regression for the evaluation. 
Table 6.3 presents the following models from the evaluation process for Hypothesis 6. Models 1 
to 3 present the association between major power managerial coordination and joining a MID without the 
sensitivity controls and with them. Model 4 presents the last full model with all variables that remained 
statistically significant during their evaluation process. 
Table 6.3 Negative Binomial Regression of Major Power managerial coordination on how many ongoing MIDs a minor power 
joins.  
 How many ongoing 
MIDs a Minor 
Power Joins 1816-
2001 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
# of 
ongoing  
disputes 
joined 
Scale of major 
power coordination 
0.124 
(0.050)* 
0.280 
(0.052)*** 
0.475 
(0.074)*** 
0.253 
(0.104)* 
      
 Monadic sensitivity  0.726 
(0.077)*** 
1.285 
(0.176)*** 
1.613 
   (0.807)* 
      
 Scale*Sensitivity   -0.218 
(0.059)*** 
0.031 
(0.079) 
     
 System 
concentration 
           0.498 
              (2.970) 
      
 SysCon*Sensitivity              -1.643 
               (1.960) 
      
 Proportion of  major 
powers that are 
democracies 
   1.657 
(0.748)* 
      
 Proportion*Sensitiv.            -1.547 
                   (0.505)** 
      
 System year with            -0.389 
 preponderant sea 
power 
             (0.317) 
      
 Seapower*Sensitiv.             0.171 
              (0.213) 
      
 #Ongoing MIDs            0.351 
                    (.068)*** 
      
 Ongoing MIDs that 
state could join 
   0.120 
(0.008)*** 
      
 _cons -1.916 -3.061 -3.623         -5.875 
  (0.140)*** (0.175)*** (0.227)***                  (1.192)*** 
      
 Ln alpha 3.757 3.622 3.605           3.007 
  (0.053)*** (0.055)*** (0.055)***                   (0.061)*** 
      
 N 11,508 11,276 11,276 11,275 
 Log Likelihood -3,596.70 -3,509.64 -3,502.92 -3,274.68 
 LR Chi2 6.17 103.49 116.92      573.30 
 Pseudo R2 0.00 0.01 0.02         0.08 
 Alpha 42.82 37.40 36.79      20.23 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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The findings falsify hypothesis 6. There is a positive statistical association between increasing 
major power managerial coordination and an increase in the number of ongoing MIDs a minor power 
joins. This holds even when I include monadic sensitivity.  
The interaction in Model 3 provides the following information. As major power managerial 
coordination increases the effect of monadic sensitivity on the number of ongoing MIDs the minor power 
joins decreases. The behavior of the scale variable in Model 3 tells us that when monadic sensitivity is 0 
(46% of cases) , major power managerial coordination has a statistically significant positive association 
with the number of MIDs a minor power joins. Consequently Models 1-3 falsify the hypothesis. Model 4 
indicates that this reverse relationship (than the one expected) is robust even in the presence of the other 
control variables. The interaction of scale of major power managerial coordination and monadic 
sensitivity ceases to be statistically significant, but each variable by itself maintains the damning 
association.50  
What is going on here, and what does it mean for the explanatory story? The positive association 
between an increasing scale of major power coordination and increasing joining of minor powers into 
ongoing conflicts is not a positive finding for the explanatory story. However it is not a fatal one. Table 
6.4 shows a cross-tabulation of the levels of the scale of major power coordination in the 1816-2001 
period and the number of MIDs joined by minor powers.  
                                                          
50 Concerning the control variables: System Concentration does not have a statistically significant association with 
the number of ongoing MIDs a minor power joins. This is due to the presence of the sensitivity variable (44).An 
increasing proportion of major powers that are democracies has a positive association with the number of ongoing 
MIDs a state joins. This is due to the effect of sensitivity, as when it is not controlled for the variable has a negative 
statistically significant association (45). The system year being one with a preponderant sea-power does not have a 
statistically significant association with the dependent variable. This is due to the presence of the other control 
variables (46). The number of ongoing MIDs a state could join has a statistically significant positive association 
with the number of ongoing MIDs a state joins. This is a robust association (47). The number of ongoing MIDs a 
state is a participant of has a positive and statistically significant association with the number of ongoing MIDs a 
minor power joins. Conflict begets conflict. This is a robust association (45). Variables that did not survive the 
evaluation process and thus were not included in the final model: Being a nuclear state does not have a statistically 
significant association with the dependent variable(46). 
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Table 6.4 Cross Tabulation for Hypothesis 7 
Joined 1 2 3 4 Total 
=<10 176 103 123 142 540 
11-19 17 2 0 24 43 
=>20 1 3 0 4 8 
Totals by period 
(% of total for 
whole period) 
194 (32%) 108(18.2%) 123(20.8%) 166(28%) 591 
 
The table indicates that the main issue is that level 3 coordination sees more minor power joins of 
ongoing MIDs than level 2, and fewer than level 4. Now the question is why would this be happening in 
scale level three? By cross tabulating the number of ongoing MIDs a state had the chance of joining and 
did not join with the four scale levels I find that level 3 is associated with the highest number of ongoing 
MIDs compared to all the other scales (3588 compared to 2854 for level 1, 2287 for level 2, and 2188 for 
level 3).  
This does not necessarily mean that scale three causes higher MIDs. If we remember that scale 3 
represents the major powers beginning to actively coordinate their policies in search of managerial 
solutions to issues a lot of the MIDs may be the detritus of a period of lower coordination. Furthermore, 
as states become more aware of the managerial intent of the major powers they may rush to resolve using 
military means ongoing conflicts before the major powers begin imposing resolutions. These are all 
suppositions that may be worth future study, but for the time being Hypothesis 6 is falsified.   
Conclusion on Hypothesis 6 
The fact that this hypothesis was falsified while 5 was not, indicates that the denial story may be 
superior to the discouragement story as an explanation of the pacific association of managerial 
coordination. The falsification does cast some shadows over elements of the explanatory story for the 
effect of major power coordination, but it does not make it wrong.  But it may be that the primary pacific 
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effect has to do with the curtailing of major power activity rather than any major changes in minor power 
behavior. The next hypotheses may help shed light to the puzzle. 
Hypothesis 7: Increasing managerial major power coordination is negatively associated with the onset 
of mutual military buildups in a dyad year in the 1817-2000 period.  
This hypothesis is the second denial hypothesis. It captures the restriction on military buildups 
due to the hypothetical refusal of major powers in managerial coordination to grant military support to 
states seeking a military resolution to international issues. This includes minor powers, and the other 
major powers. Something must be said about the evaluation of this hypothesis and its character. It is not 
the best test due to the fact that a proper test would evaluate military material and military funds transfers 
from the major powers towards other states during periods of variable coordination, and then whether 
those transfers are associated with mutual military buildups. However, this kind of information does not 
exist in a form that is readily available for quantitative evaluation on a global level over time.  
While one can find specific information on the arms transfers between some major powers and 
some other states, broader information is not readily available and would require a major project to 
compile (UCDP has such information but only for the post-1945 period). So this hypothesis evaluates the 
mechanism in an indirect manner relying on the inclusion of relevant control variables in order to provide 
some indicators of the relationship between increasing major power managerial coordination and mutual 
military buildups.  
Table 6.5 presents the basic models evaluating the association between increasing managerial 
major power coordination and mutual military buildups in politically relevant dyads in the 1817-2000 
period. The models include the controls for dyadic sensitivity to major power activity and the interaction 
of sensitivity with the scale of major power managerial coordination. Due to the availability of mutual 
military buildup information this variable is evaluated for the 1817-2000 period.  
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Table 6.5 Logit of Major Power Managerial Coordination on Mutual Military Buildups,1817-2000 
Mutual Military 
Buildup Onset 
1817-2000 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Scale of major  -0.612 -0.622 -0.553 
power coordination (0.040)*** (0.040)*** (0.073)*** 
    
Lagged dyadic  -0.395 -0.142 
Sensitivity  (0.132)** (0.264) 
    
Scale*Dyadic   -0.135 
Sensitivity   (0.124) 
    
_cons -3.297 -3.056 -3.191 
 (0.089)*** (0.120)*** (0.173)*** 
N 49,809 49,659 49,659 
Ll  -2,587.66 -2,568.85 -2,568.29 
Chi2 237.00 251.77 243.16 
R2_P 0.04 0.04 0.04 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: Standard Errors clustered by dyad 
 
The models of Table 6.5 indicate a statistically significant negative association between 
increasing managerial major power coordination and the onset of mutual military buildups.  This does not 
falsify the hypothesis and is very encouraging for the denial mechanism as this is the second hypothesis 
derived from that concept to not be falsified. To interpret the interaction of Model 3 I graph the marginal 
effect of increasing managerial major power coordination on mutual military buildup onset for all values 
of dyadic sensitivity. 
 Figure 6.3 presents the graph. The figure indicates that for all values of sensitivity increasing 
managerial coordination has a negative effect on mutual military buildups.  As sensitivity increases, that 
is as dyads of state become more the targets of major power activity, so does increase the negative effect 
of managerial coordination on mutual military buildups. This may be due to the greater ease of 
monitoring by major powers of dyad behavior when those dyads are close to the loci of major power 
activity. Alternatively states and dyads somewhat insulated from major power activity may have devised 
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alternatives to major power support for their military buildups, for example a greater reliance on domestic 
production.   
Figure 6.3 Marginal Effect of Managerial Coordination on Mutual Military Buildups 1817-2000 
 
Table 6.6 shows what happens when I include those control variables that remained statistically 
significant in their evaluation process. Model 1 and 2 are with lagged relative power, model 3 and 4 with 
preponderance (the two variables cannot be put in the same model due to high correlation). Models 1 and 
3 do not include interactions between structural variables and sensitivity, while 2 and 4 do. 
The models of Table 6 all indicate a similar dynamic.  Increasing major power managerial 
coordination has a statistically significant negative association with mutual military buildup onsets.  Even 
in the face of the largest group of control variables the association remains statistically significant during 
the evaluation process (10 variables). 
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Table 6.6 Logit of Major Power Managerial Coordination on Mutual Military Buildups with Controls, 1817-1999 
Mutual 
Military 
Buildups 
1817-1999 
Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
Scale of  -0.681 -0.519 -0.680 -0.523 
major power 
coordination 
(0.056)*** (0.083)*** (0.056)*** (0.083)*** 
     
Lagged  -0.144 0.250 -0.103 0.252 
dyadic 
sensitivity  
(0.147) (1.319) (0.145) (1.325) 
 
 
Lagged  -0.038 -0.042   
relative power 
 
(0.026) (0.026)   
 
System -1.922 1.018 -1.924 0.930 
concentration 
 
(1.590) (2.562) (1.582) (2.556) 
 
One dyad -2.114 -2.106 -2.167 -2.161 
member has 
nuclear 
weapons 
 
(0.188)*** (0.188)*** (0.182)*** (0.182)*** 
 
 
Proportion of  1.507 -1.115 1.431 -1.166 
major  powers  
that are 
democracies 
 
(0.488)** (0.685) (0.483)** (0.680) 
 
 
At least one -0.077 -0.080 -0.056 -0.058 
outside 
alliance non-
aggression 
pact 
 
(0.263) (0.262) (0.262) (0.261) 
 
 
At least one  0.303 0.282 0.292 0.270 
outside  major 
power alliance 
 
(0.110)** (0.110)* (0.110)** (0.110)* 
 
 
Shared IGO 0.148 0.144 0.158 0.155 
membership (0.042)*** (0.042)*** (0.041)*** (0.042)*** 
 
System Year   -0.222 0.405 -0.166 0.452 
with 
preponderant 
sea-power 
 
(0.174) (0.221) (0.173) (0.219)* 
 
Seapower* -0.557 -1.550 -0.591 -1.571 
Sensitivity (0.221)* (0.317)*** (0.222)** (0.316)*** 
 
Dyad member -0.414 -0.458 -0.414 -0.457 
a sea-Power (0.126)*** (0.127)*** (0.126)** (0.127)*** 
 
Rivalry 0.243 0.218 0.259 0.234 
 (0.148) (0.148) (0.148) (0.149) 
 
Strategic 0.230 0.239 0.288 0.297 
rivalry (0.152) (0.154) (0.150) (0.151)* 
 
Scale*Sens.  -0.266  -0.256 
  (0.130)*  (0.130)* 
 
System Con.  -4.731  -4.618 
*Sensitivity  (3.560)  (3.573) 
 
Proportion of  4.019  3.980 
Dem. 
Maj.Pow * 
Sensitivity 
 (0.954)***  (0.949)*** 
     
Preponderance   -0.011 -0.024 
   (0.095) (0.095) 
 
_cons -2.681 -2.812 -2.808 -2.915 
 (0.555)*** (0.947)** (0.553)*** (0.947)** 
N 49,652 49,652 49,659 49,659 
Ll  -2,372.51 -2,364.33 -2,373.30 -2,365.24 
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Table 6.6 (cont.) 
 
   
Chi2 487.57 505.09 475.56 492.03 
R2_P 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: Standard Errors clustered by dyad 
 
Creating a graph of the marginal effect of managerial coordination in order to interpret the 
interaction produces a graph similar to Figure 6.3 but with a greater negative effect (graph is not shown). 
The evaluation does not falsify hypothesis 7.51 
What of the substantive effect? Figure 6.4 presents the graphical representation of the behavior of 
the predicted probability for mutual military buildup onset. The figure is based on Model 4 of Table 6.6. 
The base scenario is one where the scale of major power managerial coordination is set to 1, all 
continuous variables to their mean, and all binary variables to their median.52 The figure indicates that as 
major power managerial coordination increases the predicted probability of mutual military buildups 
decreases. Going from point 1 coordination to point 4 decreases the predicted probability of mutual 
military buildup onset by .0039 from .0094 to .0055 (by about 41 %) . 
                                                          
51 When it comes to the control variables the following is indicated: Increases in lagged relative power do not have a 
statistically significant effect on mutual military buildup onset. This is due to the other control variables (22). 
System concentration does not have a statistically significant association with the dependent variable. This is due to 
the other control variables (23). One member of a dyad having nuclear weapons has a statistically significant 
negative association with mutual military buildup onset. This is a robust relationship (28).  An increasing proportion 
of major powers has a statistically significant positive association with the dependent variable. This is a robust 
relationship (22).  Having at least one outside alliance that is a non-aggression pact does not have a statistically 
significant association with mutual military buildup onset. This is due to the other control variables (25). Having at 
least one outside major power alliance has a statistically significant positive association with mutual military buildup 
onset. This association is due to the other control variables(26). Shared IGO membership has a statistically 
significant positive association with the dependent variable. This is a robust relationship (26). A system year being 
one with a preponderant seapower does not have a clear association with mutual military buildups. This is due to the 
other control variables (27). A dyad member being a preponderant sea power has a negative and statistically 
significant association with mutual military buildup onset. This is a robust association (27). Rivalry does not have a 
statistically significant association with the dependent variable. This is due to the other control variables (29). 
Strategic Rivalry has a tenuous positive association with mutual military buildup onset. This is weakened due to the 
other control variables (29).  Preponderance does not have a statistically significant association with the dependent 
variable .This is due to the other control variables (23). Variables that did not pass the evaluation process to be 
included in the final model are: dyadic democracy (21), allied to each other (24), at least one outside alliance (24), at 
least one outside alliance excluding non-aggression pacts (25). A dyad being a nuclear dyad is a perfect predictor of 
failure. 
52 Variables are set to One Nuke =0, Outside Allaince Non-Aggression Pact=0, Outside Major Power Alliance=1, 
Shared pacific IGO membership= 1, Sea-power Year= 1, Sea-power dyad member=0, Strategic Rivalry=0, 
Rivalry=0, Prepoderance= 0.612, System Concentration:0.284, proportion of major powers that are democratic= 0.6, 
lagged dyadic sensitivity= 0.5612. 
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Figure 6.4 Predicted Probability of Mutual Military Buildup 1817-1999 
 
 Compare this to going from no member of the dyad having nuclear weapons to one member of 
the dyad having nuclear weapons. The presence of nuclear weapons may make a dyad less likely to invest 
funds in military buildups. The predicted probability of mutual military buildup onset is decreased by 
.335 from .0383 to .0048 when one member of a dyad has nuclear weapons. Major power managerial 
coordination has a similar pacific effect as nuclear power when it comes to this dependent variable. 
Conclusion on Hypothesis 7 
The fact that both Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 7 were not falsified by the evaluation process 
indicates that the pacific association of major power managerial coordination with conflict onset is via 
mechanisms of denial. These are indicators that managerial coordination and the quest for major power 
cooperation may be associated with a decrease in the diplomatic and economic support that major powers 
give to other states.  It should be noted though that Hypothesis 7 is a very rudimentary way to assess the 
relationship between major power coordination, state decisions to build up their militaries, and conflict 
onset. The fact that it was not falsified denotes this part of the explanatory story as one fertile for future 
research. The discouragement argument though still has two interlinked hypothesis that may provide 
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indicators of an influence on conflict onset, Hypotheses 8 and 9. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Increasing managerial major power coordination should be positively associated with 
the onset of major power managerial interventions in the 1816-2001 era. 
This hypothesis is in a manner a logical implication of the explanatory story I have presented for 
the effect of managerial coordination. If engaging in increasing major power managerial coordination 
truly helps major powers reach their goal of cooperation then the highest form of major power 
cooperation that has occurred in history, major power multilateral interventions, should primarily happen 
in the context of high major power managerial coordination. This is due to the high requirements in 
consultation and multilateralism that such endeavors entail.  
Major powers have authorized members of a consultation system to take action against another 
state, as the Vienna System did with the French intervention against liberal Spain in 1823. But 
interventions in which more than one major power act together and act in a coordinated way are rarer, for 
example the Franco-British-Russian naval action against the Ottoman Empire at Navarino and afterwards 
during the Greek Revolution. Only 9 MIDs meet the requirements laid out in Chapter 4 to be considered 
major power multilateral interventions. With such a small number of cases a regression research design 
would be inappropriate. However the cases are still too many for a proper qualitative design which would 
fit in the confines of this manuscript.   
Instead I rely on an intermediate research design, a cross tabulation of levels of major power 
managerial coordination and intervention onsets in the 1816-2001 period. To have some lever at statistical 
significance I use a Pearson’s chi-square test. Table 6.7 presents the results of this evaluation process. 
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Table 6.7 Cross Tabulation of Scale of Major Power Coordination and Multilateral Intervention Onset  
 
The evaluation expressed in the table fails to falsify hypothesis 8. The majority of managerial 
interventions (6) happen during level 4 managerial coordination. A minority (3) happen during level 3 
managerial coordination. No interventions happen during the lukewarm level 2 or the conflictual level 1 
periods. This is a statistically significant relationship as indicated by the Chi square test.  
Conclusion on Hypothesis 8 
The above evaluation does not necessarily establish causal relationship between high major 
power managerial coordination and multilateral interventions. This would require careful case studies of 
the 9 interventions. However it does lead credence to the argument that major power managerial 
coordination is a high form of major power cooperation able to lead to activities that are normally lacking 
in international relations. It also opens up the space for a possible mechanism to explain the negative 
association between increasing managerial major power coordination and conflict onset. This is a possible 
discouragement effect by major power interventions on the decision of states to engage in military 
conflict. This is what hypothesis 9 evaluates.  
H9: The onset of a major power managerial intervention within the last decade should be negatively 
associated with the onset of militarized disputes in a politically relevant dyad in the 1816-2001 era. 
 Scale of Major Power Coordination  
Major Power 
managerial 
Intervention 
 
1 2 3 4 
0 
 
43 60 55 20 
1 
 
0 0 3 6 
Total 
 
43 60 58 26 
% 
 
0% 0% 5.2% 30% 
Pearson chi 
square (3) 
24.1560 Pr 0.000  
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That major power managerial intervention happens only in the context of level 3 and level 4 
coordination only tells us something about the validity of the measure of major power coordination used 
in this paper. Whether major power managerial interventions are part of the mechanisms that can explain 
the negative association between increasing managerial major power coordination and interstate conflict 
onset is to be seen. The story behind the hypothesized association is one of discouragement. Major Power 
managerial intervention makes dyads less likely to engage in military conflict due to the fear of a major 
power intervention with the goal of pacifying the conflict and then resolving it as per major power wishes. 
This hypothesis looks at the behavior of dyads of states when it comes to the onset of military interstate 
disputes with the independent variable being the ten year period after a major power managerial 
intervention. Since time erodes perceptions, this variable also has a decaying function. Thus the 
independent variable is really the temporally decaying shadow of a major power intervention.  
Table 6.8 presents the base models evaluating the hypothesis when I only look at the bivariate 
relationship and take into consideration sensitivity and temporal autocorrelation as control variables. 
Table 6.8 Logit regression of Major Power managerial intervention of MID onset 1816-2001 
MID Onset 
1816-2001 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Managerial intervention 2.560 0.373 0.982 
In last decade 
decaying function 
(0.331)*** (0.293) (0.657) 
    
Lagged dyadic  0.044 0.050 
sensitivity  (0.112) (0.113) 
    
Peace years  -0.402 -0.402 
  (0.020)*** (0.020)*** 
    
Intervention*   -0.781 
Sensitivity   (0.680) 
    
_cons -3.544 -1.548 -1.551 
 (0.061)*** (0.103)*** (0.104)*** 
N 86,163 83,892 83,892 
Ll -11,081.40 -9,453.69 -9,453.10 
Chi2 59.69 1,063.99 1,081.70 
R2_P 0.00 0.13 0.13 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: Standard Errors clustered by dyad; Splines used but not presented 
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The findings falsify hypothesis 9. Having a managerial intervention happen in the last decade has 
either no statistical effect or a positive association with MID Onset. Figure 6.5 presents the graph of the 
marginal effect of a managerial intervention in the last decade on mid onset for the various values of 
sensitivity, used to interpret the interaction variable. 
Figure  6.5 Marginal Effect of Managerial Coordination on MID Onset, 1816-2001 
 
The graph in the figure corroborates the behavior of the variables in Table 8. Having a managerial 
intervention in the last decade always has a positive marginal effect on MID onset for all values of 
sensitivity expect for the highest when it comes close to zero and has a possibility of being negative. 
These findings falsify hypothesis 9. 
What does this finding mean for the explanatory story provided in Chapter 3? It is another 
indicator that the denial of resources mechanism for explaining the pacific association between increasing 
managerial major power coordination and the onset of military conflict is more credible than the 
discouragement mechanism. The positive association with MID onset may be due to several factors. 
States may join in on a major power managerial intervention and attack the target state. States may take 
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advantage of the focus of the major powers on a specific target to use military force to solve issues while 
major power resources are “locked” in the intervention. Finally, weaker states may instigate conflict in 
the hopes of forcing a major power intervention, rationalizing that a major power imposed resolution may 
be better than a resolution imposed on the basis of the dyadic capability distribution.   
When I include other control variables the results are not changed. Table 6.9 presents the models 
created when I include those control variables that remained significant during their statistical evaluation 
process. Once more I use two models due to the high correlation between relative power and 
preponderance. 
Table 6.9 Logit Regression of Managerial Intervention on MID onset with Controls 1816-1999  
MID Onset  
1816-2001 
Mode l Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Managerial -0.028 1.387 -0.085 1.305 
intervention  
in last decade 
decaying 
function 
(0.342) (0.583)* (0.345) (0.584)* 
     
Lagged 0.209 1.616 0.166 1.595 
dyadic 
sensitivity 
(0.090)* (0.509)** (0.090) (0.512)** 
 
 
Shared IGO 0.108 0.107 0.101 0.100 
membership (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.020)*** 
     
Preponderance -0.417 -0.415   
 (0.095)*** (0.095)***   
     
Allied to each -0.080 -0.096 -0.106 -0.123 
other (0.079) (0.080) (0.079) (0.080) 
     
One dyad  -0.125 -0.148 0.003 -0.021 
member has 
nuclear 
weapons 
(0.123) (0.125) (0.125) (0.127) 
 
 
 
Dyad  0.674 0.661 0.635 0.616 
members are  
nuclear 
powers 
 
(0.272)* (0.282)* (0.265)* (0.276)* 
 
 
At least one  0.424 0.429 0.389 0.395 
Outside 
alliance non 
aggression 
pact 
(0.235) (0.234) (0.230) (0.228) 
 
 
 
 
Strategic 1.414 1.410 1.286 1.282 
rivalry (0.098)*** (0.097)*** (0.102)*** (0.101)*** 
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Table 6.9 (cont.) 
 
   
System year 0.031 0.277 0.011 0.248 
with 
preponderant 
sea power 
(0.078) (0.139)* (0.080) (0.138) 
 
 
 
 
System  1.772 4.166 1.611 4.070 
concentration (0.692)* (1.104)*** (0.706)* (1.125)*** 
 
Peace years -0.306 -0.306 -0.304 -0.303 
 (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** 
 
Managerial   -1.816  -1.791 
Inter.*Sensit.  (0.786)*  (0.779)* 
 
 
Preponderant   -0.371  -0.353 
Sea 
Power*Sensit. 
 (0.164)*  (0.164)* 
 
 
System Cons.  -3.933  -4.038 
*Sensitivity  (1.542)*  (1.552)** 
 
Lagged    -0.162 -0.161 
relative power   (0.024)*** (0.024)*** 
     
_cons -2.826 -3.679 -2.453 -3.319 
 (0.265)*** (0.390)*** (0.282)*** (0.405)*** 
N 80,777 80,777 80,618 80,618 
Ll  -8,611.85 -8,604.75 -8,563.95 -8,556.93 
Chi2 2,337.13 2,403.65 2,295.37 2,382.06 
R2_P 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: Standard Errors clustered by dyad; Splines used but not presented 
 
 
The models of Table 9 indicate that the presence of a managerial intervention is the past decade 
has no statistically significant impact on MID onset.53  That said the interaction of sensitivity is 
                                                          
53 Of the control variables the following can be said: Shared Membership in Pacific IGO  has a robust and 
statistically significant positive association with MID onset. This is a robust association (38). Preponderance has a 
statistically significant negative association with MID onset. This is a robust association (34). Being allied to each 
other does not have a statistically significant effect on MID onset. This is due to the presence of the other control 
variables (36). One member of the dyad having nuclear weapons does not a have a statistically significant 
association with mid onset. This is due to the presence of the other control variables (35). Being a nuclear dyad has a 
statistically significant positive association with MID onset. This relationship is robust (35). Having at least one 
outside alliance non-aggression pact does not have a statistically significant association with MID onset. This is due 
to the presence of the other control variables (37). Having a strategic rivalry has a statistically significant positive 
association with MID onset. This is a robust association (39). An increasing lagged distribution of relative power has 
a statistically significant negative association with MID onset. This is a robust relationship (34). System 
Concentration has a statistically significant positive association with MID onset. This is a robust association (32). 
System Year with Preponderant Sea Power does not have a clear statistically significant association with MID onset. 
This isdue to the other control variables (33). The following variables did not indicate a statistically significant 
influence during the evaluation process and thus were excluded from the final models: Proportion of Major Powers 
that are Democratic (32), At least one outside alliance (36), At least one outside alliance excluding non-aggression 
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statistically significant and negative. What does that mean? It means that as the sensitivity of a dyad to 
major power activity increases, the closer in time a major power managerial intervention happened, the 
less likely for states to engage in a MID. 
The graph of figure 6.6 produced to interpret the interaction shows a relationship similar to the 
one of figure 6.5 but an important difference. This is that sensitivity values above a certain level make the 
marginal effect of managerial intervention on MID onset negative. This means that any negative effect of 
managerial intervention is dependent on how sensitive dyads are to major power activity to begin with. In 
another name any pacific effect of managerial interventions is not due to who is doing them, but on who 
the onlookers are. 
Figure 6.6 Marginal Effect of Managerial Intervention on MID Onset, 1816-1999 
 
States that are already under the influence of major power activity may reduce their conflict 
behavior. But as the values of the managerial intervention variable in Model 2 and 4 and the interaction 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
pacts (37), At least one Outside Major Power Alliance (38), Preponderant Seapower dyad member (39), Dyadic 
Democracy (33). 
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figures indicate, states insulated from major power activity are not only not pacified by intervention but 
may very well use the major power preoccupation with the managerial intervention as a chance to engage 
in military activity. 
Hypothesis 9 has been falsified by the evaluation as any association between major power 
managerial interventions and mid onset is severely conditioned by sensitivity. 
Conclusions on Hypothesis 9 
The evaluation falsified hypothesis 9. The presence of managerial intervention in the system in 
the previous decade does not discourage dyads from engaging in military conflict expect for those dyads 
that are very sensitive to major power activity. Dyads that are fairly insulated from major power activity 
may actually be more prone to engage in MIDs during the aftermath of managerial interventions. I do not 
have, right now a good answer about why this happens. However, there seems to be some relationship 
between increased sensitivity to major power activity and a discouraging effect on MID onset by past 
managerial interventions. This finding, as well as the general lack of a negative relationship between 
managerial interventions and MID onset, are genuine puzzles that require future research. One answer 
may be something akin to the old rhyme “when the cat is absent the mice will play”  as minor states take 
advantage of the preoccupation of the major powers with managerial intervention to engage in military 
action against each other.  
That said, the falsification of both Hypothesis 9 and Hypothesis 6 indicates that the 
discouragement explanatory mechanism is inferior in explanatory power to the denial mechanism for 
explaining the pacific associations of major power managerial coordination. This provides some 
indicators on how the direct influence works. What about the influence of major power managerial 
coordination in the long run? While this study has shown that major power managerial coordination is a 
lot more common than usually assumed, does it have a pacific effect beyond the periods it is in place? I 
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argued that it may do by fostering an international environment that is conducive to democratization and 
IGO formation. The next section focuses on the hypotheses evaluating the effect, Hypotheses 10-12. 
THE INDIRECT PACIFIC EFFECTS OF MAJOR POWER MANAGERIAL 
COORDINATION  
 
Until this point I have shown that major power managerial coordination is associated with a 
decrease in the onset of military conflict in the international system. I have also provided indicators that 
this is due to the denial of material and diplomatic resources from major powers to minor powers, though 
the avoidance of unilateral alliances and mutual military buildups. These findings tell us that major power 
managerial coordination has a major influence on international relations. However, to be a truly 
transformative regime it should have some influence on international relations even after the major 
powers have failed to maintain the regime. The after-effects are as important as the actual 
contemporaneous events. We consider the World Wars as key events in international history, not only 
because of the events that happened during the wars, but also because of future events that can be traced 
to the wars. I postulated that the important indirect influence of managerial coordination is primarily 
though the pacific environment major power managerial coordination creates for the fostering of 
democratic reforms within states, and the creation of intergovernmental organizations. The following 
hypotheses evaluate these arguments. 
H10: Increasing managerial major power coordination has a positive association with a regime 
movement towards increased political participation, executive constraints, and competitiveness in the 
1816-2001 period. 
This hypothesis postulates that increasing managerial major power coordination should be 
associated with movements of regimes towards greater political competition, executive constraints, and 
participation as measured by the Polity Score of a county according to the Polity IV dataset. These three 
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elements can make a regime more democratic54. Table 6.10 presents the models concerned with the basic 
association between managerial coordination and increases in a regimes polity score. 
Table 6-10. Logit of Major Power Managerial Coordination and Change towards Participation and 
Competition. 
Polity Change 
Towards 
Participation-
Competition 1816-
2001 
Model I Model II Model III 
Scale of major power 
managerial 
coordination 
0.282 0.309 0.435 
(0.047)*** (0.048)*** (0.071)*** 
    
Lagged monadic 
sensitivity 
 0.056 0.352 
 (0.047) (0.127)** 
    
Scale*Sensitivity   -0.111 
   (0.045)* 
    
_cons -3.983 -4.113 -4.475 
 (0.137)*** (0.156)*** (0.220)*** 
N 11,747 11,564 11,564 
Log Likelihood -1,845.35 -1,816.14 -1,813.08 
LR Chi2 37.03 42.53 48.66 
Psuedo R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
The models of the table do not falsify the hypothesis. Models I and II indicate a statistically 
significant positive association between increasing managerial major power coordination and regime 
score changes towards increased participation, competition and executive constraints. To interpret the 
interaction of Model III, I create a graph of the marginal effect of increasing managerial major power 
coordination on the dependent variable for various values of monadic sensitivity. This is presented in 
figure 6.7.  
                                                          54 One could argue that all I capture is the secular trend towards democracy in the modern era. However, as Narizny points out, there is nothing deterministic about the expansion of democracy in international relations. Modernity does not require democracy, and a change in some historical events might had killed democratic expansion outside of a handful of western European states (2013). I am also agnostic as to whether there is secular trend towards increased managerial coordination. I am not confident that enough history has passed to make such a claim.  
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Figure 6.7 Marginal Effect of Major Power Managerial Coordination on regime transition 
towards increased participation, competitiveness and executive constraints 1816-2001 
 
The graph indicates a generally positive marginal effect by increasing managerial major power 
coordination on increased competitiveness, participation and executive constraints within polities. As 
sensitivity increases this marginal effect becomes weaker and at the highest levels may even become 
negative. But in general it is positive.  As a state becomes more influenced by major powers the positive 
effect of managerial coordination becomes less powerful.  This behavior might indicate the primacy of 
direct ties between minor states and major powers for the political development of minor states. A 
possible scenario is that minor powers (for example Bavaria) that are too close to the orbit of authoritarian 
major powers (let us say Austria) may be less willing to engage in the breadth of  reforms that states more 
insulated would do. However, the pacification of international relations does open up the space for some 
reform.  
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 Including other control variables does not negate this relationship. Table 6.11 presents the 
relevant results for those models that include those control variables that remained significant during the 
evaluation process.  
Table 6.11 Logit of Major Power Managerial Coordination and increases in participation, competitiveness 
and executive constraints with controls 1816-2001 
Transition towards increases in 
participation, competitiveness and 
executive constraints 1816-2001 
Model 1 Model 2 
Scale of major power 0.285 0.295 
Coordination (0.054)*** (0.082)*** 
   
Lagged monadic 0.001 0.738 
Sensitivity (0.055) (0.163)*** 
   
Proportion of major 0.390 2.275 
powers that are democracies (0.288) (0.566)*** 
   
Logged energy -0.039 -0.037 
Consumption (0.021) (0.022) 
   
State age 0.004 0.004 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
   
Ongoing civil war 1.028 0.972 
 (0.139)*** (0.140)*** 
   
Scale*Sensitivity  -0.035 
  (0.050) 
   
Proportion of Major Powers  -1.199 
that are Dem.*Sensitivity  (0.274)*** 
   
_cons -4.279 -5.428 
 (0.207)*** (0.332)*** 
   
N 10,025 10,025 
Ll -1,602.88 -1,589.37 
Chi2 104.11 131.12 
R2_P 0.03 0.04 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
The models in table 6.11 indicate the following. Major Power managerial coordination has a 
statistically significant positive association with the movement of a polity score towards increasing 
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participation and competitiveness.55 When I control for sensitivity, when sensitivity is 0 (38% of cases) 
the statistically significant relationship remains.  When I produce a graph of the marginal effect of 
increasing managerial coordination on the dependent variable for the various values of sensitivity in 
figure 6.8 the general relationship is the same as that of figure 6.7 but with some differences. 
Figure 6.8 Marginal Effect of Managerial Coordination on increases in participation, 
competitiveness and executive constraints under controls. 1816-2001 
 
The main difference is that the positive marginal effect of managerial coordination becomes more 
robust, with a slight possibility of a negative effect at high levels of sensitivity. These findings do not 
falsify the hypothesis.  
                                                          
55 On the behavior of the control variables the following is indicated: Being in an Ongoing Civil War has a positive 
and statistical  with changes towards increased participation ,competitiveness, and executive constraints. This may 
reflect reformation attempts by governments in order to address some of the issues that have brought about the civil 
war. This is a robust relationship (66). An increasing Proportion of Democratic Major Powers has a positive and 
statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. This association is driven by the presence of the 
other control variables (64). State Age has a positive association with increases in participation, competitiveness and 
executive constraints. This is a robust association (65). Logged Energy Consumption: does not have a statistically 
significant association with the dependent variable. This is due to the other control variables (65). 
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What of the substantive effect? Figure 6.9 has the graphical representation of the behavior of the 
predicted probability of increases in participation, competitiveness and executive constraints for the 
various values of managerial coordination. The graph is extracted from Model 2 of Table 6.11. The base 
model is one where major power coordination is set to 1, the lowest level, and all continuous variables are 
set to their mean and binary to median.56 
Figure 6.9 Predicted Probabilities of Increasing Managerial Major Power Coordination on 
increases in participation, competitiveness and executive constraints, 1816-2001 
 
The figure indicates that the predicted probability of increases in participation, competitiveness 
and executive constraints in a polity increases as managerial coordination increases. Going from point 1 
coordination to point 4 coordination increases the predicted probability by .0277 from .0251 to .0538 (by 
about 54%) Compare these changes of the predicted probability with the change when I increase the 
proportion of democratic major powers in the system to its maximum from the mean of the base scenario. 
                                                          
56 The exact values are: Lagged monadic sensitivity= 1.066199, Proportion of Major Powers that are democratic= 
0.47, Logged Energy Consumption= 8.03, State Age=81.7, Civil War=0 
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This increases the predicted probability of changes towards increased participation and competitiveness in 
a polity by .0139 from .0210 to .0349. 
Conclusion on Hypothesis 10 
That hypothesis 10 was not falsified is an indication that major power managerial coordination 
has a fostering association with changes in the domestic politics of states that are conducive to 
democratization. More specifically increases in participation, for example more liberal electoral laws, 
increases in competitiveness, for example elections or a larger pool of possible chief executives, and 
increases in executive constraints, for example the principle of parliamentary supremacy. This association 
in the explanatory sector was attributed primarily to the pacification of international relations due to the 
direct effects of major power managerial coordination. More peaceful international relations dampen the 
demands for political repression that military conflict engenders in societies, opening up the possibility 
for opening up a political system.  
Still, in the explanatory section I offered, based on Paul Schroeder’s work, another direct 
mechanism through which the powers of a major power managerial coordination system can affect 
positive movements towards democratization. This was the promotion of legitimism by Metternich, 
Alexander I, and Castlereagh through the Vienna Concert. The main tenant of legitimism was the 
replacement of the Divine Right absolute monarchy by the idea of a monarchy restricted by the idea of 
good governance whose material form was a granted constitution. Hypothesis 11 evaluates this purported 
relationship. 
H11: Increasing managerial major power coordination has a positive association with the enactment 
of a constitution within a given country year in the 1816-2001 period. 
The congress system created in 1816 is usually seen by popular opinion as a reactionary system 
created by the victors of the Napoleonic wars with the goal of repressing the liberal and radical forces 
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unleashed by the French revolution.57 While it is true that the slogan of fraternate-egalite-liberte left the 
monarchs and political elites of the great powers unmoved (as it did for many erstwhile supporters 
disillusioned by the excesses of the French Terror and Napoleonic Empire), the administrative reforms of 
the revolution and empire did not. Indeed the administrative bureaucratic state that the Committee of 
Public Safety, Directorate and Napoleon tried to build was prefigured by the reforms of Joseph II in 
Austria and the “enlightened” monarchs of the late 18th century. The Revolution brought about not a 
reaction, but a transformation of the ideology of enlightened absolutism to legitimism (Schroeder 1994; 
Esdaile 2007).  
The core of legitimism was the idea that while people do not have the right to rule, they do have 
the right to be ruled justly, efficiently and most crucially not arbitrarily. This is why the congress system 
generally was supportive of royal constitutions, except in the case that those were given due to fear or 
imminent or actual revolution (Spain, Kingdom of Two Sicilies).  Constitutions play an interesting role in 
the process of democratization of a country. They do not necessarily lead to it but the enactment of a 
constitution provides a tangible focus point around which the political struggle can be waged. More 
importantly it nationalizes that struggle, which leads to the formation of a common identity that seems to 
be often associated with democratization especially in this period. Table 6.12 presents the basic models of 
the evaluation of the association of major power managerial coordination with constitutional events of 
enactment or reinstatement.  
Models I-III of Table 6.12 falsify the hypothesis as increasing managerial major power 
coordination does not have a statistically significant association with the enactment of constitutions. 
Figure 6.10 has the graph representing the marginal effect of managerial coordination on constitutional 
events, which can help interpret the interaction of Model III. 
 
                                                          
57 In reality this forces had already been unleashed in the second part of the 18th century. Massive and radical 
progressive reforms characterized the rule of such monarchs as Joseph II of Austria, Frederick VI of Denmark (as 
both regent and regnant), and Joseph III of Portugal among others.   
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Table 6.12 Logit models of major power managerial coordination of constitutional events. 1816-2001 
Constitutional 
Event 1816-2001 
Model I Model II Model III 
Scale of major 
power managerial 
coordination 
-0.069 -0.017 -0.067 
(0.039) (0.042) (0.058) 
    
Lagged monadic 
sensitivity 
 -0.070 -0.195 
 (0.043) (0.108) 
 
Scale*Sensitivity   0.052 
   (0.041) 
    
_cons -2.853 -3.012 -2.881 
 (0.102)*** (0.126)*** (0.161)*** 
    
N 13,045 12,806 12,806 
Log Likelihood -2,450.09 -2,233.67 -2,232.86 
Lr Chi2 3.19 2.70 4.32 
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
Figure 6.10 Marginal Effect of Major Power Managerial Coordination on Constitutional Events 
1816-2001 
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The graph indicates that for low levels of sensitivity the marginal effect of managerial 
coordination is negative. As sensitivity increases the marginal effect becomes slightly positive but never 
free of the possibility of a negative effect. The findings falsify the hypothesis. Including control variables 
does not change these findings. Table 6.13 presents the relevant models. Model 1 contains the variables 
without the interactions of structural variables with sensitivity, while model 2 contains the interactions.  
Table 6.13 Logit model of major power managerial coordination and enactment of constitutions 
with controls. 1816-2001  
Constitutional Events 
1816-2001  
Model 1 Model 2 
Scale of major power -0.027 -0.116 
managerial coordination (0.046) (0.065) 
   
Lagged monadic 0.088 0.080 
Sensitivity (0.052) (0.163) 
   
Proportion of 1.369 1.870 
major powers that are democracies  (0.289)*** (0.510)*** 
   
Logged energy -0.086 -0.084 
Consumption (0.017)*** (0.017)*** 
   
State age -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
   
Ongoing civil 0.658 0.647 
War (0.149)*** (0.149)*** 
   
Scale*Sensitivity  0.079 
  (0.044) 
 
Proportion of Major   -0.338 
Powers that are democracies* 
Sensitivity 
 (0.275) 
 
 
_cons -3.245 -3.309 
 (0.196)*** (0.298)*** 
N 11,081 11,081 
Ll  -1,879.82 -1,877.96 
Chi2 68.21 71.94 
R2_P 0.02 0.02 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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The two models in Table 6.13 still falsify the hypothesis. Increasing managerial major power 
coordination does not have a statistically significant association with the enactment or reinstatement of a 
constitution.58 The same holds for the interaction with sensitivity. The graphical presentation of the 
marginal effect of managerial coordination on constitutional events for the models with the control 
variables is no different from that of figure 6.10.  
Why is this case? If I do a cross-tabulation of the four  points of the scale of major power 
managerial coordination intensity with the cases of constitution enactment or reinstatement I find the 
following patterns as presented in Table 6.14. 
Table 6.14 Cross tabulation of Scale of Major Power Coordination Intensity with Constitutional events, 
1816-2001 
Point of Scale Country Years with Constitutional Events (ratio over 
total country years) 
Total Country Years 
   
1 183 (.055) 3293 
2 110 (.037) 2907 
3 204 (.047) 4261 
4 109 (.042) 2584 
 
What becomes obvious is that the majority of constitutional events happen either in periods of 
extreme major power competition as captured by Point 1 of the scale, or periods of high coordination but 
not of a managerial system, as captured by Point 3 of the scale. The first relationship may bear credence 
to the Nariznian argument that to a great extent of the spread of democracy is due to the policy of liberal 
powers, like the US and UK, exporting their political system in times of conflict with other major powers 
(2012). The second result, that Point 3 coordination is associated with constitutional events, is more 
contingent with the story told here.  
                                                          
58 Of the behavior of the control variables the following is indicated: Having an ongoing civil has a 
statistically significant positive association with constitutional events in the 1816-2001 period. This a robust 
association (69). An increasing proportion of democratic major powers has a statistically significant positive 
association with constitutional events.  This is a robust association (67). Increasing logged energy consumption  has 
a statistically significant negative association with constitutional events (enactment and reinstatement).  This is a 
robust association (68). State Age does not have a statistically significant association with constitutional events.  
This is due to the other control variables (68) 
182 
 
But why is this not an increasing effect as coordination increases? When I focus on constitutional 
events during country years when major power managerial coordination is at point 4 I find that the main 
reason for the falsification of the hypothesis is the fact that legitimism actually may not have worked. 
Very few constitutional events take place in the 1816-1848 period of point 4 major power managerial 
coordination. Most take place either in the interwar years or the post-Cold War period.  This means that 
Schroeder’s legitimism argument is falsified as far as constitutionalism is concerned.  
The fact that Hypothesis 10 was not falsified and Hypothesis 11 was, indicates that while major 
power managerial coordination may foster increased competition and participation in a country (as 
captured by Polity scores), it may have a harder time fostering the “locking-in” of such changes in the 
form of constitutions. The culprit may very well be Russian opposition to limits on royal authority as 
expressed by Nicholas I.  
Conclusion on Hypothesis 11 
Hypothesis 11 was falsified. Increasing managerial major power coordination does not seem to be 
associated with the enactment or reinstatement of constitutions. This is primarily due to the lack of a 
positive relationship between Point 4 coordination and constitutional events in the 1816-1830 period. This 
casts some doubt to Schroeder’s legitimism argument. That said, the fact that hypotheses 10 was not 
falsified does indicate a positive relationship between major power managerial coordination and some 
domestic changes that are positive for democracy. The fostering effect was not as strong or clear as I 
hoped for. But it does exist. Next I will present the evaluation of the final hypotheses for the 1816-2001 
period, Hypothesis 12 in which I ask if there is a relationship between major power managerial 
coordination and the rise of the international organizations as regimes of the international system.  
H12: Increasing managerial major power coordination should be positively associated with the 
possibility of a state entering an IGO either as a founding or subsequent member in a given year in the 
1816-2001 period. 
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This hypothesis evaluates that argument that by pacifying relations between themselves major 
powers engaged in managerial coordination have no incentive to undermine attempts to provide 
alternatives to military force for managing international relations. Furthermore, the needs of 
multilateralism and consultation will lead the major powers to create the basis for international 
organizations (IGO). An example of this is the Rhine Commission created by the Congress of Vienna in 
order to manage in a pacific manner issues about the navigation and use of the Rhine.  Is this one instance 
a part of a bigger trend? Table 6.15 indicates that this may not be the case. 
Table 6.15 Logit of Major Power Managerial Coordination into ascension to IGO membership, 1816-
2001 
Ascension to 
IGO 
membership 
1816-2001 
Model I Model II Model III 
Scale of major 
power 
managerial 
coordination 
0.006 -0.022 -0.181 
(0.028) (0.031) (0.042)*** 
    
Lagged monadic 
sensitivity 
 -0.123 -0.539 
 (0.032)*** (0.084)*** 
    
Scale*Sens   0.169 
   (0.031)*** 
    
_cons -2.260 -2.257 -1.848 
 (0.075)*** (0.093)*** (0.115)*** 
    
N 13,045 12,806 12,806 
Ll -4,119.65 -3,578.41 -3,563.07 
Chi2 0.05 14.82 45.51 
R2_P 0.00 0.00 0.01 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
The findings presented in the table provide an initially dispiriting picture. Model I shows no 
statistically significant association between increasing managerial major power coordination and the 
ascension of states to IGO membership. The results of Model II indicate that as states become more 
sensitive to major power activity they are less likely to accede to IGOs. The scale still remains in a 
statistically insignificant relationship to the dependent variable.   
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Model III indicates the following.  When sensitivity is 0 (37% of cases) increasing managerial 
major power coordination has a statistically significant negative association with the ascension of states to 
IGOs. To help further interpret the interaction figure 6.11 presents the marginal effect of major power 
managerial coordination on ascension to IGO for the various values of monadic sensitivity. 
Figure 6.11 Marginal Effect of Major Power Managerial Coordination on IGO ascension. 1816-
2001 
 
The figure indicates that as sensitivity to major power activity increases an initially negative 
marginal effect on IGO ascension becomes positive. This means that IGO ascension is more tied to 
sensitivity to major power activity than to managerial coordination. States that are more closely tied to the 
major powers are more likely to enter IGOs during periods of major power coordination. States insulated 
from major power coordination are less likely. These results are not clear enough to not falsify the 
hypothesis, though the falsification is conditional. 
 Why is this the case, especially when I consider that no IGOs existed before the first instance of 
a managerial coordination regime in 1816? A cross tabulation of the four points of the scale and country 
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years in the 1816-2001 period in which a state acceded to at least one IGO membership might help us 
understand. Table 6.16 presents such a cross-tabulation. 
Table 6.16 Cross tabulation of scale of major power managerial coordination and IGO ascension  
Scale Point Country Years with at least 1 ascension to IGO 
(ratio over total country years in Point) 
Total Country Years 
1 356 (.108) 3293 
 
2 227(.078) 2907 
 
3 382(.089) 4261 
 
4 285(.110) 2584 
  
The cross tabulation indicates that the reason for the falsification of the hypothesis is the 
association of point 1 coordination, the lowest level, with as many IGO ascensions as those associated 
with point 3 and 4. This means that while states are more likely to enter an IGO when the major powers 
are engaged in managerial coordination, they are equally likely to do so when the major powers are 
embroiled in antagonistic alliances. Why is this the case? If I further look at the association between 
country years and IGO ascension during Point 1 coordination then the culprit is the Cold War, specifically 
the 1945-1970 period. During the cold war major power coordination was very low. However, de-
colonization led to a large influx of states into pre-existing and new organizations, most of them part of 
the Non-aligned movement.   
What this means is that while this variable has been conditionally falsified, the theoretical 
relationship behind the proposition this hypothesis was based on does have merit, as long as we take into 
consideration the Cold War’s effect. Indeed if I exclude those years, the relationship between increasing 
managerial major power coordination and IGO ascension follows the expected direction. However until a 
theoretical reason is formulated for excluding that part of the Cold War, I cannot claim the hypothesis 
escapes falsification.  
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Table 6.17 presents the results of the model including control variables. Because trade info only 
exists for the 1870-2000 period, the full model is restricted to that period. 
Table 6.17 Logit of Scale of Major Power Coordination and ascension to IGO membership, 1870-2000 
Ascension to IGO 
Membership 1870-2001 
Model 1 Model 2 
Scale of major power -0.131 -0.312 
Coordination (0.035)*** (0.047)*** 
   
Lagged monadic -0.065 -0.535 
Sensitivity (0.038) (0.177)** 
   
Proportion of 5.059 4.968 
major powers that are democracies (0.423)*** (0.562)*** 
   
State age -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Number of preexisting -0.046 -0.040 
IGOs (0.009)*** (0.009)*** 
   
Absolute volume of trade -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
   
Scale*Sensitivity  0.198 
  (0.034)*** 
   
Proportion of Major Pow.  0.006 
that are democracies* 
Sensitivity 
 (0.323) 
   
_cons -4.310 -3.851 
 (0.207)*** (0.280)*** 
   
N 10,811 10,811 
Ll  -3,164.52 -3,143.56 
Chi2 235.58 277.50 
R2_P 0.04 0.04 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: absolute volume of trade exhibited abnormal numbers. 
 
The hypothesis remains falsified as the dynamics of the models of Table 6.16 remain 
unchanged.59 Until a theoretical justification for excluding the 1945-1970 period can be produced, this 
                                                          
59 When it comes to control variables the following can be said of their behavior: An increasing absolute 
volume of trade has a statistically significant negative association with ascension to IGO membership. This is a 
robust association (73) The large size of the coefficient tails though indicate that this variable may not be correct. An 
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must remain the case. The falsification is conditioned though by the evidence that the marginal effect of 
managerial coordination on ascension to IGO membership becomes positive as sensitivity to major power 
activity increases.  
Conclusion on Hypothesis 12 
The falsification of hypothesis 12 does weaken the transformative effects of major power 
managerial coordination. However the possibility of this falsification being an artifact of decolonization 
during the Cold War, and the possible positive effect under high sensitivity to major power activity leaves 
some hope of a different research design capturing the expected effect. Further research is needed. 
CONCLUSION FOR CHAPTER 6 
 
In this chapter I presented the second set of findings from the evaluation of the hypotheses in the 
1816-2001 period. Two sets of hypotheses were evaluated, those on the denial and discouragement 
mechanisms that may explain a negative association between major power managerial coordination and 
the onset of interstate military conflict; and those on the indirect pacific effects of increasing managerial 
major power coordination on polity change, constitutional events and state ascension to IGOs.  The 
findings are from a system that is being transformed by the new regime. The following were determined: 
• Denial mechanisms, which are the denial by major powers of their diplomatic and 
military support to minor powers, received strong indicators of support as possible 
explanations for the negative association of managerial coordination and conflict onset. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
increasing proportion of  major powers that are democracies  has a strong positive statistical association with state 
ascension to at least one IGO . This is a robust association (70). State age has no statistical relationship between 
increasing state age and ascension to IGO membership. This is due to the other control variables (71). There is a 
statistically significant negative association between an increasing number of preexisting IGOs in a region and state 
IGO ascension to membership. This is due to the other control variables in the model (72). The following variables 
did not exhibit a statistically significant association during the evaluation process and were not included in the final 
models:Logged energy consumption (71) , monadic democracy (72,73)  
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Increasing managerial major power coordination is negatively associated with Major 
Power ascension to unilateral alliances with minor states, and the onset of mutual military 
buildups. 
• All of the managerial interventions by major powers in the 1816-2001 period happened 
during managerial coordination that reached level 3 or level 4 on the scale of major 
power managerial coordination intensity. These are the highest levels. As a result I am 
more confident of the face-validity of the scale measurement instrument. 
• Discouragement mechanisms, which are the discouragement of military activity by other 
states due to major power censure, or the possibility of censure of such activity, did not 
receive support as explanations. Managerial interventions did not have a negative 
association with MID Onset. Increasing Managerial Major Power coordination did not 
have a negative association with minor powers joining ongoing disputes. 
• Increasing major power managerial coordination has a robust positive association with 
increases in participation, competitiveness, and executive constraints within polities. 
These are phenomena that are associated with democratization, so managerial 
coordination by fostering international peace may foster democratization. 
• Increasing major power managerial coordination does not have a positive association 
with the enactment or reinstitution of constitutions. This undermines Schroeder’s 
legitimist theses.  
• Increasing major power managerial coordination does not have a positive association 
with the ascension of states to IGO membership. There is a positive association if I 
exclude the Cold War years from the analysis. 
• Controlling for sensitivity to major power activity is paramount when looking at the 
effect of structural variables produced by major power interaction.  Under high levels of 
sensitivity to major power activity increasing managerial coordination has a positive 
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effect on constitutional events within a state, and sate ascension to IGO membership. 
Furthermore, managerial interventions have a negative effect on MID onset when 
sensitivity to major power activity is high. 
• Of the control variables an increasing proportion of major powers that are democracies 
has a robust positive association with increases in participation, competitiveness and 
executive constraints, with constitutional events, and with state ascension to IGOs. This 
indicates support for the arguments about the role of democratic major powers in 
international politics presented by Mitchell (2002), and Narizny (2012) among others. 
The above findings bode well for major power managerial coordination as a building block for a 
more peaceful world. However the findings from the evaluations of the indirect effects cooled the 
enthusiasm for the transformative effect of major power managerial coordination.  While major power 
managerial coordination is more likely to be contemporaneous with a broadening of political participation 
and competition within polities, an expected fostering effect on constitutionalism was not found. The 
Cold War period also makes it hard to find a positive relationship between major power coordination and 
the creation of the dense system of IGOs that help states manage in a pacific manner the issues of the 
world system.  
The above findings tell the story of how the fluctuations in major power coordination affect peace 
in a system where such a regime as managerial coordination has existed and thus is possible. To truly 
grasp if there is a transformative effect to the existence of such a regime, we need a system to compare 
with in which managerial coordination is not yet a possibility. This role falls to Europe from 1715 to 
1815. In the next chapter we will look at the dynamics of conflict in this period.  
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C H A P T E R  7 :  T H E  1 7 1 5 - 1 8 1 5  P E R I O D  
The previous chapter presented findings that provide an indicator that major power managerial 
coordination may have a pacific role in international politics in the 1816-2001 period. However I wish to 
compares those findings with international politics before the first case of a managerial coordination 
regime in 1816, the Vienna System. In this chapter I will be reviewing findings on a number of 
hypothesis but for the 1715-1815 period. 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE AGE OF KINGS AND REVOLUTION 60 
The peace of Utrecht in 1715 was seen by contemporaries and subsequent scholars as a key point 
in diplomatic history.  It was seen by many as a decisive defeat of the ambitions of Louis XIV of France 
for a European hegemony, and as a reaffirmation of the principles of the Westphalia system. It was also 
one of the first treaties to explicitly mention the idea of a balance of power as the key for European peace. 
However, as often is the case, things are not as they seem. Louis XIV’s ambitions have been exaggerated 
by essentially a Whig interpretation of history (Butterfield 1931[1965]). The treaty’s balance of power 
was in reality an alliance between France and Great Britain pursued by Cardinal Fleury and Sir Robert 
Walpole. The peace it brought was limited to Western Europe and could not provide a comprehensive 
resolution for the most important issue of the War of Spanish Succession, the question of what would 
happen to the Spanish Hapsburg patrimony. The treaty resolved the issue of the Spanish Netherlands, 
giving them to the Austrian Hapsburgs. But in Italy no such resolution was possible, and the Hapsburg 
emperor Charles II was unwilling to even recognize the Bourbon’s in Spain. Elsewhere in Europe war 
raged. 
                                                          60 The following narrative is drawn from Paul Schroeder (1994), Jeremy Black (1990;2002a), Charles Esdaile (2007) 
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Northern Europe was devoured by the flames of the Second Great Northern War as a coalition 
headed by Russia was dismembering the Swedish Baltic Empire. In the south the Ottoman Empire had 
begun a campaign with the goal of destroying the remnants of Venetian power. To these ongoing wars 
were added the tensions created in Italy by the highly opportunistic and rapacious policies of the Spanish 
Bourbons and Austrian Habsburgs. By 1718 Italy became once more a theatre of war as King Phillip V of 
Spain, urged by his formidable wife Elizabeth Farnese and Cardinal Aleberoni, sought to ensure the 
Habsburg patrimony for Spanish interests. This led to a sharp short war where Great Britain and France 
momentarily limited Spanish ambitions, even if nothing was resolved due to the intransigence of the two 
competing houses of Bourbon and Habsburg. In the Baltic, Great Britain risked war with Russia and 
Austria but succeeded in limiting the gains of Russia from its victory in the Great Northern War. With the 
Austrian entry in the Veneto-Ottoman war leading to a western victory in 1718, it seemed as the great 
period of conflict inaugurated in the early 1700s had come to an end. 
Habsburg and Spanish Bourbon opportunism and the changes in diplomatic politics brought about 
by the rise of Russia undermined any lasting peace. The chaotic politics of Poland coupled with the open 
Italian issues, and the increased Anglo-Spanish colonial competition led to two wars in the late 1720s-
1730s. To these were added another Ottoman war between the Porte and the Habsburgs and Romanovs. 
The system of Utrecht as a system of general peace had failed. However the Anglo-French part of the 
system was a success. Despite the fact that Europe saw war five times between 1715 and 1740, France 
and Great Britain remained either at peace or were allies. A remarkable feat of diplomacy, it could not last 
because the wider elites of the two countries did not fear war. Ounce Walpole and Fleury fell from power, 
the rivalry between France and Great Britain took fire again.   
When Charles II of Austria died he left his heir Maria Teresa a state that had become a pariah in 
international relations. Charles II had followed a fanatically anti-Bourbon policy that had alienated the 
historical allies of Austria in Germany, and left multiple open fronts for opponents to take advantage of. 
What started  as an attempt at extortion by Frederic II of Prussia, who was following the opportunistic 
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expansion policies of his father, led to the collapse of the Utrecht settlement and what was a world war. 
The War of Austrian succession ended in 1748 with another attempt at creating a pacific system, this time 
under the guidance of Louis XV of France. Unlike the Treaty of Utrecht this war put to rest a number of 
open issues in Europe. Italy was finally distributed between the Bourbons, Habsburgs and locals in a 
satisfactory way. It would remain at peace until the fires of the revolutionary wars in 1792, providing a 
case of successful conflict resolution if we remember that this is an area that had fed 3 wars since 1715. 
The settlement of the Low Countries won at Utrecht was once more confirmed. But alas the pacification 
of parts of Europe did not extend to all of Europe. 
Frederick’s the Great ambitious policy during the War of Austrian Succession had upturned the 
internal peace of Germany. The question of Russian influence in Europe was not resolved, especially 
concerning Poland. And outside Europe the colonial conflicts of the United Kingdom and its ally Portugal 
with France and Spain were not put to rest. British support for Frederick the Great, partly fed by fears for 
the fate of Hanover if Prussia decided to invade it, brought Whitehall into a collision course with the 
Austro-Russian goal of breaking Prussian power. Franco-Spanish antagonism with Great Britain over 
India and the Americas led to the Diplomatic revolution when Bourbon France broke two centuries worth 
of foreign policy to ally with the Hapsburgs.  
The war that followed, the Seven Years war, was in a way smaller in scope than the War of 
Austrian Succession. While it raged in America, India and Europe, in Europe it was only focused in two 
theaters, the Low Countries and Bohemia. Italy, the Baltic, and the Balkans remained at peace. It was 
however a more intense war as Austria and Russia fought for a total victory against Prussia. In the end the 
war ended with Prussia and Austria left in the same place as before and German politics hopelessly 
divided. Great Britain won the colonial war but lost all possible allies in Europe. Russia gained the most 
as it now became the third power in the Austro-Prussian rivalry in Germany. 
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The period after 1763 would see Western Europe at peace, but Eastern Europe in flames. In 
Germany, the new Habsburg emperor Joseph II had ambitious plans to re-forge the Hapsburg Empire into 
a unified state, something that entailed huge territorial changes. His opportunistic and radical schemes led 
to a series of military crises in Germany that opened up the space for Russian opportunism in Eastern 
Europe. Playing Austria and Prussia against each other, Russia under Catherine the Great engaged in an 
explosive expansion. Poland was ransacked by Russia, a policy that Austria and Prussia helped bring 
about at times because of extortion, and at times because of greed.  The Ottoman Empire and Sweden of 
Gustav III tried to stop the Russians, a policy that led to a number of Ottoman and Swedish wars with 
Catherine. The western powers, France and Great Britain, exhausted from the Seven Years War and their 
conflict during the War of American Independence, found themselves unable to control events. 
The weakening of Austria’s position due to the policies of Joseph II both external and internal, so 
reminiscent of Charles II, created the seed of an initially Austrian consideration of creating a more 
permanent system of major power coordination to avoid potentially dangerous consequences from 
unilateral foreign policy. This different conception of international relations by Leopold II and Kaunstiz 
was also driven by the events in the Low Countries. An area of Europe that had not produced a war since 
1715 was now in flames. The Austrian Low Countries had rebelled in a conservative reaction to Joseph’s 
radical reforms. That rebellion together with the ideas of the American Revolution and the increasing 
revolutionary fervor in France led to a Dutch civil war which Prussia took advantage of in order to install 
a friendly regime against French protests and Austrian inaction. At the same time the situation in Poland 
and the Balkans where Russia was slowly becoming a dominant power had started to bring Austria before 
the unenviable position of contemplating a great war against Russia. 
The French revolution averted that danger only partly. Initially the revolution was not a big worry 
for most European monarchies. Expect for Gustav III who was driven by a fanatical anti-revolutionary 
fervor, everybody was worried about Russian expansion in the East. Austria saw an intervention against 
France, with the revolution as the pretext, as a way to tie Prussian attentions in the West and thus deny its 
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support to Russia. Unfortunately for Austria, both the radicals and the king in France for their own 
reasons wanted an Austrian war. Austria found itself fighting France and thus was not able to stop Russia 
from eliminating Poland in association with the opportunistic Prussia, and humiliating the Ottomans who 
came to Poland’s defense.  
The anti-Austrian war of France quickly escalated to a European war. There are many reasons for 
this, the smallest of which is ideology. The French radicals, like the monarchy before them, had never 
accepted the Prussian resolution of the Dutch civil war. Their war with Austria was partly fed by old 
prejudices and partly by the even older goal of getting natural borders. Ideology only played an important 
role in Italy where French anti-austrianism and territorial greed were married with a goal of overthrowing 
the local Bourbons. Great Britain entered the war decisively only because the French overthrew the 
Utercht settlement in the Low Countries.  
The French revolutionary wars were really a re-fight of the wars of the last 90 years in Europe. 
The French revolutionary governments overthrew the settlements of Italy and the Low Countries, un-
doing the most robust results of the treaties signed between the major powers in the 18th century.  And yet 
they were not alone in this. Prussia and Spain followed opportunistic policies at times fighting France and 
at times allying with it. Many minor powers welcomed the destruction of the old order. In Germany the 
French wars were just the newest turn in the struggle for dominance in Germany opened up in 1740 by 
Frederick the Great. 
The revolutionary wars came to an end when Austria decided to throw its lot in with France by 
trying to create a new order in Italy and Germany in conjunction with the French. Because of this Great 
Britain ran out of allies to fight the war for it. What seemed like a lasting settlement based on Franco-
Austrian understanding was broken up by three things. These were Napoleon Bonaparte’s imperial 
ambition, the Russian wish to be a key player in the disposition of central Europe, and British-French 
unresolved issues. Napoleon with the opportunistic help of Prussia and minor German states sought to 
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dominate Germany and dismantle the Holy Roman Empire. The eruption of war with Great Britain 
provided a possible bankroller for a European war.  
Austria saw the war as a way to force France to ally with it and forsake Prussia as the main 
French collaborator. Russia saw the war as a chance to force France to accept it as an equal in the 
management of Eastern Europe. The war did not go well for Austria which found itself humiliated and 
forced to become a dependent of France. Prussia then went to war with France in another burst of 
opportunism because of Napoleon’s unwillingness to take into consideration its demands on a defeated 
Austria. Russia continued fighting as long as the British were willing to pay. The Prussians were also 
defeated and Russia, increasingly at loggerheads with Great Britain over Mediterranean issues, signed the 
Peace of Tilsit. 
The Treaty of Tilsit was seen by Russia as a grand bargain that would resolve the questions of 
Europe through a Russo-French condominium. Russia was so willing to play this role that it just stood by 
when Austria made a last attempt at freedom in 1809. However, Napoleon was never willing to accept 
Russia as an equal and various Napoleonic unilateral actions in Germany, the invasion of Spain, and the 
continental system that was hurting Russia’s economy led to war. The Napoleonic wars from 1812 were 
essentially the turning point in European politics. The drastic defeats that Prussia and Austria suffered in 
1806 and 1809, the threat of 1812 for Russia, and the inability of Great Britain to create a stable alliance 
system based on bipolarity during the whole 1803-1812 period, led to the maturing of the thought that a 
stable European system could only be the result of a regime that united all the major powers. 
This was a radical break from all the schemes to manage Europe in the past hundred years which 
usually were attempts to fashion a bipolar hegemony. This was the case with Utrecht (France-Great 
Britain), Aix-a-Chappelle (France, Austria) ,Paris (Austria, Russia), and the various treaties of the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (Prussia-France, France-Austria, France-Russia, Russia-Great 
Britain). This determination to change international politics led the allies to victory not only over 
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Napoleon but also their own inhibitions and greed. A serious dispute over the fate of Saxony in 1814 
almost led to a war among the allies. For the first time all of the great powers sat down and pacifically 
managed the issue avoiding war. In 1815 Napoleon’s last attempt to take advantage of the old divisions of 
Europe failed on the field of Waterloo.  
In Vienna in 1816 the signatories brought about the Congress system. This was a system for the 
first time not based on some bipolar understanding by two powers against all others but on a multilateral 
system where the two most powerful states of Europe, Russia and Great Britain, would work in an 
organized way with the central powers Austria, Prussia and later France,. The goal of this cooperation 
was to resolve any issues that arose in Europe in such a way as to avoid a descent to war like that of 1792. 
Where the previous settlements had settled some issues only to birth other issues (for example peace in 
the Low Countries but war everywhere else, or peace in Italy but war in Germany), Vienna had tried to 
settle all issues.  
Why did the 18th century fail to produce a pacific system? To summarize, international politics in 
the 18th century was very conflict inducing. Military force or the threat of military force was seen as the 
primary means for staking a position on an issue. What was worse, the threat of force or use of force 
against a country was actually seen as ways to gain that country as an ally. The diplomatic means used to 
resolve issues contained the grain of conflict in them. Territorial compensation created an attitude of 
greed as no power could afford to let another power gain without some compensation, because of the loss 
of prestige and the fear of a change in the balance of power. Compensation led to conflicts with victims 
from which “the pound of flesh” would be carved, like Poland. If compensation was not forthcoming 
states may threaten war or try to ally with other powers that could guarantee it.  
Alliances acted more as attempted restrains towards powerful adversaries rather than as a 
balancing mechanism, partly due to the existence of the auxiliary norm. But more often than not such 
restraining alliances only led the weaker member to become a pawn in the stronger member’s policy. All 
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of this meant that peace treaties failed to pacify the system. Peace in one sector, the Low Countries let us 
say, was bought by tolerance for conflict in another, Italy for example. But the conflicts in those areas due 
to the compensation regime would “suck” in the pacific powers, like France and Britain in the 1720s, and 
undo the work of peace-makers. As figure7.1 shows the 1715-1815 period saw an increasing trend in 
conflict as a ratio of the number of states in the system. 
Figure 7.1 Ratio of Number of Conflicts to States in the 1715-1815 period. 
 
The system became unstable as the thirst for compensation started threatening the security and 
existence of major powers. When the victims were minor powers or weak states, the major powers elites 
thought nothing about the way international politics was played. Nevertheless, when even major powers 
like Austria, Prussia, and France found themselves on the dock, the elites became fearful. The French 
Revolution and the social upheavals brought about by absolutist reforms and capitalist expansion 
attenuated this crisis of confidence in the system. War had now become too costly as defeat could lead to 
dismemberment (Prussia 1806) and victory to domestic upheaval (France in 1789). The fate of Paul I of 
Russia killed by his own elites for his foreign policy cast a long shadow over Francis I, and Alexander I. 
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What the Napoleonic wars did was force every major power to try every hat trick available by the 
old system to gain security and suffer for it. As a result by the end of the wars the governing elites had 
become disillusioned with the old system and wrought a new one in the form of the Vienna Congress. 
This happened in 1815 and not 1715, 1748 or 1763 because in the past some powers had gained by 
playing by the old rules. Austria and Russia in 1715, Prussia and Russia in 1748, and Russia and Great 
Britain in 1763. Only the quickly iterated conflicts of the Napoleonic wars permitted all major powers to 
go through all the old regimes and for the old regimes to fail all the major powers in some way.   
This becomes clearer when we compare figure 7.1 to the 1816-2001 period conflict ratio for wars 
in figure 7.2. This comparison indicates that post 1816 the incidence of war has been decreasing. It should 
be noted that MIDs have an increasing trend even after 1816. What seems to have happened is that the 
system after 1816 became more capable in avoiding war, even if they still used military force as a tool. 
Figure 7.2 Ratio of Number of Wars over Number of States 1816-2001 
 
The information in the two graphs indicates that there was something different between the pre-
1816 and post-1816 international systems. My argument is that this is due to the presence of major power 
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managerial coordination in the post-1816 period, and its absence in the pre-1816 period. To evaluate this I 
look at the quality of major power interaction in the 1715-1815 period, as interpreted through the scale of 
major power coordination intensity, and see how it influenced the dynamics of military conflict and 
peace.  
FINDINGS 
 
Of the 12 hypotheses presented in this project only 6 can be applied to the 1715-1815 period. 
Hypothesis 1 is about the expected negative association between increasing managerial major power 
coordination and the onset of militarized interstate disputes. Hypothesis 2 applies that same expectation to 
the onset of wars. Hypothesis 3 reverses the use of the scale I have used until now, expecting a positive 
association between increasing antagonistic coordination and the onset of militarized disputes. To 
calculate this I just reverse the numbers used in the scale, with higher numbers indicating less managerial 
coordination and more antagonism. Hypothesis 5 expects a negative association between increasing 
managerial major power coordination and the entrance of a major power in at least one unilateral alliance. 
I remind the reader that a unilateral alliance is an alliance by one or more major powers with one or more 
minor powers that does not target another major power. Hypothesis 6 expects increasing managerial 
major power coordination to be negatively associated with minor powers joining ongoing militarized 
interstate disputes.  Hypothesis 11 expects a positive association between increasing managerial 
coordination and the enactment of a constitution or its reinstatement. This hypothesis can only be 
evaluated for the 1789-1815 period.  
Of the hypotheses that cannot be evaluated in exclusivity in the 1715-1815 period I can say the 
following. Hypothesis 4 will be presented in the last chapter where I focus on dynamics across the whole 
1715-2001 period. Hypothesis 7 that focuses on military buildups cannot be evaluated in the 1715-1815 
period due to a lack of data on such events before 1816. Hypothesis 10 on the relationship between major 
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power managerial coordination and increased competition and participation in political systems as 
captured by the Polity 4 variable on regime transition cannot be evaluated for two reasons. First Polity 
only goes back to 1800, and second, within that period there are only two cases of regime transition, the 
USA in 1809 and France in 1814. This means that the dependent variable would have too little variation 
to permit meaningful statistical analysis for the 1800-1815 period. Instead I will conduct an evaluation 
across the 1800-2001 period in the next chapter.  
Hypothesis 12 on the relationship between increasing managerial major power coordination and 
the birth and growth of intergovernmental organizations cannot be evaluated because of the lack on data 
on IGOs before 1816. I cannot assume that the lack of data necessarily means a lack of IGOs. The 
historical record and common wisdom would indicate this, and that would be a finding that would provide 
at least some prima facie support for my belief in the transformative effect of managerial coordination. 
However, the lack of data may very well be due to a lack of research on whether some kind of IGOs pre-
existed 1816. Until further research this Hypothesis has to be limited to the post-1816 period. 
Hypotheses 8 expects that major power managerial interventions, MIDs in which a majority or all 
major powers are on the same side against a minor power, should be positively associated with increasing 
major power coordination. That was the case in the 1816-2001 period, and the fact that no major power 
managerial intervention took place in the 1715-1815 period further reinforces that finding. However, it 
also means that hypothesis 9 on the effect of interventions cannot be evaluated in the 1715-1815 period 
due to the lack of variation in the variable of interest.  
I do not expect increasing major power managerial coordination to have a statistically significant 
effect in the pre-1815 period. As Figure 7.3 indicates, and in agreement to the transformation thesis, 
major power behavior in the 1715-1815 period never reaches point 4 of the scale of major power 
managerial coordination intensity.  
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Figure 7.3 Scale of Major Power Coordination 1715-1815 
 
As pointed out this is consistent with the transformation thesis. However, it does mean that until 
the post-1816 period, the scale variable varies a lot less in the 1715-1815 period. This leads me to expect 
a statistically insignificant effect on mid onset and war. In general I am not the tied to any specific 
expectations about the behavior of the variables in the 1715-1815 period. This is terra-incognita for 
quantitative analysis.  However any results will be grappled in the confines of the explanatory story 
provided in Chapter 3. I begin with the hypotheses evaluating the basic association between the quality of 
major power interaction and conflict dynamics.  
The Association between Major Power Managerial Coordination and Peace in the Age of Kings 
Past forays into the dynamics of international relations in the 1715-1815 period were usually not 
predicated on looking at major power behavior as a collective variable. They also tended to focus only on 
war as a dependent variable. In this section I break new ground by conducting the first ever quantitative 
evaluation of the relationship between major power interaction, and a number of control variables with 
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the onset of militarized interstate disputes in the 1715-1815 period. These evaluations are possible 
because of the collection of the new MID data for the 1715-1815 period. 
Hypothesis 1: Increasing managerial major power coordination should be negatively associated with 
the onset of originator Militarized Disputes in a politically relevant dyad year in the 1715-1815 period. 
The evaluations of this hypothesis did not show a statistically significant negative independent 
association between increasing managerial major power coordination and MID onset. The avoidance of 
adversarial major power alliances when not combined with positive cooperative elements like 
consultation and multilateralism cannot have the pacific effect of a full managerial coordination regime. 
The hypothesis is thus falsified. Table 7.1 indicates that the issue is not one of control variables, but of a 
lack of a strong bilateral relationship. Furthermore, as Models I and II of the table show, if major power 
interaction goes from one characterized by antagonistic alliances, to one lacking those, but absent of any 
cooperative elements,  MID onset becomes more likely in the 1715-1815 period. 
Table 7.1 Logit regression of increasing managerial major power coordination on MID onset, 1715-1815 
MID onset 1715-1815 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Scale of major power 
coordination 
0.201 
(0.136) 
 
0.289 
(0.140)* 
0.638 
(0.168)*** 
0.231 
(0.455) 
 
 
Lagged dyadic sensitivity  0.525 
(0.208)* 
0.400 
(0.233) 
-0.164 
(0.589) 
 
Peace years   -0.016 -0.017 
   (0.039) (0.039) 
 
Scale*Sensitivity    0.375 
    (0.380) 
 
_cons -4.052 -4.754 -4.497 -3.882 
 (0.214)*** (0.335)*** (0.379)*** (0.702)*** 
 
N 9,683 9,445 9,445 9,445 
Ll -1,052.74 -1,009.69 -983.70 -983.30 
Chi2 2.18 9.61 40.51 42.38 
R2_P 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 
     * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 Note: Standard Errors are clustered by dyad; Splines used but not shown  
                                                      
Models I-III indicate that major power interaction that decreases in antagonism to such an extent 
that it reaches point 2 of the scale is insufficient as a pacific factor. Indeed it has a statistically significant 
positive association with MID onset when I control for temporal autocorrelation and sensitivity.  Model 
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IV indicates that the interaction between the scale and sensitivity does not produce any statistically 
significant relationships. This finding is consistent with the generally conflict inducing association of 
major power behavior that lacks attempts at managerial coordination during the 1816-2001 period.61  
Table 7.2 presents the behavior of the variable in models that contain all those control variables 
that had a significant effect during the evaluation process. Model I and Model III only differ in that the 
preponderance measure is used instead of the relative power measure (due to high correlation the two 
cannot be used in the same model). Model II and Model IV contain the interaction of variables with 
sensitivity. 
Models I and III indicate that the positive association between increases in the scale of major 
power coordination and MID onset becomes stronger in the presence of the control variables. In Table 1 
the initially statistically insignificant scale variable became significant once I controlled for sensitivity. 
Including the other control variables in the models of Table 7.2 doubles the coefficient value. From the 
viewpoint of theory this may indicate that major power behavior that lacks elements of managerial 
coordination can only account for a small part of why states fight.  
This may cast some doubt on the explanation for the pacific effect of major power managerial 
coordination. This is because if the conflict inducing effect of the lack of managerial coordination is not 
great, then where does the pacific influence of coordination come from?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
61 I remind the reader that point 2 of the operationalized scale of major power managerial coordination intensity, 
which is the equivalent of point 0 of the theoretical scale, relates to major power behavior that lacks the three 
elements of major power managerial coordination. 
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Table 7.2 Logit Regression of Scale of Major Power coordination intensity on MID onset, 1715-1815 
MID Onset 1715-
1815 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Scale of major 
power 
coordination  
0.519 
(0.196)** 
0.425 
(0.491) 
0.511 
(0.197)** 
0.425 
(0.490) 
 
     
Lagged dyadic 
sensitivity  
0.387 0.398 0.393 0.411 
 (0.176)* (0.675) (0.174)* (0.672) 
 
System year with 0.655 1.502 0.647 1.484 
preponderant 
seapower 
 
(0.181)*** (0.605)* (0.183)*** (0.604)* 
 
Strategic rivals 1.180 1.170 1.195 1.182 
 (0.262)*** (0.266)*** (0.258)*** (0.262)*** 
 
Preponderance -0.046 -0.045   
 (0.168) (0.169)   
 
Allied to each 
other 
0.485 0.481 0.488 0.484 
 (0.162)** (0.161)** (0.161)** (0.160)** 
 
Major power 0.709 0.669 0.722 0.681 
Dyad (0.405) (0.402) (0.413) (0.409) 
 
Major-Minor 0.283 0.258 0.260 0.239 
Dyad (0.366) (0.364) (0.361) (0.360) 
 
Peace years 0.012 0.009 0.012 0.010 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
 
Scale*Sensitivity  0.087  0.080 
  (0.406)  (0.407) 
 
Seapower Year  -0.806  -0.795 
*Sensitivity  (0.525)  (0.522) 
 
Lagged relative 
power 
  -0.210 -0.191 
   (0.314) (0.316) 
 
_cons -5.407 -5.370 -5.344 -5.324 
 (0.478)*** (0.848)*** (0.488)*** (0.848)*** 
     
N 9,445 9,445 9,445 9,445 
     
Ll -937.92 -936.77 -937.73 -936.62 
     
Chi2 282.95 302.33 284.81 305.39 
     
R2_P 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 Note: Standard Errors are clustered by dyad; Splines used but not shown 
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However, it would be imprudent to assume symmetry between the negative effects of the absence 
of a condition and the positive effects of its presence. These findings may very well be just the result of 
the peculiarities of the data for the 1715-1815 period.62Models II and IV indicate that the interaction with 
sensitivity remains statistically insignificant. 
Of the control variables the most interesting behavior was that of the control for whether a dyad 
was a major power or mixed power dyad. In the models of Table 7.2, being a major power dyad has a 
statistically insignificant positive association with MID onset. Considering that on a bivariate basis, being 
a major power dyad has a significant association, I summarize that this result is due to the inclusion of the 
other control variables.  When it comes to the dyad being one of a major power and minor power the 
models in Table 7.2 indicate a positive but statistically not significant association with MID onset. Once 
more a significant bivariate association, this time negative, is not only   wiped out by the other control 
variables, but also suffers sign reversal. 63    
  
                                                          
62 Once again this is not unusual. Point 2 in the 1816-2001 period was a conflict inducing point in the scale, though 
not always. In the 1715-1815 this is even clearer. On an explanatory basis it does indicate that an abstention from 
some kinds of overt adversarial behaviors, in this case major power adversarial alliances, is not enough to create a 
pacific trend. Positive cooperative actions must accompany that abstention to create an impression among states that 
the major powers wish for a pacific system.  
63 Concerning the other control variables the following is indicated: Seapower Year : This variable shows a 
consistent positive and statistically significant association with MID onset. The association between a year having a 
dominant sea-power and MID onset is robust (75). Strategic Rivalry:  The findings indicate a robust positive and 
statistically significant association between strategic rivalry and MID onset. This is a robust finding (75). 
Preponderance:  The models indicate a negative but statistically insignificant association between preponderance 
and MID onset. The presence of the control variables has a strong effect on the behavior of this variable (75). 
Lagged relative power: This variable exhibits exactly the same behavior as Preponderance. Allied to each other: The 
models indicate a strong positive and statistically significant association between a dyad sharing an alliance and 
MID onset. This is a robust relationship (76).  
The following variables did not have a statistically significant effect during the evaluation process and thus were not 
included in the models: Dyad has at least one outside alliance : Model 2 of Table 76 of the statistical appendix 
indicates that this variable has a positive but statistically not significant association with MID onset. This is different 
than in the 1816-2001 period when the variable had a significant association that got wiped out by the control 
variables. Dyad has at least one outside  major power alliance: Model 3 of Table 76 of the statistical appendix 
indicates that this variable has a negative but not significant association with MID onset. The insignificance is 
similar to the behavior this variable exhibits in the 1816-2001 period. 
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Conclusion on Hypothesis 1 
The evaluations of the hypothesis in the 1715-1815 period did not indicate a pacific association 
for increasing managerial major power coordination with MID onset. This makes sense as in this period 
major power interaction never reaches above the still antagonistic point 2 of the scale. Furthermore, the 
lack of variation in the variable should partly explain the insignificance of the variable’s influence on 
MID onset. As far as what does contribute to MID onset in the 1715-1815 period one variable is the 
presence of preponderant sea power, logical due to the war participation of the United Kingdom in the 
period. A second one is two states being allied to each other, which reinforces the well-known hypothesis 
that allies fight each other (Bueno de Mesquita & James Lee Ray, 2004). Finally, the findings on the 
conflict-inducing character of strategic rivalry corroborate the findings of Colaresi, Thompson, and Rasler 
(2008).  
Hypothesis 2: If a politically relevant dyad experienced a dyadic militarized dispute onset, increasing 
managerial major power coordination should be negatively associated with that dyadic dispute onset 
being the onset of a war in the 1715-1815 period. 
The evaluations of this hypothesis did not show a statistically significant association between 
increasing managerial major power coordination and war onset. Table 7.3 presents the findings of the 
models evaluating the bilateral association between the dependent and independent variable as well as the 
models with the controls for sensitivity and temporal autocorrelation. As the models of Table 7.3 show 
the scale of major power managerial coordination does not have a statistically significant association with 
war onset. This is most likely due to the small variation of the variable in the 1715-1815 period as well as 
the small n. This holds for sensitivity and for the interaction of the scale with sensitivity. 
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Table 7-3. Logit of Scale of Major Power Coordination on War Onset 1715-1815 
War Onset 
1715-1815 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Scale of major power 
coordination 
-0.533 
(0.275) 
-0.475 
(0.280) 
-0.469 
(0.253) 
0.007 
(1.013) 
 
     
Lagged dyadic sensitivity  -0.053 -0.236 0.444 
  (0.453) (0.407) (1.495) 
 
Peace years   -0.084 -0.083 
   (0.053) (0.052) 
     
Scale*Sensitivity    -0.437 
    (0.918) 
     
_cons 1.121 1.044 1.426 0.680 
 (0.438)* (0.675) (0.600)* (1.632) 
     
N 221 212 212 212 
 
Ll -148.51 -143.64 -139.02 -138.91 
 
Chi2 3.79 2.91 13.33 13.32 
 
R2_P 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 Note: Standard Errors are clustered by dyad; Splines used but not shown 
                                                  
The inclusion of control variables does not change things substantially as Table 7.4 indicates. 
Models 1 and 2 of Table 7.4 indicate a dynamic similar to that found in Table 3. The scale does not have a 
statistically significant association with war onset. This also holds for sensitivity and also for their 
interaction.  
When it comes to the control variables the most interesting finding is that unlike its conflict 
inducing effect on MID onset, being allied to each other dampness the possibility of a war onset. The 
models of Table 7.4 indicate a statistically significant negative association with War onset. What this 
means is that I may had been too quick to discount the use of alliances as a way to avoid war with an 
opponent. It seems that an alliance did not guarantee rosy relations or the avoidance of military conflict, 
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but it does seem to have protected the members from war with each other. How robust that protection is 
though in the long run is an open question.64 
Table 7.4 Logit of Scale of Major Power coordination on War onset with Controls, 1715-1815 
War Onset Model 1 Model 2 
Scale of major power coordination -0.297 0.139 
 (0.292) (1.158) 
   
Lagged dyadic sensitivity -0.009 0.806 
 (0.416) (1.790) 
   
System year with preponderant  1.227 2.298 
Seapower (0.514)* (1.313) 
 
Territorial dispute 0.303 0.302 
 (0.085)*** (0.087)*** 
 
Allied to each other -0.880 -0.916 
 (0.376)* (0.383)* 
 
Peace years -0.093 -0.094 
 (0.054) (0.054) 
 
Scale*Sensitivity  -0.439 
  (1.057) 
 
Seapower*Sensitivity  -1.058 
  (1.258) 
 
_cons 0.604 -0.212 
 (0.690) (1.949) 
 
N 212 212 
Ll -128.21 -127.90 
Chi2 27.67 31.32 
R2_P 0.12 0.12 * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 Note: Standard Errors are clustered by dyad; Splines used but not shown 
                                            
Conclusions on Hypothesis 2 
As expected, Hypothesis 2 was falsified by the evaluations. A change in major power behavior 
from one dominated by adversarial alliances to one that lacks them, as indicated by a movement form 
                                                          
64 On the other control variable the following can be said: Seapower Year:  This variable has a statistically 
significant positive association with War onset. The findings are robust (79). Territorial Issue: This variable has a 
strong positive association with MID onset, validating the Senese and Vasquez argument about territory and war. 
This is a robust relationship (79). The following variables did not exhibit a statistically significant effect during the 
evaluation process and thus were not included in the models presented: Strategic Rivals (79) ,Preponderance (80) 
,Lag of relative power (80) Major Power Dyad (80),  Major-Minor Dyad (80),  At least one outside alliance: (81),  
At least one outside alliance with a major power (81). 
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point 1 of the scale to point 2, but which also lacks any elements of managerial coordination is not going 
to affect the possibility of dyadic military disputes being wars. Together with the findings about the 1816-
2001 period, this reinforces the inadequacy of major power relations that are not characterized by 
cooperative elements to foster peace. Lack of overt enmity is not enough. A more activist stance by the 
major powers in pursuit of peace is necessary. This is probably because just avoiding open enmity does 
not overcome the weight of a history of enmity. A decisive change of the direction of major power 
relations is needed to foster peace in the system.    
The variables most clearly associated with war onset in the 1715-1815 period are the presence of 
a preponderant sea power and presence of territorial disputes. Being allied to each other acts as a damper 
on a dispute being a war. The finding on sea power continues to indicate that preponderance is not peace-
inducing if the preponderant power is a major war participant in the system, casting doubt on more 
“naïve” version of hegemony arguments. The war-inducing character of territorial issues in the 1715-1815 
period agrees with the finding on the war-inducing character of territorial disputes in the 1816-2001 
period. If a similar finding could be unearthed for the 1648-1715 period then one could venture to argue 
that territorial disputes are one of the main correlates of war in what we call “The Westphalian System”. 
The fact that being allied to each other is associated with the onset of MIDs but not those MIDs 
being war may indicate that there was some wisdom in the attempt by 18th century states to seek alliances 
with potential enemies. While such alliances would not guarantee a conflict-free relationship, they seem 
to have helped manage disputes in a way as to not lead to war. On the other hand, what we may be seeing 
is the result of the decision of a state to accommodate the demands of a foe in the form of an alliance after 
a period of robust military threats. Only a careful look on how 18th century alliances came about can help 
clarify which story is more relevant.  
Hypothesis 3: Increasing antagonistic major power coordination should be positively associated with 
the onset of militarized interstate disputes in a politically relevant dyad year in the 1715-1815 period. 
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This variable reverses the scale of major power coordination. Instead of every increasing point 
indicating an accumulation of cooperative elements that lead to managerial coordination, this time the 
points indicate increasing overt antagonism between the major powers. The expectation is that this makes 
MID onset is more probable. The findings in Table 7.5 indicate that this is not the case. 
Table 7.5 Logit of Inverted Scale of Major Power Coordination on MID onset, 1715-1815 
MID Onset 
1715-1815 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Inverted scale of  
major power 
coordination 
-0.201 
(0.136) 
-0.289 
(0.140)* 
-0.638 
(0.168)*** 
-0.231 
(0.455) 
 
     
Lagged dyadic 
sensitivity 
 0.525 0.400 0.961 
  (0.208)* (0.233) (0.643) 
 
Peace years   -0.016 -0.017 
   (0.039) (0.039) 
 
Inverted 
Scale*Sensitivity 
   -0.375 
    (0.380) 
 
_cons -3.449 -3.888 -2.582 -3.190 
 (0.216)*** (0.295)*** (0.431)*** (0.802)*** 
 
N 9,683 9,445 9,445 9,445 
Ll -1,052.74 -1,009.69 -983.70 -983.30 
Chi2 2.18 9.61 40.51 42.38 
R2_P 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 Note: Standard Errors are clustered by dyad; Splines used but not shown 
 
What the models show is that as major power behavior becomes more antagonistic there is a 
negative effect on MID onset. This is not statistically significant until I take into consideration sensitivity 
and temporal autocorrelation, and is never significant for dyads with zero sensitivity (Model 4). This is a 
highly peculiar result. It seems that in the 1715-1815 period major power behavior that reaches point 1 of 
the scale is more conflict prone than point 2 (remember that points are inverted compared to the normal 
scale). This is a highly problematic result as it means that adversarial alliances are not as conflict prone in 
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the 18th century as they were in the 19th and 20th. Table 7.6 has the models that result when I include the 
other control variables. 
Table 7.6  Logit of Inverted Scale of Major Power Coordination on MID onset with Controls, 1715-1815 
MID Onset 1715-
1815 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Inverted scale of  -0.519 -0.425 -0.511 -0.425 
major power 
coordination 
(0.196)** (0.491) (0.197)** (0.490) 
 
 
Lagged dyadic 
sensitivity 
0.387 0.658 0.393 0.652 
 (0.176)* (0.618) (0.174)* (0.623) 
 
System year  0.655 1.502 0.647 1.484 
with preponderant 
seapower 
 
(0.181)*** (0.605)* (0.183)*** (0.604)* 
 
Strategic rivals 1.180 1.170 1.195 1.182 
 (0.262)*** (0.266)*** (0.258)*** (0.262)*** 
 
Preponderance -0.046 -0.045   
 (0.168) (0.169)   
     
Allied to each other 0.485 0.481 0.488 0.484 
 (0.162)** (0.161)** (0.161)** (0.160)** 
 
Major power dyad 0.709 0.669 0.722 0.681 
 (0.405) (0.402) (0.413) (0.409) 
 
Major-Minor dyad 0.283 0.258 0.260 0.239 
 (0.366) (0.364) (0.361) (0.360) 
 
Peace years 0.012 0.009 0.012 0.010 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
 
Inverted 
scale*sensitivity 
 -0.087  -0.080 
  (0.406)  (0.407) 
 
Seapower*   -0.806  -0.795 
Sensitivity  (0.525)  (0.522) 
 
Lag of relative 
power 
  -0.210 -0.191 
   (0.314) (0.316) 
 
_cons -3.850 -4.094 -3.812 -4.049 
 (0.597)*** (0.879)*** (0.595)*** (0.884)*** 
N 9,445 9,445 9,445 9,445 
Ll -937.92 -936.77 -937.73 -936.62 
Chi2 282.95 302.33 284.81 305.39 
R2_P 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 Note: Standard Errors are clustered by dyad: Splines used but not shown 
  
The models of Table 7.6 show similar results to those of Table 7.5. Increases in Major Power 
antagonism as captured by the scale are negatively associated with MID onset. This is significant for all 
cases but those dyads with 0 sensitivity (Models 2,4). Again I must remind the reader that this only 
212 
 
happens when I account for sensitivity and temporal autocorrelation. Otherwise the association is not 
significant. Either way, hypothesis 3 is falsified.65  
Conclusions on Hypothesis 3 
Inverting the scale did not bring about the expected positive association between increased 
antagonism and MID Onset. The relationship was negative and not statistically significant. This finding 
could indicate one of the two following associations. Taking into consideration the findings for the first 
two hypotheses this indicates that the lack of adversarial alliances among the major power is not as much 
a peace-inducing factor as I hypothesized in the theory section. This does not necessarily undo the 
theoretical foundations of this paper, but it raises the issues of the type of evaluations used for it and the 
operationalization of managerial coordination.  
If there is little difference between the presence and lack of adversarial alliances in major power 
relations that also lack any elements of major power managerial coordination, then it makes little sense to 
consider point 1 and point 2 of the scale as being in an ascending relationship. Indeed I may be dealing 
with something better represent as a three point scale or binary variable between the antagonistic points 
and the cooperative points. I would be hesitant to take that path though. First, in the 1816-2001 period 
there are differences between point 1 and point 2. Second, this might just mean that in the 18th century 
major power adversarial alliances are not as conflict inducing as after 1816. This may be partly explained 
                                                          
65 When it comes to the behavior of the control variables the following can be extracted from the models of Table 6: 
Seapower Year: The models in Table 6 indicate that this variable has a strong positive association with conflict 
onset. This is a robust relationship (83). Strategic Rivals: This variable has a consistent statistically significant 
positive association with MID onset. This is a robust case (83). Preponderance: This variable does not have a 
statistically significant association with MID onset. This is due to the  presence of the other control variables (84). 
 Allied to each other: This variable has a positive and statistically significant association with MID onset. This is a 
robust finding (85). Major Power Dyad: This variable has a positive but not significant association with MID onset. 
This is due to the control variables (86). Major-Minor Power Dyad: This variable has a positive but not significant 
association with MID onset. This is due to the control variables (86). Lag of Relative Power : This variable does not 
have statistically significant association with MID onset. This is due to the control variables (84). The following 
variables did not exhibit a statistically significant behavior during the evaluation process and thus were not included 
in Table 6: At least one outside alliance in the dyad (85) , Major Power Alliance (85) . 
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by the finding in the evaluation of the previous hypothesis, that being allied to each other in the 1715-
1815 period dampened the possibility of war. These are questions for future research.  
Hypothesis 11: Increasing managerial major power coordination has a positive association with the 
enactment of a constitution within a given country year in the 1789-1815  period. 
In the 1816-2001 period I found indicators that increasing managerial major power coordination 
did not have a strong association with the enactment or reinstatement of constitutions, a finding that casts 
some doubt on Schroeder’s legitimism argument. I remind the reader that what Schroeder meant is that 
while the major powers of the Vienna system were anti-democratic they were not opposed to the 
rationalization of politics and limits to arbitrary power, an element of which was a constitution.   
In this part of the chapter I look at whether the movement from a major power interaction 
dominated by adversarial alliances (point 1 of scale) to one where there are no adversarial alliances but 
also no cooperative elements (point 2 of scale) has any influence on the birth and reinstatement of 
constitutions in the 1789-1815 period. Table 7.7 presents the results of the bilateral models as well as 
those models containing the controls for temporal autocorrelation.  
Table 7.7 Logit of Scale of Major Power Coordination on Constitutional Events,1789-1815 
Constitutional Event 
1789-1815 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Scale of major  1.288 1.325 0.265 1.140 
power coordination (0.208)*** (0.212)*** (0.833) (1.156) 
     
Lagged monadic   0.286 -0.411 -0.255 
sensitivity  (0.108)** (0.544) (0.750) 
     
Scale*Sensitivity   0.378 0.229 
   (0.291) (0.395) 
     
Time from last    0.032 
constitutional event    (0.078) 
     
_cons -2.286 -3.142 -1.178 -2.089 
 (0.375)*** (0.508)*** (1.566) (2.213) 
     
N 539 531 531 402 
Ll -352.38 -344.07 -343.25 -245.91 
Chi2 41.91 47.16 48.80 64.27 
R2_P 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.12 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001   
Note: Splines used but not shown 
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The models of the table indicate an initially statistically significant association that becomes 
insignificant when sensitivity is 0 (5.35% of cases). This indicates that there may be some veracity in the 
argument I put forward for the positive effect on domestic political progress when major power 
antagonism is not at its strongest. However, considering that most constitutional events in the 1789-1815 
period happened in the fires of the Napoleonic Wars, this would be a statement that is too ambitious. 
Table 7.8 presents the results of the Models including the only control variable for the era, state age.  
Table 7.8 Logit of Scale of Major Power Coordination on Constitutional Events,1789-1815 
Constitutional Event 1789-1815 Model 1 Model 2 
Scale of major  1.832 1.208 
power coordination (0.280)*** (1.164) 
   
Lag of monadic 0.151 -0.257 
Sensitivity (0.140) (0.754) 
   
State age 0.004 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
   
Time from last 0.026 0.025 
Constitutional (0.078) (0.078) 
event 
 
  
Scale*  0.219 
Sensitivity   (0.397) 
 
_cons -3.604 -2.420 
 (0.702)*** (2.250) 
 
N 402 402 
Ll -245.57 -245.42 
Chi2 64.94 65.24 
R2_P 0.12 0.12 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: Splines used but not shown 
                                                  
The inclusion of state age does not change the results.  A really quick run of predicted 
probabilities indicates that when all other variables are set at mean, increasing the scale from point 1 to 
point 2 increases the predicted probability of a Constitutional Event by .285 or from .237 to .558.  
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Conclusions on Hypothesis 11 
The hypothesis was not falsified by the evaluations. However the historical conditions under 
which the observations took place do not permit the use of the finding to support the legitimist argument. 
The America and French constitutional events took place during a period of decreased antagonism after 
Britain’s retreat from international politics due to the War of American Independence.  But the other 
constitutional events (Switzerland, Netherlands, and France after 1800) took place in the fires of the 
Napoleonic Wars. However one can use them as indicators of the general argument that peace is 
conducive to internal political reforms (Gibler, 2012).  These findings require further research. 
Hypothesis 5: Increasing managerial major power coordination should be negatively associated with 
major power initiating membership in at least one unilateral alliance with a minor power in a given 
major power country year in the 1715-1816 period. 
In the 1816-2001 period this hypothesis was not falsified by the evaluations, providing a powerful 
indicator that denial of major power resources to minor states through alliances may be the explanation 
for the negative association between major power managerial coordination and conflict onset. This time I 
am looking at whether the lack of major power adversarial alliances in the 1715-1815 period is associated 
with a lack of major-minor alliances in the same time, even if there are no managerial coordination 
signals by the major powers. I remind the reader that in this period major powers are the prime drivers of 
alliance dynamics. 
Table 7.9 presents the bivariate models about the association between major power unilateral 
alliance activity and increasing managerial major power coordination (Model 1). It also contains 
multivariate models with controls for temporal auto-correlation and sensitivity (Model 2). Models 3 and 4 
contain the interaction between sensitivity and the scale. 
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Table 7.9 Logit of Major Power Managerial Coordination on Unilateral Alliance Ascension, 1715-1815 
Unilateral 
Alliance 
Ascension 1715-
1815 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Scale of major  -0.499 -0.403 -1.034 -0.479 
power 
coordination 
(0.193)** (0.196)* (0.630) (0.740) 
     
Lagged monadic 
sensitivity 
 0.202 -0.109 0.278 
  (0.101)* (0.305) (0.345) 
     
Scale*Sens   0.235 -0.070 
   (0.220) (0.257) 
     
Years since last     -2.356 
major-minor 
alliance 
   (0.301)*** 
     
_cons -0.957 -1.673 -0.842 0.077 
 (0.272)*** (0.388)*** (0.860) (0.971) 
     
N  900 891 891 891 
Ll -395.52 -378.09 -377.51 -301.55 
Chi2 6.96 8.61 9.78 161.69 
R2_P 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.21 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: Splines used but not presented 
 
Model 1 and 2 indicate a statistically significant negative association between increasing 
managerial major power coordination and the ascension of major powers to unilateral alliances with 
minor powers. This indicates that the lack of major power adversarial alliances may also see the 
individual major powers avoiding entering alliances with minor powers. This may indicate an 
unwillingness of major powers to risk the happy lack of dangerous entanglements between themselves, by 
becoming tied up in alliances with minor powers that may lead them to conflict with each other. 
However, the implications are something requiring further research, beyond the scope of this manuscript.  
However, Model 3 of Table 7.9 indicates that the hypothesis is falsified. The negative association 
between the lack of major power adversarial alliances and major power unilateral alliances is not 
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statistically significant when I control for time since the last unilateral alliance. The interaction between 
the scale and sensitivity is also statistically insignificant.  Is this a legitimate control? Yes if we believe 
that past alliances, affect the decision of a state to enter a new alliance. In general it can also control for 
previously activist policy, and how that may create an impetus in the state apparatus for future active 
policy. 
Why is this finding the result of the evaluation? If I do a cross-tabulation of the two points of the 
scale in the 1715-1815 period and which major power state years saw at least one major power unilateral 
alliance the percentages meet the expectations of the hypothesis (19% at point 1, 9% at point 2). The raw 
numbers indicate a possible contemporariness between the absence of adversarial major power alliances 
in the system, and the avoidance of major power alliances with minor powers.  
What may be going on is that current major-minor power dynamics are mostly driven by past 
major-minor power dynamics. Past alliances seem to make current alliances less likely. This is an 
interesting result. Why would a past major-minor alliance make it less likely that a major power will 
become an ally with a minor power in the future? It may be driven by the very nasty treatment minor 
powers received at the hand of their major power allies. Examples of this are Poland with Prussia, Venice 
with Austria. Consequently minor powers once allied to a major power may avoid allying with it in the 
future. But this is a supposition, not fact and I am still not sure why it dampens the effect of increasing 
managerial major power coordination. 
Of the three control variables used:  preponderant sea power status, system year with 
preponderant sea power, and ongoing dispute, only the presence of a preponderant sea power in a system 
year remained significant throughout the evaluation process. Table 7.10 presents the bivariate and 
multivariate models with this control variable. 
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Table 7.10 Logit of Scale of Major Power Coordination on Major Power Unilateral Alliance Ascension 
with control for preponderant sea-power, 1715-1815 
Unilateral 
Alliance 
Ascension 
1715-1815 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Scale of major  -0.361 -0.226 -0.536 -0.404 
power 
coordination 
(0.202) (0.207) (0.243)* (0.768) 
 
 
System year 0.613 0.744 0.711 0.865 
with 
preponderant 
seapower 
 
(0.235)** (0.239)** (0.296)* (0.866) 
 
Lagged   0.206 0.189 0.261 
monadic 
sensitivity 
 
 (0.103)* (0.113) (0.375) 
 
Peace years   -2.484 -2.482 
   (0.313)*** (0.314)*** 
 
Scale*Sens    -0.049 
    (0.268) 
 
Seapower*Sens    -0.061 
    (0.319) 
 
_cons -1.254 -2.063 -0.016 -0.206 
 (0.302)*** (0.419)*** (0.468) (1.052) 
 
N  900 891 891 891 
Ll -392.28 -373.50 -298.70 -298.67 
Chi2 13.44 17.79 167.39 167.45 
R2_P 0.02 0.02 0.22 0.22 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: Splines used but no presented 
 
The models of table 10 do not change the dynamics found in the models of Table 9. Being in a 
year when a preponderant seapower exists increases the chances of a major power entering a unilateral 
alliance with a minor power, expect when sensitivity is 0 (Model 4). Increases in managerial coordination 
from point 1 to 2 still lack a statistically significant association.  Hypothesis 5 is falsified.66 
                                                          
66 When it comes to the control variables not in Table 10, the following can be pointed out: Seapower: The Models 
of Table 92 of the statistical appendix indicates that this variable does not have a robust statistically significant 
219 
 
Conclusion on Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 5 was falsified by the evaluation process. What does this mean for the general 
argument of this project? My thoughts are that the main point to extract is that denial cannot operate 
successfully in the absence of strong signals of managerial coordination.67 The lack of major power 
adversarial alliances is not enough to deter major power unilateral behavior. Consultation and 
multilateralism are essential elements for a denial effect. 
Hypothesis 6:  Increasing managerial major power coordination should be negatively 
associated with a minor power entering an ongoing bilateral conflict in a given year in the 1715-1815 
period.  
The pervious hypothesis indicated that denial mechanisms, the denial by major powers of their 
political and military support to minor powers, may not function without the presence of consultation and 
multilateralism.  The absence of antagonism in the form of adversarial alliances is not a sufficient 
condition for denial mechanisms as far as major power alliance dynamics are concerned. What about 
discouragement, the avoidance of international military activity by minor power due to the fear of major 
power censure or punishment? This hypothesis postulates that the movement of major powers away from 
adversarial alliances may discourage minor powers from entering ongoing conflicts. It is as noted in the 
previous Chapter and Chapter 4, a proxy hypothesis.  
This is because I lack the detailed information that would permit me to collect data on how major 
powers reacted to minor power attempts to join an ongoing conflict and why minor powers decided to 
avoid it. I thus assume that the avoidance of major power adversarial alliances also means that major 
powers are adverse to minor power unilateral military activity on the basis that such activity may bring 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
relationship with unilateral alliance ascension.  Ongoing Dispute: The Models of Table 93 of the statistical appendix 
indicates that this variable does not have a robust statistically significant association. 
67 I remind the reader that denial here refers to those mechanisms through which increased major power managerial 
coordination makes the system more pacific that entail the major powers not giving their military and political 
support to other major powers or minor powers. The other mechanism is discouragement, in which major powers 
discourage minor or major power unilateral behavior by threats or censure.  
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major powers into conflict. I also assume that when minor powers decide to join and ongoing dispute or 
not they will take into consideration the general international environment as expressed by major power 
interactions. They will wish to follow the lead of the major powers except if there is no choice.  
Neither assumption is totally indefensible as cases of such activity exist. Prussia and the United 
Kingdom discouraged Denmark from entering the Russo-Swedish War of 1788, during a period when no 
overt major power adversarial alliances existed in the European system .However, the general 
relationships are assumptions and not facts. Consequently any findings will have to be taken as indicators 
of an association worth further study, rather than as a decisive resolution of the issue at hand.  
Table 7.11 presents negative binomial regression models of increasing managerial major power 
on the number of ongoing disputes a minor power joins.  Model 1 and 2 are bivariate models using the 
scale and sensitivity measures and Model 3 is multivariate using the scale and sensitivity variables.  
Table 7.11 Negative Binomial Regression of Major Power Coordination on number of ongoing disputes a 
minor power joins, 1715-1815 
Minor Power Ongoing Dispute 
Joining 1715-1815 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
# of  Scale of major power -0.471 -0.296 -0.926 
ongoing 
disputes 
joined 
coordination (0.183)** (0.187) (0.644) 
     
 Constant -1.648 -3.035 -2.158 
  (0.262)*** (0.436)*** (0.936)* 
     
 Lagged sensitivity  0.974 0.252 
   (0.246)*** (0.731) 
     
 Scale*Sensitvity   0.526 
    (0.513) 
     
Lnalpha Constant 0.528 0.431 0.430 
  (0.372) (0.387) (0.387) 
     
N  1,550 1,524 1,524 
Ll  -514.97 -491.64 -491.10 
Chi2  6.84 23.96 25.03 
R2_P  0.01 0.02 0.02 
Chi2_C  16.81 15.14 15.12 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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The models of the table indicate that hypothesis 6 is falsified by the evaluation. While an increase 
in major power coordination from point 1 to point 2 has a negative association with the number of 
ongoing disputes minor powers join, this is not statistically significant once we include sensitivity.  
Discouragement, like denial, does not seem to work with just the absence of major power adversarial 
alliances.  I remind the reader, that sensitivity controls for how much major power activity a state, or its 
politically relevant neighborhood, has experienced. The more sensitive to major power activity a state is, 
the more likely it is to be influenced by major power behavior. 
Table 7.12 presents the models with the inclusion of those control variables that remained 
significant in the evaluation process. Model 1 lacks the interaction of sensitivity and the scale variable 
that Model 2 has.  
Table 7.12 Negative Binomial Regression of Major Power Coordination on number of ongoing disputes a minor power joins, 
1715-1815 with controls. 
Minor Power Ongoing Disputes Joining 1715-1815 Model 1 Model 2 
# of ongoing  Scale of major  -0.395 -1.113 
disputes joined power coordination. (0.178)* (0.662) 
    
 # of ongoing 0.032 0.029 
 disputes could join (0.023) (0.024) 
    
 # Ongoing disputes 0.260 0.260 
  (0.065)*** (0.065)*** 
    
 Lagged Monadic  0.084 -0.706 
 Sensitivity (0.244) (0.724) 
    
 _cons -0.827 0.154 
  (0.445) (0.949) 
    
 Scale * Sens  0.597 
   (0.527) 
    
Lnalpha _cons -15.843 -47.352 
  (1,021.374) (0.000) 
    
N  335 335 
Ll  -272.65 -272.00 
Chi2  26.71 28.02 
R2_P  0.05 0.05 
Chi2_C  0.00 0.00 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Model 1 of Table 12 indicates a statistically significant negative association between the scale 
variable and the number of ongoing disputes a minor power joins. This is deceptive though. This is 
because the models of Table 7.11 indicate this happens due to the control variables. The results of 
bivariate evaluations (not pictured), indicate that the main driving force of states joining ongoing MIDs is 
opportunity (how many ongoing MIDs are going on in a states neighborhood), and conflict proneness as 
expressed in the number of MIDs a state is embroiled in at any one point of time.  While these are 
findings that may be worth further study, for the time being hypothesis 6 remains falsified.68  
Conclusion on Hypothesis 6 
The falsification of Hypothesis 6 indicates that just the absence of major power adversarial 
alliances is not able to pacify international relations through discouragement. Indeed, this may mean that 
consultation and multilateralism are required for the major powers to avoid overt antagonism, rather than 
being a result of the lack of overt antagonism.  
CONCLUSION FOR CHAPTER 7 
 
In this chapter I looked at the European precursor of the international system before the point of 
transformation in 1816. This is the system before major power managerial coordination was reached by 
major powers. It is a system of either intense major power enmity expressed through adversarial alliances 
or at best a tenuous avoidance of such alliances that is not accompanied by any of the cooperative 
elements of managerial coordination.  It is a system of power-politics. My expectation was that the strong 
pacific findings found in the 1816-2001 period will be absent in this pre-transformation environment.  I 
was not proven wrong. The findings are: 
                                                          
68 The association between the number of opportunities for joining an ongoing dispute in the form of ongoing 
disputes of neighbors, while positive with actually joining is not statistically significant. This is due to the control 
variables (97).The more ongoing disputes a state is embroiled in the more likely it is to join other state disputes. This 
is a robust association (96). Being a system year with a preponderant sea power does not have a statistically 
significant association (95) 
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• That before 1816 major power coordination only reached point 2 of the scale, the 
avoidance of adversarial alliances. Before 1816 the cooperative elements of major power 
managerial coordination are either overwhelmed by the presence of adversarial alliances 
or not present, as expected by the transformation thesis. 
• The lack of adversarial alliances between the major powers devoid of any cooperative 
elements of managerial coordination is a conflict-inducing condition in the 1715-1815 
period when it comes to MID onset. 
• The lack of adversarial alliances between the major powers devoid of any cooperative 
elements of managerial coordination is not statistically strong enough to dampen the 
possibility of war-onset in the 1715-1815 period. 
• The creation of adversarial alliances between the major powers in the 1715-1815 period 
is not strongly associated with MID onset.  
• The lack of adversarial alliances between the major powers devoid of any cooperative 
elements of managerial coordination does have an association with the enactment and 
reinstatement of constitutions in the 1789-1815 period.  
• The denial mechanisms for explaining the pacific effect of increasing managerial major 
power coordination may not work under conditions of absence of major power 
adversarial alliances but also a lack of cooperative elements of major power managerial 
coordination. 
• The discouragement mechanism for explaining the pacific effect of increasing managerial 
major power coordination may not work under conditions in which the major powers are 
avoiding adversarial alliances, but are also not engaged in the cooperative elements of 
major power managerial coordination. 
• The main correlates of MID onset in the 1715-1815 period are the presence of a 
preponderant sea power (the UK in this period), states being allied to each other, and 
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strategic rivalry. The main correlates of War onset in the same period, are the presence of 
a preponderant sea power and the existence of territorial dispute, while being allied to 
each other dampens the possibility of war. 
  The findings from the evaluations in this chapter indicate the following. For major power 
coordination to have a pacific effect it must include at least one of the active cooperative managerial 
elements (consultation or multilateralism), beyond the avoidance of major power adversarial alliances. 
Just trying to avoid the overt expression of hostility that is an adversarial alliance will not help the major 
powers secure the pacific management of international issues. They must instead strive in a trajectory of 
positive action to proscribe and prescribe behaviors in the broader international system that will secure 
the relative peace they wish for. To have peace the major powers must engage in active management, 
rather than just avoiding antagonism in their numbers.  
The findings confirm that something monumental happened in 1816 when it came to the quality of 
major power coordination. The 1715-1815 period did not see positive coordination elements in major 
power behavior. It is only after 1816 that the major powers become capable of envisaging their relations a 
something more than overt antagonism or opportunistic cooperation on specific issues. The 18th century 
was the age of major powers as opportunistic actors. The 19th century saw the major powers attempt to 
become managers of the international system, and succeed in doing so for part of that period.  
Part of this transformation of international politics captured by the scale of major power 
coordination intensity can be explained by the growing confidence of western societies that they could 
morph the future of human affairs, a result of the break from the presentism of medieval society.69 But 
part may be due to major power elites becoming wary of the domestic consequences of war after the 
dangerous Napoleonic Wars, as Schroeder describes (1994).  In the next chapter I take a more full view of 
the role of managerial coordination by conducting evaluations of its influence on conflict and peace for 
                                                          
69 This was a point offered by Peter Halden.  
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the whole 1715-2001 period. This will permit me to better understand the role the results in the 1715-
1815 period play in the grander theoretical story of transformation.  
Most of the models in this period produced results supporting the Null hypothesis that there is no 
statistical association. This lack of statistical power may be driven by the lack of variation in the data in 
the 1715-1815 period. In some instances, like in that the scale of major power managerial coordination 
intensity does not show much variation in the generally low to non-existent level of managerial 
coordination behavior by the major powers in the period, this lack of variation was expected by theory. 
But in many cases it is the result of the lack of data on variables of interest in the 18th century.  
Statistical power is partly driven by an abundance of data and variables that permit scholars to 
capture more of the empirical reality they wish to study. The 1715-1815 Datasets are still in their infancy 
and us such lack many variables that are available for later periods. Many variables are also crude, as new 
variables tend to be. My expectation is that more date is made available concerning international politics, 
and the intersection of international and domestic politics in the 18th century, future models should prove 
more informative. But for the time being, I must work with the data we have, not the data I would like 
researchers to have.  
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C H A P T E R  8 :  B R I N G I N G  I T  A L L  T O G E T H E R ,  T H E  1 7 1 5 - 2 0 0 1  P E R I O D  
INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous three chapters presented the findings from the evaluation of the effect of major 
power coordination on peace in the 1816-2001 period, and the 1715-1815 period. Within the 1816-2001 
period the findings indicated that major power managerial coordination and the movement of major 
power behavior towards managerial coordination does indeed have a pacific influence on international 
relations. Findings indicate that this influence may be due to denial rather than discouragement 
dynamics.70 The supposition based on Schroeder’s work that the transformation that major power 
coordination brings to international politics has a domestic element was not supported in a decisive 
manner. Increasing managerial major power coordination is associated with increases in participation, 
competition, and executive constraints within states, but that is not necessarily expressed in the preferred 
legitimist tool, a constitution. It is also not associated with the ascension of state into intergovernmental 
institutions. Thus the long term pacific effect of managerial coordination is not as strong as expected, but 
in the short term it has a decisive pacific influence. 
The findings of the 1715-1815 period indicate that the transformation thesis is correct in that 
1816 is a crucial date for major power managerial coordination. Before that date major power 
coordination never reaches a cooperative character. Just the lack of adversarial alliances, the most 
cooperative major power behavior is in the 1715-1815 period, does not have a pacific influence. The 
findings in the two periods indicate that the presence of the more active cooperative elements of major 
power managerial coordination, consultation and multilateralism, are important for its pacific influence. 
                                                          
70 I remind the reader that denial mechanisms entail the major powers denying other states their diplomatic and 
material support. Discouragement entails the major powers discouraging other states through threats or prescriptions 
from taking a course of action.  
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The time has come now to evaluate the strength of the pacific effects of coordination across the 
entire 1715-2001 period. There are several reasons to do this. First, the addition of the 1715-1815 period 
makes the evaluations harder as it adds observations in which managerial coordination was at the lower, 
less cooperative levels. Second, the addition permits me to evaluate the main argument of this study, that 
increasing managerial coordination is one of the explanations for the increasingly pacific character of the 
modern era across the history of most of modernity (with only the 1648-1715 and post-2001 periods 
missing). Finally the full period evaluation permits me to look at the influence of managerial coordination 
on the evolution of the modern state system by bringing together the pre-transformation period (1715-
1815), the transformation period (Vienna system) and the post transformation period (after 1850). Figure 
8.1 presents graphically the level of major power coordination as captured by the scale of major power 
coordination intensity for the whole 1715-2001 period. 
Figure 8.1 Scale of Major Power Coordination 1715-2001 period 
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What is evaluated? 
Not all hypotheses are evaluated for the 1715-2001 period. The main reason for this is the lack of 
information on some variables in the pre-1815 period. In some cases, like the existence of nuclear 
weapons, we can assume with certainty the value of those variables before 1815. In other cases things are 
not so clear. The main issue is the population of IGOs before 1815. Since we do not have data on IGO 
membership before 1816 I am unwilling to run hypothesis 12 about IGO ascension before 1816.  Another 
issue is the mutual military buildup variable. While I have provided draft data on military capabilities in 
the pre-1815 period, this data cannot be used in its current form to give us information on arms races or 
military buildups before 1816. Thus I do not evaluate Hypothesis 7 that focuses on military buildups. 
Hypothesis 3 only applied to the 1715-1815 period.  The addition of 1715-1815 will not change the 
falsifying result of Hypothesis 9, which focused on whether the temporal shadow of major power 
managerial interventions made MID onset less likely, since no major power managerial interventions took 
place before 1815.  
All other hypotheses are evaluated. Hypothesis 1 (mid onset), 2 (war onset), H5 (major power 
unilateral alliances), H6 (minor power joining ongoing disputes), H8 (managerial interventions onset) are 
evaluated for the whole period. Hypothesis 10 on increasing participation and competition within a polity 
is evaluated for the 1800-2001 period, since the Polity dataset begins in 1800. Hypothesis 11 on the 
association between managerial coordination and the enactment and reinstatement of constitutions will be 
evaluated for the 1789-2001 period since the Comparative Constitutions dataset does not go before 1789. 
Hypothesis 5 was not evaluated in previous chapters and shall be evaluated here. Hypothesis 5 
presents an argument about the usual conceptions of periodization by political scientists. It divides the 
1715-2001 period into five sub-periods which are commonly used by political scientists and historians.  
These are the pre-1815 period, the Vienna System (1816-1849), the Age of Imperialism (1850-1945), the 
Cold War (1946-1990), and the Unipolar moment (1991-2001). In a way this periodization partly 
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corresponds to periods characterized by high or low managerial coordination between the major powers, 
or to specific distributions of major power capabilities. I am using these periods to conduct a dyad-based 
evaluation of the general argument. 
I divide the history of each dyad into the five periods. For each period I compile the number of 
MID onsets and War onsets the dyad experienced. I also compile the number of years that major power 
coordination reached levels 4, or levels 3 and 4. This does two things. In one way it evaluates if this 
periodization is partly driven by coordination dynamics between the major powers. If this is the case any 
study that uses some combination of these periods is unknowingly controlling for major power 
coordination. If those periods are by default associated with varying levels of military conflict due to the 
level of major power coordination, then it would be imprudent to use these periodizations when 
evaluating levels of military conflict. This is the second thing that I can do with the periodization, which 
is to evaluate how much conflict dynamics in each period are driven by coordination dynamics.71 
 
THE FINDINGS 
 
H1: Increasing managerial major power coordination should be negatively associated with the onset of 
originator Militarized Disputes in a politically relevant dyad year in the 1715-2001 period. 
In the 1816-2001 period this hypothesis was not falsified by the evaluations. In 1715-1815 it was. 
My expectation for the full period evaluation is that it will not falsify the hypothesis. This is because the 
                                                          
71 When it comes to control variables only a minimal number can be used in this full test. These are dyadic 
democracy/ monadic democracy/ number of years in a period a dyad was a dyadic democracy , proportion of 
democratic major powers/ average proportion in period, strategic rivalry/ number of years in period that dyad had 
strategic rivalry, allied to each other/ number of years in period allied to each other, outside ally/ number of years in 
period with outside ally, outside ally was a major power / number of years in period with an outside major power 
ally, preponderance/ number of years in dyad period with preponderance,  dominant sea power year/ number of 
years in period with dominant seapower, nuclear state, nuclear dyad/ number of years in period that dyad is a nuclear 
one, ongoing disputes, chances to join ongoing disputes,  state age, and national capability.   
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inclusion of 1715-1815 will bring in 100 years of low level major power managerial coordination, periods 
characterized by antagonism.  These 100 years will bring into sharp focus the fewer periods of managerial 
coordination as well because those fewer periods were more peaceful than the now larger normal of major 
power enmity. Table 8.1 presents the bivariate findings between increasing managerial major power 
coordination and MID onset.  
Table 8.1 Logit of scale of major power coordination on MID onset, 1715-2001 
MID 
Onset 
1715-
2001 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI 
Scale 
of 
-0.193 -0.147 -0.202 -0.190 -0.141 -0.122 
mjr. 
power 
coordin
ation 
(0.030)*** (0.025)*** (0.032)*** (0.056)*** (0.025)*** (0.043)** 
       
Peace   -0.294   -0.359 -0.359 
Years  (0.016)***   (0.019)*** (0.019)*** 
       
Lagged   -0.148 -0.103 -0.016 0.055 
dyadic 
sensitiv
ity. 
  (0.134) (0.195) (0.098) (0.143) 
       
Scale*    -0.021  -0.033 
Sens.    (0.078)  (0.059) 
       
_cons -3.097 -1.584 -2.986 -3.013 -1.299 -1.342 
 (0.084)*** (0.094)*** (0.130)*** (0.165)*** (0.121)*** (0.147)*** 
       
N 95,880 95,880 93,371 93,371 93,371 93,371 
Ll -12,228.51 -11,038.05 -11,931.69 -11,931.58 -10,581.78 -10,581.49 
Chi2 41.72 888.14 40.77 41.32 1,029.55 1,051.81 
R2_P 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.12 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 Note: Standard Errors clustered by dyad; Splines used but not presented   
 
 
The findings presented in Table 8.1 do not differ substantially from those found in the 1816-2001 
period. Increasing managerial major power coordination has a statistically significant negative association 
with MID onset under all conditions, even when sensitivity is 0 (13% of observations). Table 8.2 presents 
the two multivariate models with the control variables. One is with interactions, the other without 
interactions. 
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Table 8.2 Logit of scale of major power coordination on MID onset with controls, 1715-2001 
MID Onset 
1715-2001 
Model 1 Model 2 
Scale of major  -0.176 -0.134 
power coordination (0.027)*** (0.045)** 
   
Lagged dyadic 0.182 0.169 
sensitivity (0.083)* (0.156) 
   
Proportion of  0.905 0.634 
major powers  that are 
democracies 
(0.149)*** (0.278)* 
   
Allied to each other 0.101 0.112 
 (0.067) (0.069) 
   
At least one 0.133 0.129 
outside major power alliance (0.067)* (0.068) 
   
Strategic rivalry 1.441 1.441 
 (0.093)*** (0.094)*** 
   
Preponderance -0.458 -0.457 
 (0.084)*** (0.084)*** 
   
Dyad members 0.504 0.492 
are nuclear powers (0.272) (0.272) 
   
One member has -0.350 -0.346 
nuclear weapons (0.108)** (0.108)** 
   
Major power -0.237 -0.227 
dyad (0.104)* (0.105)* 
   
Peace -0.277 -0.277 
years (0.016)*** (0.016)*** 
   
Scale*Sens  -0.071 
  (0.059) 
   
ProDem*Sens  0.372 
  (0.299) 
   
_cons -2.192 -2.155 
 (0.136)*** (0.176)*** 
   
N 93,371 93,371 
Ll -9,916.01 -9,914.12 
Chi2 2,441.73 2,475.93 
R2_P 0.17 0.17 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001  
Note: Standard Error clustered by dyad; Splines used but not presented   
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The findings of Table 8.2 indicate that major power coordination has a statistically significant 
association with MID onset in the 1715-2001 period. This holds, as model 2 indicates, even when dyadic 
sensitivity is 0 (13% of observations).72 Figure 8.2 presents the interaction between the scale and 
sensitivity variable to facilitate interpretation. 
Figure 8.2 Marginal Effect of Coordination on MID onset when conditioned by sensitivity, 1715-2001 
 
 
 
The figure indicates that the effect of coordination on MID onset is significant under all values of 
                                                          
72 When it comes to the control variables the following can be said: An increasing proportion of major powers that 
are democracies has a statistically significant positive association with MID onset. This is a robust relationship 
(100). Being allied to each other has a positive but statistically insignificant association with MID onset. This is due 
to the other control variables (102). Having at least one outside alliance that is with a major power has a positive 
statistically significant association with MID onset .This is a robust association (103). Strategic Rivalry has a 
statistically significant positive association with MID onset. This is a robust association (106). Preponderance has a 
statistically significant negative association with MID onset. This is a robust relationship (107). Being a nuclear 
dyad has not statistically significant effect on MID onset. This is due to the other control variables (108). Being a 
dyad where only one state has nuclear weapons has a statistically significant negative association with MID onset. 
This is a robust relationship (109). Being a major power dyad has a statistically significant negative association with 
MID Onset. This is a robust relationship (111). The following variables did not exhibit a statistically significant 
association with the dependent variable during the evaluation process and thus were not included in the final model: 
System year with a preponderant sea power  (101), At least one outside alliance  (104),  Democratic dyad (105). One 
dyad member being a preponderant major power sea-power (110).  
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sensitivity, and that as sensitivity increases that effect becomes stronger. This means that regardless of 
how close or isolated from the foci of major power activity a dyad is, the managerial coordination of 
major powers is associated with that dyad avoiding MID onset. 
Figure 8.3 presents the substantive effect in the form of changes in the predicted probability of 
mid onset when the scale of major power coordination increases in value.  
Figure 8.3 Predicted Probability of MID onset and Scale of Major Power Coordination 
 
 
It is based on Model 2 of Table 2 with the base scenario having all binary variables set to their 
median, all continuous to mean, sensitivity set to mean, the interaction of sensitivity and the scale set to 
the value that results from multiplying the current level of the scale with the mean of sensitivity, and 
sensitivity set to 1.73  The figure indicates a decreasing predicted probability of mid onset as coordination 
increases. Going from level 1 coordination to level 4 decreases the predicted probability of mid onset by 
.0074 from .0183 to .0109 (by about 40%).  
 
                                                          
73 The actual values are  allied to each other =0, at least one outside alliance with major power =1, strategic rivals=0, 
Prepoderance =1, Nuclear dyad=0, One nuclear power in dyad=0, major power dyad=0, proportion of democratic 
major powers * sensitvity=.233690 
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Conclusion on Hypothesis 1 
 
The findings fail to falsify hypothesis 1. Taking into consideration the findings for the 1715-
1815,1816-2001 and 1715-2001 periods I can confidently say that increasing managerial major power 
coordination has a pacific effect on MID onset between dyads of states. At this very crucial level of 
interstate relations, states are less apt to engage in a militarized dispute between them when the major 
powers are engaged in managerial coordination. This association is independent of how sensitive a dyad 
is to major power activity. The findings of the 1715-1815 period indicate that Paul Schroder is correct in 
his transformation thesis. This effect is tied to the first time major powers tried their hand in managerial 
coordination in Vienna in 1816.  
 This finding by itself is novel and important. No other quantitative research has looked at the 
possible effect of group major power interaction on the MID dynamics of states. The fact that MID onset 
is in an upward trend compared to war onset over the last 300 years may have an explanation in the 
difficulty major powers had over most of this long period to enact managerial coordination. However 
when they do strive to reach that point of interaction, MID onset is dampened. Major Power managerial 
coordination is a part of the puzzle of peace.  
Hypothesis 2: If a politically relevant dyad experienced the onset of a MID, increasing managerial 
major power coordination should be negatively associated with a dispute escalating to war in the 
1715-2001 period. 
 
In the 1816-2001 period the findings indicated that increasing managerial major power 
coordination has a negative association with War onset in all cases but that minority where sensitivity to 
major power activity is 0. In the 1715-1815 period there was no statistically significant association 
between the scale variable (in this case indicating the difference between major power interaction 
characterized by adversarial alliances and one lacking both adversarial and cooperative elements) and war 
onset.  
In the 1715-2001 period I expect similar results to the 1816-2001 period. Table 8.3 presents the 
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bivariate models between the scale and war onset. 
Table 8.3  Logit of Scale of Major Power Coordination on War Onset, 1715-2001 
War Onset 
1715-2001 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Scale  -0.522 -0.493 -0.091 -0.459 -0.044 
of  major  
power coordination 
(0.058)*** (0.058)*** (0.125) (0.061)*** (0.126) 
      
Peace  -0.134  -0.103 -0.108 
Years  (0.022)***  (0.023)*** (0.023)*** 
      
Lagged 
dyadic  
  2.476 1.474 2.500 
Sensitivity   (0.367)*** (0.167)*** (0.356)*** 
      
Scale   -0.514  -0.549 
*Sensit.   (0.147)***  (0.147)*** 
      
_cons -0.888 -0.453 -2.911 -1.748 -2.545 
 (0.145)*** (0.154)** (0.314)*** (0.178)*** (0.315)*** 
      
N 2,696 2,696 2,633 2,633 2,633 
Ll -991.59 -955.93 -861.69 -846.55 -840.26 
Chi2 82.30 131.66 134.37 152.50 194.22 
R2_P 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.13 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 Note: Standard Errors clustered by dyad; Splines used but not presented  
 
The findings do not indicate a big departure from those of the 1816-2001 period. Increasing 
managerial major power coordination has a statistically significant negative association with War onset, 
except when sensitivity is 0 (about 19% of observations).  Increasing sensitivity itself has a positive and 
statistically significant association with War onset. Including the control variables does not change this 
result. Table 8.4 presents the multivariate models with the control variables. The first one does not have 
interactions, the second one does.  
The findings of Table 8.4 are similar to those of Table 3 and similar to the ones of the 1816-2001 
period.  
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Table 8.4 Logit of Scale of Major Power Coordination on War onset with controls. 1715-2001 
War Onset 1715-2001 Model I Model II 
Scale of major power -0.308 0.042 
Coordination (0.081)*** (0.159) 
 
Lagged dyadic sensitivity 0.758 2.033 
 (0.178)*** (0.412)*** 
 
Proportion of major powers -3.343 -1.924 
that are democracies (0.366)*** (0.679)** 
 
System year with preponderant -0.350 -0.800 
sea Power (0.169)* (0.356)* 
 
At least one outside  0.291 0.284 
major power alliance (0.156) (0.162) 
 
Democratic dyad -0.445 -0.416 
 (0.406) (0.405) 
 
One member -0.365 -0.264 
has nuclear weapons (0.306) (0.304) 
 
Major power dyad 0.174 0.179 
 (0.225) (0.238) 
 
Peace years -0.055 -0.054 
 (0.023)* (0.024)* 
 
Scale* Sensitivity  -0.499 
  (0.186)** 
 
Proportion of democratic   -1.724 
major powers *Sensitivity  (0.793)* 
 
Seapower Year*  0.436 
Sensitivity  (0.399) 
 
_cons -0.445 -1.438 
 (0.245) (0.377)*** 
 
N 2,633 2,633 
Ll -751.24 -743.54 
Chi2 275.96 302.77 
R2_P 0.22 0.23 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: Standard Errors clustered by dyad; Splines used but not presented 
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Increasing managerial major power coordination has a statistically significant negative 
association with war onset, except in those dyads that have zero sensitivity to major power activity 
(roughly  19% of observations).74  
Figure 8.4 graphs the interaction between the scale of major power coordination and sensitivity to 
aid interpreting the way the interaction works. What the figure shows is that the negative association 
between increasing managerial major power coordination and war onset only holds for at least minimal 
and above amounts of sensitivity  (around the .5 level). This means that for roughly 30% of observations 
managerial coordination does not necessarily help the cause of peace. But for 70% it does as it retains a 
negative effect on war onset. 
That said, as sensitivity increases the effect of coordination on War onset becomes stronger. The 
closer you are to the activity foci of a major power the more likely is a dyad to avoid war. But states 
isolated from major power influence are more likely to ignore the pacific activity of the coordinating 
major powers. 
The substantive effect of increasing managerial major power coordination is presented by figure 
8.5, which graphs the change in the predicted probability of war onset as I increase the level of major 
power coordination. The scenarios are extracted from model II of Table 8.4 and the base scenario has all 
the binary variables at median, continuous variables at mean, sensitivity at mean, the interaction equal to 
the number that results from multiplying sensitivity with the value of the scale and the scale at 1. 
 
                                                          
74 When it comes to the control variables the following can be said: An increasing proportion of major powers that 
are democracies has a statistically significant negative association with War onset. t\This is a robust relationship 
(114). If the year was one where there was a preponderant sea power this has a statistically significant negative 
association on war onset. This is a robust association (115). If the dyad had at least one outside alliance with a major 
power then this does not have a statistically significant effect on war onset. This is due to the other control variables 
(117). Being a democratic dyad does not have a statistically significant effect. This is due the presence of the other 
control variables (120). If only one of the states in the dyad is a nuclear power then this has a statistically 
insignificant association with War onset. This is due to the other control variables (122).  Being a major power dyad 
does not have a statistically significant effect on war onset. This is due to the other control variables (124). 
The following variables (in parentheses the relevant table of the statistical appendix) did not exhibit statistical 
significance during the evaluation process and thus were not included in the models of Table 4: Preponderance 
(121),Outside Ally (118), Strategic Rivals (119), Dyad member being a preponderant sea power (123), Territorial 
Dispute (125). Being a nuclear dyad is a perfect predictor of peace.  
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Figure 8.4 Marginal Effect of Coordination on War onset when conditioned by sensitivity, 1715-2001 
 
Figure 8.5 Predicted Probability of War onset and scale of major power coordination 
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The figure indicates a decreasing predicted probability of war onset as the values of the scale of 
major power coordination increase. Going from level 1 coordination to level 4 decreases the predicted 
probability of war onset by .0430 from .0836 to .0406 (by about 51%) . As the major powers engage in 
robust managerial coordination their efforts pay off as dyads in the system become less apt to engage in 
war. Even if neighborhoods may dominate the immediate concerns of states, coordinated activism by the 
major powers in pursuit of the pacific management of issues does help promote peace.  
 Conclusion on Hypothesis 2 
I would argue that Hypothesis 2 was not falsified by the findings. Increasing managerial major 
power coordination does have a pacific influence in the majority of cases when it comes to war-onset. 
However unlike MID onset, sensitivity plays a crucial role in conditioning that effect. Those states with 
very little sensitivity do not see their war onset dynamics affected by major power group behavior. Unlike 
the clear pacific influence of major power managerial coordination on MID onset irrespective of 
sensitivity, this means that the finding about war onset is not as groundbreaking. This is because  the 
commonsense expectation is that the pacific effect of major power activity when it comes to war-onset is 
stronger the closer a dyad is to the foci of major power activity (most would say that this means the 
central system, European system etc.). This is indeed the case, but this also means that this finding is not 
very novel. In this case, I simply corroborate empirically an extant argument.  
As far as the transformation thesis is concerned, what I claimed in the conclusion about 
hypothesis 1, holds here as well. The pacific association of coordination is tied to the Vienna system 
attempt at managerial coordination. Before that system the major powers never reached a level of 
coordination that contained cooperative elements. Attempts at increasing managerial major power 
coordination are a part of the key that will explain why interstate war is decreasing even though MID 
onset increases.  
Hypothesis 4: Politically Relevant Dyads should  had experienced more disputes in the 1715-1815 
period compared to the 1850-1945 period, in which they should had more disputes than in the 
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1946-1990, in which they should had more disputes than in the 1991-2001 period, in which they 
should had more disputes than in the 1816-1849 period.  
This hypothesis evaluates whether the usual periodization done by scholars of international 
relations actually controls for the quality of major power managerial coordination.  The usual division of 
international history since 1648 is into a pre-Congress period before 1816, a Congress period roughly 
lasting from 1816 to the start of the Crimean war, a “real-politic” period from after the Crimean War to 
the end of World War 2, the Cold War, and then the post-Cold War period.   
I argue that this periodization unconsciously closely follows the patterns of major power 
managerial coordination intensity. The Congress and Post-Cold War period see major power interaction 
reach the higher points of the scale of major power managerial coordination intensity. On the other hand 
the pre-1816 period, the Cold War and the “real-politik” periods see it reach the lowest points. 
Furthermore the “real-politik” period saw more variation than the pre-1816 period, and the Cold War 
thanks to nuclear deterrence was less conflict prone in interstate relations than the 19th century and first 
half of the 20th century. Essentially I am saying that when scholars divide their evaluations by these 
periods they are selecting cases on the amount of managerial coordination. This might bias results if done 
unknowingly. Here I evaluate whether my argument has merit.  
I also wish to evaluate another conception. Generally the perception is that the 18th century and 
Napoleonic period are seen as almost as war-torn as the 1850-1945 period that saw two World Wars. The 
Cold War is seen as less war-torn than those two, but more war torn when compared with the pre-
Afghanistan post-Cold War era. And all are considered less pacific than the Vienna system. Whether this 
perception is valid is also evaluated by this hypothesis. 
The question of the validity of the perception is easily assessed by the tabulations of Table 8.5 
which show the number of MID onsets and War onsets by period.  
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Table 8.5 Aggregate MID and War Onsets by historical periods  
Period 1 (1715-1815) 3 (1850-1945) 4 (1946-1990) 5 (1991-2001) 2 (1816-1849) 
Wars 58 113 41 9 9 
MIDs 76 317 279 162 45 
 
The relationship between periods holds for the modern period expect for the fact that period 1 
(1715-1815) is less conflictual than period 3 (1850-1945) when it comes to war, and less conflictual than 
all other periods but the Vienna Congress when it comes to MIDs. This may be due to the fact that period 
1 had fewer states than the other periods. That said in the post-1816 period the periods fall in the expected 
relationship. Our perceptions of pacifism are not totally misguided. Periods generally considered pacific 
as far as interstate conflict is concerned, like the Cold War and Vienna System, are more pacific than 
periods considered more conflictual.  
When I focus on the difference between period 1(1715-1815) and period 2 (1816-1850) there is a 
telling image of the transformation Schroeder argued for. Consider this. These two periods were very 
similar in the number of states that were part of the system (about 24). True, one is half the length of the 
other, but this is no limit on warfare as the Cold War shows. The difference in conflict dynamics between 
period 1 and period 2 are very acute, considering that there were no major fluctuations in system 
membership.  
The next step is to evaluate if this pacific trend is due to managerial coordination. To do this I use 
ordinary least squares regression with the dependent variable being number of war onsets in a dyad in 
each period and number of mid-onset in a dyad in each period. The independent variables are the number 
of years in a period that major power coordination reached level 3 or above in the scale (present 
cooperative elements), or was at level 4 (managerial coordination). I also include control variables.75 
                                                          
75 Systemic variables are straight counts, dyadic variables are averaged by number of years in period, sensitivity is 
the average sensitivity in period.  
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Table 8.6 presents the models for the association between Level 3 and above coordination on 
number of war onset. The first model is bivariate, the second adds period averaged sensitivity, the third is 
multivariate with controls, and the last includes sensitivity and the controls. 
Table 8.6 OLS Regression of Years of Level 3-4 Coordination per period on Number of War onsets per dyad period, 1715-2001 
Number of War Onsets 
1715-2001 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
#Years with level  -0.004 -0.003 -0.012 -0.012 
3,4 Coordination (0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
     
# of Years of dyadic   -0.025 -0.040 
democracy averaged   (0.028) (0.027) 
     
# of  Years strategic   0.929 0.956 
rivalry averaged   (0.045)*** (0.045)*** 
     
# of Years of allied    -0.045 -0.037 
to each other averaged   (0.020)* (0.020) 
     
# Years of outside    0.119 0.112 
alliance averaged   (0.030)*** (0.031)*** 
     
# Years of outside    0.013 -0.036 
alliance with   (0.022) (0.022) 
major power averaged     
     
# of years with   -0.008 0.001 
preponderance    (0.018) (0.018) 
Averaged     
     
Average of    -0.831 -0.715 
proportion of  major 
powers that 
are democracies 
  (0.041)*** (0.044)*** 
 
     
# of years with   0.000 0.000 
preponderant seapower   (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
Average sensitivity  0.118  0.086 
  (0.010)***  (0.010)*** 
     
_cons 0.162 -0.031 0.645 0.467 
 (0.019)*** (0.025) (0.034)*** (0.040)*** 
     
N 3,700 3,652 3,700 3,652 
R2 0.00 0.04 0.23 0.25 
F 14.22 76.31 123.86 121.56 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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The table models indicate a robust negative association between the number of years of level 3 
and 4 coordination in a period and the number of wars a dyad sees begin in each period. This association 
is robust in the face of the control variables.76 Hypothesis 4 is not falsified by the evaluation. 
Table 8.7 presents the same regressions but with level 4 coordination by itself. In another name 
this is an evaluation of managerial coordination as a regime, rather than evaluation of the activity of major 
powers towards reaching such a regime. The findings support an independent pacific association between 
a managerial coordination regime and number of war onsets.77 
                                                          
76 Of the control variables the following can be said: The higher the average of number of years with dyadic 
democracy in the period does not have a statistically significant influence on the number of war onsets per period. 
This is due to the presence of the other control variables (141). The higher the average of the number of years a dyad 
had a strategic rivalry in a period does have a positive and statistically significant association with the number of 
war onsets in the period. This is a robust relationship (141). The higher the average of the number of years the 
members of a  dyad were allied to each other has tenuous negative association with the number of wars a dyad had 
in a period. This is due to the control variables (142). The higher the average of the number of years the members of 
a dyad had at least one outside alliance in a period has a statistically significant positive association with the number 
of war onsets they had in a period. This is due to the other control variables (142). The higher the average of the 
number of years the members of a dyad had at least one outside alliance with a major power in a period does not 
have a statistically significant effect on the number of war onsets a dyad had in a period. This is due to the presence 
of the other control variables (142). The higher the average of the number of years there was a preponderant 
distribution of capabilities among the members of a dyad in a period does not have a statistically significant 
influence. This is due to the other control variables in the models (143). The average of the proportion of major 
powers that were democracies over the total number of major powers in a period has a statistically negative 
association with the number of war onsets a dyad had in a period. This is a robust relationship(144). The count of the 
number of years in a period that had a preponderant sea-power has no statistically significant influence on the 
number of war onsets a dyad had in a period. This is due to the presence of the other control variables (144). The 
average of the number of years a dyad had at least one nuclear power member exhibited no influence during the 
evaluation process and was left out of the final models (144). 
77 Of the control variables the following can be said: The higher the average of number of years with dyadic 
democracy in the period does not have a statistically significant influence on the number of war onsets per period. 
This is due to the presence of the other control variables (145). The higher the average of the number of years a dyad 
had a strategic rivalry in a period does have a positive and statistically significant association with the number of 
war onsets in the period. This is a robust relationship (145). The higher the average of the number of years the 
members of a dyad had at least one outside alliance in a period has a statistically significant positive association with 
the number of war onsets they had in a period. This is robust relationship (146). The higher the average of the 
number of years the members of a dyad had at least one outside alliance with a major power in a period does not 
have a statistically significant effect on the number of war onsets a dyad had in a period. This is due to the presence 
of the other control variables (146). The higher the average of the number of years there was a preponderant 
distribution of capabilities among the members of a dyad in a period does not have a statistically significant 
influence. This is due to the other control variables in the models (147). The average of the proportion of major 
powers that were democracies over the total number of major powers in a period has a statistically negative 
association with the number of war onsets a dyad had in a period. This is a robust relationship (148). The count of 
the number of years in a period that had a preponderant sea-power has a statistically significant negative influence 
on the number of war onsets a dyad had in a period. This is a robust relationship (148). The average of the number 
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Table 8.7 OLS Regression of Years of Level 4 Coordination per period on Number of War onsets per 
dyad period, 1715-2001 
Number of War 
Onsets 1715-2001 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
# Years of level 4  -0.016 -0.015 -0.020 -0.017 
major power 
coordination 
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
     
# of years of    -0.007 -0.021 
dyadic democracy 
averaged 
  (0.027) (0.027) 
     
# of years of    0.886 0.915 
strategic rivalry 
averaged 
  (0.045)*** (0.045)*** 
     
# of years      0.268 0.262 
of outside alliance 
averaged 
  (0.029)*** (0.030)*** 
     
# of years of     0.009 -0.035 
outside alliance 
with major power  
averaged 
  (0.022) (0.022) 
     
# of year with    -0.002 0.005 
preponderance 
averaged 
  (0.017) (0.017) 
     
Averaged 
proportion of major 
powers  
  -0.532 
(0.048)*** 
-0.463 
(0.049)*** 
that are 
democracies 
    
     
# of Years with    -0.005 -0.004 
preponderant sea 
power 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
     
Sensitivity averaged  0.109  0.079 
  (0.010)***  (0.010)*** 
     
_cons 0.196 0.023 0.384 0.221 
 (0.011)*** (0.020) (0.021)*** (0.030)*** 
     
N 3,700 3,652 3,700 3,652 
R2 0.04 0.07 0.23 0.24 
F 144.13 136.83 135.36 129.22 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of years a dyad had at least one nuclear power member(148)  and the higher the average of the number of years the 
members of a  dyad were allied to each other  (146) exhibited no influence during the evaluation process and was 
left out of the final models. 
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The next set of tables present the exact same evaluations but with number of mid onsets by dyad 
period as the independent variable. Table 8.8 presents the models evaluating the associations between the 
number of MID onsets in a dyad period and the number of years with level 3 and 4 coordination in the 
same period. 
Table 8.8 OLS Regression of Years of Level 3-4 Coordination per period on Number of MID onsets per dyad period, 1715-2001 
Number of MID Onsets 1715-
2001 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
# of years of level 0.036 0.038 0.028 0.030 
3-4 Coordination (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
     
Average proportion of    -1.557 -1.175 
major powers that   (0.187)*** (0.202)*** 
are democracies 
 
    
# of years of nuclear   1.742 1.577 
dyad averaged   (0.348)*** (0.350)*** 
     
# of years with preponderance   -0.429 -0.410 
averaged   (0.082)*** (0.082)*** 
     
# of years with     0.008 0.008 
preponderant seapower   (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
     
# of years of outside   -0.108 -0.249 
alliance with major power  
averaged 
  (0.099) (0.103)* 
     
# of years of outside    1.254 1.216 
alliance averaged   (0.138)*** (0.143)*** 
     
# of years allied to each    -0.131 -0.110 
other averaged   (0.091) (0.092) 
     
# of years with strategic   7.647 7.727 
rivalry averaged   (0.207)*** (0.208)*** 
     
# of years with dyadic   -0.132 -0.173 
democracy averaged   (0.126) (0.126) 
 
Sensitivity averaged  0.229  0.246 
  (0.050)***  (0.045)*** 
 
_cons 0.126 -0.253 0.071 -0.458 
 (0.096) (0.127)* (0.155) (0.186)* 
N 3,700 3,652 3,700 3,652 
R2 0.01 0.02 0.34 0.35 
F 45.88 33.88 194.28 177.75 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
The models of Table 8.8 falsify the hypothesis. The more years of level 3 and 4 coordination in a 
dyad period the more MID onsets the dyad experienced.78 This is contrary to the findings at the dyadic 
                                                          
78 Of the control variables the following can be said. The average proportion of major powers that are democratic 
over all major powers in a period has a negative statistically significant association with the number of MID onsets a 
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level. Why is this? The answer may be provided by the findings of the next Table, 8.9 in which I only 
focus on managerial coordination as the independent variable.  
Table 8.9 OLS Regression of Years of Level 4 Coordination per period on Number of MID onsets per dyad period, 1715-2001 
Number of MID Onsets 1715-
2001 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 
# Years of Level 4  -0.086 -0.087 -0.122 -0.118 
Coordination (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** 
     
Average proportion of major   -0.234 -0.129 
powers that are democracies   (0.211) (0.217) 
     
# of years of nuclear   1.712 1.612 
dyad averaged   (0.341)*** (0.344)*** 
     
# of years with preponderance    -0.397 -0.393 
averaged   (0.080)*** (0.080)*** 
     
# of years with preponderant    -0.015 -0.014 
seapower   (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
     
# of year of outside   1.351 1.263 
alliance averaged   (0.120)*** (0.127)*** 
     
# of years allied to    -0.095 -0.095 
each other averaged    (0.089) (0.089) 
     
# of years of strategic   7.647 7.703 
rivalry  averaged   (0.202)*** (0.204)*** 
     
# of years of dyadic   -0.145 -0.182 
democracy averaged   (0.122) (0.123) 
     
Sensitivity averaged  0.145  0.124 
  (0.050)**  (0.043)** 
     
_cons 1.278 1.077 0.910 0.686 
 (0.054)*** (0.098)*** (0.091)*** (0.124)*** 
N 3,700 3,652 3,700 3,652 
R2 0.04 0.05 0.37 0.37 
F 172.00 94.35 239.20 213.09 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
dyad experiences in a period. This is a robust relationship (154). The average of the number of years in a period that 
a dyad was a nuclear dyad has a statistically significant positive association with the number of MID onsets a dyad 
experienced in a period. This is a robust relationship (154). The average of the number of years that a dyad was 
characterized by preponderance in relative power in a period has a statistically significant and negative association 
with the number of MID onsets a dyad experiences in a period. This is a robust relationship (153). The count of the 
number of years in period that there was a preponderant sea-power has a statistically significant positive association 
with the number of MID onsets a dyad has in a period. This is a robust relationship (154). The average of the years 
in a period that a dyad had at least one outside alliance with a major power has a tenuous negative association with 
the number of MID onsets a dyad experiences in a period. This is contingent on the other control variables (152). 
The average of the years in a period that a dyad had at least one outside alliance has a statistically significant 
positive association with the number of MID onsets a dyad has in a period. This is a robust relationship (152). The 
average of the years in a period that members of a dyad shared an alliance does not have a statistically significant 
association with the dependent variable. This is due to the other control variables (152). The average of the number 
of years in a period that a dyad had a strategic rivalry has statistically significant positive association with the 
number of MID onsets a dyad has in a period. This is a robust relationship according  (151) The average of the 
number of years in a period a dyad was made up of two democracies does not have a statistically significant 
influence on the dependent variable. This is due to the other control variables (151). 
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The models of Table 8.9 indicate that the number of years of level 4 coordination in a dyad-
period has a robust negative association with the number of MID onsets in the dyad-period.79 These 
findings indicate that the finding of the models in Table 8 might be driven by level 3 coordination.  
Conclusion on Hypothesis 4 
The findings on this hypothesis decisively show that managerial coordination as a regime, that is 
level 4 coordination, has a pacific effect in the number of wars and MIDs dyads experience in a period. It 
did not show such a clear effect for when we add level 3 coordination, presence of cooperative elements 
but not managerial alliance, to level 4. While the pacific effect on war remains, the effect on MID onset is 
positive and thus conflict inducing. The findings did indicate that the periodization does seem to be tied to 
the level of major power coordination and thus a possible unconscious control for it.  
Hypothesis 5: Increasing managerial major power coordination should be negatively associated 
with major power initiating membership in at least one unilateral alliance with a minor power in a 
given major power country year in the 1715-2001 period. 
In the 1815-2001 period this hypothesis was not falsified. Together with the non-falsification of 
the hypothesis on arms races, this indicated that the pacific character of increasing managerial major 
power coordination may be the result of denial dynamics, in which major powers deny minor powers their 
diplomatic and military capability. Will this finding hold in the full 1715-2001 period? 
                                                          
79 Of the control variables the following can be said: the average of the Proportion of Major Powers that are 
democracies over the whole number of major powers does not have a statistically significant association with the 
number of MID onsets a dyad experiences in a period. This is due to the other control variables (159). The average 
of the number of years in a period a dyad was a nuclear dyad has a statistically significant positive association with 
the number of MID onsets a dyad experiences in a period. This is a robust association (159). The average of the 
number of years in a period that dyad had a preponderant distribution of capabilities has a statistically significant 
negative association with the dependent variable. This is a robust relationship (158). The count of the number of 
years in a period where there was a preponderant sea power has a statistically significant negative association with 
the number of MID onsets a dyad experiences in a period. This is a robust relationship (159). The average of the 
number of years in a period that a dyad had at least one outside alliance has a statistically significant positive 
association with the dependent variable. That this is a robust relationship (157). The average of the number of years 
in a period that the members of a dyad were allied to each other does not influence the dependent variable. This is 
due to the presence of the other control variables (157). The average of the number of years in a period that a dyad 
had a strategic rivalry has a statistically significant positive association with the number of MID onsets a dyad 
experiences in a period. This is a robust relationship (156). The average of the number of years in a period that a 
dyad was made up of two democracies does not have statistically significant influence on the dependent variable. 
This is a robust association (156). The variable for a dyad having at least one outside alliance with a major power 
also lacks any influence (157). 
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Table 8.10 presents the findings for this hypothesis in the 1715-2001 period. The findings do not 
falsify the hypothesis. I remind the reader that the unit of analysis here is the major-power monad-year. 
Table 8.10 Logit of Scale of Major Power Managerial Coordination on Major Power ascension to at least 
one unilateral alliance, 1715-2001. 
Major Power 
Ascension to at 
least one unilateral 
alliance 1715-2001 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Scale of major -0.146 -0.183 -0.249 -0.690 
power 
coordination 
(0.071)* (0.073)* (0.078)** (0.207)*** 
     
Lagged monadic  0.371 0.181 -0.406 
sensitivity  (0.085)*** (0.101) (0.258) 
 
Monadic    -0.044 -0.040 
democracy   (0.171) (0.176) 
 
Nuclear power   -0.102 -0.121 
   (0.263) (0.270) 
 
System year with   0.288 0.812 
preponderant sea 
power 
  (0.211) (0.427) 
 
 
Proportion of   1.694 0.734 
major powers that 
are democracies 
  (0.416)*** (0.926) 
 
 
Scale * Sensitivity    0.234 
    (0.102)* 
 
Sea-power Year*     -0.308 
Sensitivity    (0.212) 
 
Proportion of     0.597 
Democratic Major 
Powers*Sensitivity 
   (0.463) 
 
 
_cons -1.201 -1.758 -1.858 -0.814 
 (0.153)*** (0.199)*** (0.282)*** (0.514) 
 
N 1,589 1,583 1,158 1,158 
Ll  -754.35 -734.73 -551.10 -546.37 
Chi2 4.39 23.16 49.50 58.95 
R2_P 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.05 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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The models indicate a robust statistically significant negative association between increasing 
managerial coordination and major power ascension to at least one unilateral alliance. This holds even for 
cases with zero major power sensitivity (0.82%). When the major power engages in increasing managerial 
coordination they avoid alliances with minor powers throughout the 1715-2001 period.80 Figure 8.6 
graphs the interaction of coordination and sensitivity (essentially the sensitivity of major powers to other 
major powers) to aid interpretation.  
Figure 8.6 Marginal effect of Major Power Coordination on major power ascension to unilateral alliance 
conditioned by sensitivity.   
 
The figure indicates that the negative effect of coordination for all levels of sensitivity. However, 
as sensitivity increases the negative effect of coordination on unilateral alliances decreases. At the highest 
                                                          
80 Of the control variables the following can be said: Being a democracy does not have a statistically significant 
effect on the decision of a major power to enter a unilateral alliance. This is due to the other control variables (127) . 
Being a nuclear power does not have a statistically significant effect. This is due to the presence of the other control 
variables (128). The fact that the current year was one with a preponderant sea-power does not have a statistically 
significant effect. This is due to the other control variables present (130). The proportion of the major powers in the 
system that are democratic has a tenuous positive association with major powers joining unilateral alliances. This is 
a relationship which becomes less significant as we add control variables (130) . Being a preponderant sea-power 
(128) or having an ongoing dispute (129) had not significant effect. 
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levels of sensitivity it comes close to 0. This indicates that the importance of the political “near-abroad” 
of major powers can dampen attempts to remain aloof of minor power struggles. 
The substantive effect is presented in Figure 8.7 which graphs the behavior of the predicted 
probability of unilateral alliance ascension under different levels of sensitivity. It is based on Model 4 of 
Table 8.10. The base scenario is one where coordination is set to 1, all binary variables to median (0 in 
this case for all of them) and continuous to mean. 
Figure 8.7 Predicted Probability of Unilateral Alliance Ascension, 1715-2001 
 
The figure shows that as major power coordination increases in managerial character the 
predicted probability of unilateral alliance ascension decreases. Going from level 1 coordination to level 4 
coordination decreases the predicted probability by .113 from .200 to .087 (by about 56%). 
Conclusions on Hypothesis 5  
The findings do not falsify the hypothesis. In the 1715-2001 period when the major powers 
engage in increasing managerial coordination they avoid entering unilateral alliances with minor powers. 
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This cuts off at least one path by which major powers provide support to minor powers that may make 
military force cheaper. Together with the other findings in the 1816-2001 and 1715-1815 period I am 
more persuaded that the answer about how managerial coordination fosters peace is to be found in 
research into the effects of denial. 
Hypothesis 6: Increasing managerial major power coordination should be negatively associated  
with minor power entering an ongoing bilateral conflict in a given year in the 1816-2001 period. 
The falsification of this hypothesis as well as the hypothesis on the effect of major power 
managerial interventions in the 1816-2001 period indicated that discouragement is probably not a 
mechanism for explaining the pacific effect of coordination. Would something change if I look at the full 
1715-2001 period? Table 8.11 presents the findings on this question. 
Table 8.11 Negative Binomial Regression of Scale of Major Power Managerial Coordination and Minor Power joining ongoing 
conflict, 1715-2001 
Minor Power Ongoing 
Conflict Joining 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
# of  Scale of  0.137 0.283 0.284 0.228 
Ongoin
g 
disputes 
joined 
major 
power 
coordinatio
n 
 
(0.044)** (0.046)*** (0.049)*** (0.074)** 
      
 Lagged   0.708 0.453 0.804 
 dyadic 
sensitivity 
 (0.069)*** (0.059)*** (0.181)*** 
 
 
 # of    0.499 0.493 
 ongoing 
disputes 
  (0.073)*** (0.073)*** 
      
 # of    0.113 0.114 
 ongoing 
disputes 
that could 
join 
  (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
      
 Proportion    -1.056 0.197 
 of major 
powers that 
were 
democracies 
  (0.332)** (0.568) 
      
 System    -0.059 -0.248 
 year with   (0.155) (0.251) 
     
 prepoderant 
seapower 
 
    
 
252 
 
Table 8.11 (cont.) 
 
 _cons -2.033 -3.136 -4.352 -4.765 
  (0.119)*** (0.153)*** (0.160)*** (0.248)*** 
      
 Scale*Sens    0.057 
     (0.056) 
      
 Seapower*    0.167 
 Sens    (0.176) 
      
 Prodem    -1.140 
 MP*Sens    (0.417)** 
Lnalpha _cons 3.609 3.485 2.814 2.810 
  (0.049)*** (0.051)*** (0.056)*** (0.056)*** 
      
N  13,510 13,267 12,076 12,076 
Ll   -4,237.66 -4,121.87 -3,790.63 -3,785.93 
Chi2  9.82 125.21 649.03 658.42 
R2_P  0.00 0.01 0.08 0.08 
Chi2_C  10,506.28 9,678.25 6,519.13 6,519.24 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
The findings falsify the hypothesis as increasing major power managerial coordination is 
positively associated with minor powers joining ongoing disputes.81 This finding reinforces the indication 
that discouragement may not be a fruitful focus for further research on how managerial coordination 
pacifies interstate relations.82  
Conclusion for Hypothesis 6 
The findings on hypothesis 6 do not differ between the 1816-2001 period and the 1715-2001 
period. The hypothesis is falsified and this indicates that discouragement may not be able to explain the 
pacific effect of coordination. I remind the reader that discouragement is when the major powers 
discourage the minor powers from using force in their relations by threats or censure. The evaluations in 
the 1816-2001 and 1715-1815 period did not find support for this mechanism. 
                                                          
81 For a possible explanation please read the conclusion for this hypothesis in the 1816-2001 period. 
82 As for the control variables the following can be said: The number of ongoing disputes of a minor power has a 
statistically significant positive association with a minor power joining an ongoing conflict. This is a robust 
relationship (132). The number of possible disputes a minor power could join has a statistically significant positive 
association with a minor power joining an ongoing dispute. This is a robust relationship (133). The proportion of 
major power that are democracies has a tenuous statistically significant negative association with a minor power 
joining an ongoing conflict. This is due to the other control variables (134). If a country year is also a system year 
with a preponderant sea-power has no statistically significant influence (134) Being a nuclear power had also no 
influence (133). 
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Hypothesis 10: Increasing managerial major power coordination has a positive association 
with a regime transition towards increased competiveness, participation and executive 
constraints within a polity in the 1800-2001 period. 
 
Hypothesis 10 was the only one of the indirect hypothesis to not be falsified in the 1816-2001 
period. I do not expect this to change due to the inclusion of the 15 years between 1816 and 1800. Table 
8.12 presents the findings on this hypothesis.  
Table 8.12 Logit of Scale of Major power managerial Coordination on increased competitiveness, 
participation and executive constraints within a polity,1800-2001 
Increased 
competitiveness, 
participation and 
executive 
constraints 1800-
2001 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Scale of major 0.300 0.320 0.303 0.407 
power 
coordination 
 
(0.047)*** (0.048)*** (0.048)*** (0.070)*** 
 
State age   0.003 0.003 
   (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
 
Lagged 
monadic 
 0.023 -0.066 0.176 
sensitivity  (0.047) (0.051) (0.125) 
 
Scale*Sensitivit
y 
   -0.092 
    (0.044)* 
     
_cons -4.049 -4.128 -4.255 -4.557 
 (0.136)*** (0.157)*** (0.159)*** (0.220)*** 
N 12,057 11,881 11,881 11,881 
Ll  -1,857.68 -1,829.55 -1,820.16 -1,817.95 
Chi2 42.07 45.98 64.75 69.16 
R2_P 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
The findings do not falsify the hypothesis. Increasing managerial major power coordination has a 
statistically significant positive association with the movement towards increased competitiveness, 
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participation and executive constraints in a polity.83   As noted in Chapter 5, this indicates some support 
to argument that the pacification of international relations has a positive effect on developments within 
polities that lead to democratization.  
How does sensitivity condition this relationship? From Model 4 I can deduce that the positive 
association of managerial coordination holds even for those cases of 0 sensitivity (33% of observations).  
Figure 8.8 graphs the interaction to aid interpretation. 
Figure 8.8 Marginal Effect of Managerial Coordination on increased participation, 
competitiveness and executive constraint as conditioned by sensitivity.  
 
The figure indicates that the positive effect of major power coordination on the opening of 
political systems is strong under all levels of sensitivity.   
The substantive effect is presented in figure 8.9 which graphs the changes in the predicted 
probability of increases in participation, competitiveness, and executive constraints in a polity as 
                                                          
83 Of the control variables the following can be said: State Age has statistically significant positive association 
increased competitiveness, participation and executive constraints within a polity. This is a robust relationship (137). 
Neither the proportion of major powers that are democratic (137) or the composite index of national capabilities (as 
a proxy for economic development)  had any influence (136). 
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managerial coordination increases. The base model is based on model 4 of Table 8.12 with all binary 
control variables set to the median, continuous to the mean, and coordination to level 1. 
Figure 8.9 Predicted probability of increases in participation, competitiveness and executive 
constraints, 1800-2001 
 
As the figure indicates increasing coordination increases the predicted probability of increased 
participation, competitiveness and executive constraints in a polity. Going from level 1 coordination to 
level 4 increases the predicted probability of increases in participation, competitiveness and executive 
restraints by .0309 from .0218 to .0527 (by about 40%). 
Conclusion on Hypothesis 10 
Hypothesis 10 was not falsified in the 1800-2001 period. The conclusions from the 1816-2001 
period are retained. The pacification of international relations by major power managerial coordination 
does lead to an opening up of polities at least as measured by the Polity scale. This opening up should 
affect democratization dynamics.  
Hypothesis 11: Increasing managerial major power coordination has a positive association with the 
enactment or reinstatement of a constitution within a given country year in the 1789-2001 period. 
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This hypothesis was falsified in the 1816-2001 period which undermined the argument that 
Schroeder made about legitimism. Basically, the argument was that by promoting responsible government 
in the form of legitimism the Vienna System had a positive effect on long term democratization. The fact 
that Hypothesis 10 was not falsified provides some evidence for such an argument. However the evidence 
of hypothesis 10 can also support the alternative argument that peace helps democratization. A more 
focused examination of legitimism would focus on the main tool of the legitimists which was ruler 
bestowed constitutions. This is what the evaluation of hypothesis 11 does. Table 8.13 presents the 
findings. 
Table 8-13. Logit of Scale of Major Power Coordination on constitutional enactment or reinstatement, 1789-2001 
Constitutional 
Event 
1789-2001 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Scale of  -0.202 -0.100 -0.024 -0.092 
major power 
coordination 
(0.033)*** (0.036)** (0.038) (0.058) 
 
     
Lagged   0.343 0.395 0.850 
monadic 
sensitivity 
 (0.032)*** (0.036)*** (0.086)*** 
     
     
State age   -0.005 -0.005 
   (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
     
Proportion of    -1.412 0.974 
major powers 
that are 
democracies 
  (0.138)*** (0.273)*** 
     
Scale*Sens    0.021 
    (0.035) 
Prodem*    -1.461 
Sensitivity    (0.132)*** 
     
_cons -2.212 -2.982 -2.283 -3.169 
 (0.083)*** (0.109)*** (0.126)*** (0.181)*** 
     
N 13,584 13,358 13,358 13,358 
Ll -3,205.77 -2,944.23 -2,859.79 -2,790.30 
Chi2 37.19 133.97 302.85 441.82 
R2_P 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.07 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
The findings falsify the hypothesis and are similar to those of the 1816-2001 period.84 This 
indicates that any effect on domestic politics by major power managerial coordination is probably more 
                                                          
84 As far as the control variables, the following can be said: State Age has a statistically significant negative 
association with the enactment or reinstatement of constitutions. Table 139 of the Statistical Appendix indicates that 
this is robust relationship. The proportion of major powers that are democratic has findings that are different 
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driven by pacification dynamics, as indicated by Hypothesis 10, rather than legitimism, as indicated by 
this hypothesis. 
Conclusion on Hypothesis 11 
The findings in the 1789-2011 period for this hypothesis are not different from the 1816-2001 
period. The hypothesis is falsified and this undermines the argument for a positive effect of legitimism on 
the enactment of constitutions during the Vienna System put forward by Schroeder. 
CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER 8 
 
In this chapter I evaluated some of the key hypotheses across the entire 1715-2001 period.  This 
encompasses the period before, during and after the transformation of international politics expressed in 
the Vienna Congress. The findings generally did not differ from the 1816-2001 period. More specifically: 
• Increasing managerial major power coordination has a clear and strong pacific 
association with mid onset irrespective of dyad sensitivity to major power activity. 
• Increasing managerial major power coordination has a pacific association with war onset 
expect when dyad sensitivity to major power activity is zero (19% of cases in the 1715-
2001 period) 
• This pacific association is probably due to denial mechanisms rather than discouragement 
mechanisms. The denial by major powers of their political and military support for 
adventurous foreign policy by other major power or minor powers may have a stronger 
effect on the decision of states to use military force than any threats or proscriptions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
depending on the level of sensitivity (139). The composite index of national capabilities (as a proxy for 
development) does not have an influence on the dependent variable (138). 
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• Increasing managerial major power coordination has a positive association with the 
opening of political systems when it comes to competiveness, participation and executive 
constraints. 
• It does not have a positive association with the enactment or reinstatement of 
constitutions, which undermines the legitimist thesis put forward by Schroeder (1994).85 
I also conducted an evaluation of the argument using a dyad-period rather than dyad-year 
research design. The goal was to provide a more specific evaluation of the managerial coordination thesis 
by just focusing at the highest points (3 and 4), and also evaluate whether the usual periodization used by 
political scientists unconsciously controlled for managerial coordination.  The findings were: 
• That dividing international history into the pre-1816, Vienna System, 1850-1945, Cold 
War and Post-Cold War periods (or similar divisions) closely follows the variation of 
intensity of major power managerial coordination. 
• The number of years when major power managerial coordination intensity reaches points 
3 and 4 of the scale has a clear negative association with the number of wars a dyad has 
in a period.  
• The number of years when major power managerial coordination intensity reaches point 
4 of the scale has a clear negative association with the number of MIDs a dyad has in a 
period. 
• The number of years when major power managerial coordination intensity reaches point 
3 has an unclear effect on the number of MIDs a dyad experiences in a period. When 
included in the same variable as point 4, the variable created has a positive association 
with the number of MIDs. Why this happens is a research topic for the future, especially 
                                                          
85 I remind that this is the argument by Paul Schroeder that the Vienna System was not as opposed to reforms within 
states that would speed up democratization, as is often thought. The system was not reactionary, but legitimist and 
reforms against arbitrary power were welcome. I proxy legitimism by constitutional events since the grating of a 
written constitution by monarchs was seen as a proper reaction to popular demands by system stalwarts like 
Metternich and Castlereagh.  
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considering that in the dyadic-year design point 3 coordination has a negative association 
with MID onset. 
 Taking together the findings in the 1715-1815, 1816-2001 and 1715-2001 periods it becomes very clear that there was a change in the quality of major power interaction situated around the date 1816. The major powers became more competent in coordinating their foreign policies in order to manage international issues in a way that reduced the likelihood of military action. These coordination attempts while not always successful do seem to have been associated with a decrease in the likelihood of dyads experiencing military events. Before 1816, such coordination attempts singularly failed to take place or have a pacific effect.  
These findings at the very least provide some support for Paul Schroeder’s argument that there was a transformation of European politics after 1816, and Peter Wallensteen’s argument that cooperating major powers can create a system of relative peace. It does not corroborate the realist expectation that major power cooperation with a managerial rather than adversarial goal, will be rare and ineffectual (that said my findings are in agreement with defensive realist expectations). The findings also are not in complete agreement with liberal stories of the evolution of the international system because those tend to underestimate the role of the “conservative” Vienna System for a focus on either hegemonic liberal powers, or institutionalization.  
In the conclusion I situate this project in a broader problematic about international politics, and over-view what all this work amounts to.  
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C H A P T E R  9 :  T H E  R E M A I N S  O F  A N  E R A  
 
The study of international relations was once the study of the relations among major powers. The 
findings of this study indicate that this monomania with major powers was not completely reckless, even 
if thankfully it is over. Major Power interaction has a decisive effect on the decision of states to use 
military force against each other and may had played a role in domestic developments towards 
democracy. The key development was the evolution of major power attempts at cooperation after 1816 
towards a managerial coordination regime.  
For the first time since the birth of the major power system after the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) 
the major powers were able to overcome their mutual distrust, proclivity for limited exclusionary 
agreements between a small clique of their number, and engage in consultation, multilateralism and the 
avoidance of adversarial alliances among themselves. The Vienna System provided an alternative to the 
old “power-politics” for resolving international issues. Even though the system collapsed in 1850, the 
major powers continued to engage in elements of the regime, even if many times it was done haphazardly. 
There were successes and there were failures. More importantly the Vienna system provided a template 
for the various institutions that rose up in order to build managerial coordination regimes for various issue 
areas of international relations. The bouts of major power cooperation in the last 300 year period may also 
had pacified international relations enough to permit crucial domestic political reforms that helped 
polities along the path towards democratization.  
That said the point of this project is not to stress the importance of the major powers in current 
international relations. We may very well be living in the end of the major power period if we define that 
as a period when small number of states acted as the main nodes of the network of international relations 
and without whose support other states would not have been able to influence each other. The expansion 
of the transportation and communications global network now permits minor powers to offer many of the 
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services that major powers used to in the international system. Minor powers like Israel, Ukraine and Italy 
can provide the military hardware to states that cannot get them from the major powers. Regional 
organizations permit minor powers to coordinate their political support for other states. States like the 
Scandinavian countries use their small defense demands and their stable economies to provide economic 
aid to other states. Non-governmental actors and international organizations have taken the role of the 
primary censors of the international system, with about as much success as this study found for major 
power discouragement.  
On a more fundamental level the major powers may have reached the holy grail of external 
security. While terrorism possess a threat on the margins, other major powers, indeed any other kind of 
state, does not constitute the main threat for the hold on power of domestic major power elites. Nuclear 
weapons and the twin exploding costs of war and the welfare system of states have made major power 
war a very foolish enterprise for any political elite interested in keeping their position of power. The 
lesson learned by the Vienna System makers has stuck even if momentarily forgotten. War is a threat for 
domestic power. This new-found security from their peers had paradoxically also meant that the major 
powers have taken a secondary place compared to IGOs when it comes to trying to maintain a peace-
regime in the international system.  
The direct interaction of the major powers nowadays is focused mostly on isolating themselves 
from regional crises. In Georgia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Korea, East Asia, and Europe the powers that felt 
their interests threatened by the the international activity or of another power, preferred to step back and 
insulate themselves from conflict rather than take actions that could escalate to a major power military 
confrontation. In Syria while all the major powers have stakes at interest, their primary policy was one of 
insulation and letting minor powers deal with the situation.  
This decrease in the importance of major powers has been accompanied by a decrease in the 
focus by scholars of international relations on major powers. So what exactly is the role of this project? I 
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believe in a very fundamental way that the modern international system internalized the three elements of 
major power managerial coordination to such a degree that the major powers are not fully required for it 
to function. The modern international system is one of managerial coordination characterized by 
consultation in the form of a nexus of forums for international cooperation, multilateralism in the form of 
a multitude of regional and international programs for addressing issues, and the avoidance of adversarial 
alliances in the de jure and de facto outlawing of offensive alliances.  
Before embarking on this project I would had never been able to see this fundamental character of 
the international system. Consequently understanding how major power managerial coordination affected 
international relations will help us understand how the modern international system does so. The waning 
importance of major powers is not an issue if the regime they created continues to exist despite them or 
without them. In a way it is their true legacy.  
CONCEPTUALIZING AND MEASURING A REGIME 
 
Previous scholars have tried to capture the effect of major power cooperation in international 
politics. But even the best of those attempts in the form of Wallensteen’s “particualrist” vs. “universalist” 
thesis, had flaws that inhibited a good understanding of the character and effect of major power 
managerial coordination.  The main flaw was that they did not conceive it as a form of international 
regime, mistaking opportunistic instances of cooperation for a managerial coordination regime. Beginning 
from the concept of a regime I located the core of a managerial coordination regime in three elements 
whose confluence maximized the chance for major powers to avoid military conflict. 
These elements were consultation, multilateralism and the avoidance of adversarial major power 
alliances. Consultation entailed the willingness of the major powers to come together and discuss issues 
of interest and their reaction to those issues. Multilateralism entailed the major powers to agree or tolerate 
a specific set of actions in response to an issue and if need be to execute them as part of a multilateral 
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effort. The avoidance of adversarial alliances entailed the major powers avoiding overt alliances that 
targeted other major powers. I argued that the accumulation of these three elements in major power 
behavior would make the major powers more able to reduce the likelihood of military action in the 
relations between them, and due to the fear of diffusion, in the relations among all states.  
To be able to evaluate the effect of the accumulation of the elements of major power managerial 
coordination on international relations I needed a scale measure instead of the usual dichotomous 
measures of past research. This led me to operationalize the process of accumulation by using the scale of 
major power managerial coordination intensity. This scale was based on operationalizations for each of 
the three elements and then an absence-presence schema. Consultation was operationalized by the shared 
membership of major powers in intergovernmental organizations or congress systems. Multilateralism 
was operationalized by the shared membership of the major powers in an alliance that does not target 
other major powers. The avoidance of adversarial alliances was operationalized with the lack of alliances 
which had at least two major power members and targeted a non-member major power. The combination 
of these three variables created a 4 point scale, with point 1 representing major power behavior lacking all 
the elements of major power managerial coordination, and point 4 having all three elements. 
In my evaluation I wished to avoid the usual system level unit of analysis for the dependent 
variables. This is because military force is the result of interaction usually between pairs of states and I 
was interested to see if major power managerial coordination affected the incidence of violence at that 
level. Consequently I chose to focus on research designs at the dyad-year, dyad and state-year level. 
However, such a research design raised the question of how to connect a structural variable like major 
power managerial coordination to a dyadic outcome. My answer is the concept of sensitivity in which the 
effect of major power managerial coordination is conditioned by how subject to various form of major 
power action the member of a dyad and its immediate environment is.  
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The logic is that when a higher level variable (like managerial coordination) is produced by lower 
level sources (major power interaction) then one could evaluate the effect of the higher level variable on a 
another lower level variable (dyadic interaction) by also evaluating how sensitive that new variable is to 
the lower level sources of the higher level variable. To put it simply one should expect dyads to be more 
receptive to the influence of major power managerial coordination the more exposed they are to major 
power activity. The concept of sensitivity is of course applicable to any structural phenomenon which has 
a lower level source. For example one could apply it to the effect of a global financial regime on dyadic 
or monadic outcomes, using the most important financial powers in the place of major powers. 
The evaluations generally indicated that in the 1816-2001 period increasing managerial major 
power coordination had a negative influence on the likelihood of war and MID onset. While this 
corroborated the findings of scholars like Peter Wallensteen and the argument of Paul Schroeder about the 
pacific effect of the Vienna Congress, it was not a complete evaluation of the transformation thesis. To do 
this I would need to reach before the transformation point so as to be able to compare the post-
transformation period with the post-transformation period.  The focus was on how the lower levels of 
major power coordination before 1816 impacted dyad conflict dynamics. If the effect was similar then 
one could not talk of transformation. 
To conduct this evaluation I began the compilation of novel data on militarized disputes in the 
1715-1815 period, beginning form Douglas Gilber’s work on 18the century alliances (1999). While 
datasets on wars in the pre-1816 period existed, no one had collected data on militarized disputes 
hampering our understanding of conflict dynamics in the 18th century. Consequently I compiled basic 
data on MIDs before 1816 and on disputant characteristics (primitive capability data). Using this new data 
my evaluations indicated that there was indeed a crucial difference in both the quality and influence of 
major power managerial coordination before and after 1816. These findings in turn supported Paul 
Schroeder’s transformation thesis.  
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What those findings showed is that as major power interaction increasingly corresponds to higher 
points in the scale this has a pacific association with the likelihood of war or MID onset among pairs of 
states. Point 4 interaction, when all three elements of the managerial coordination regime are present, 
always has a clearly pacific character for the 1715-2001 period. Point 3 interaction, which lacks one of 
the elements but is characterized by the other two, has a clear pacific character when we are concerned 
with war in the 1715-2001 period, even if its character concerning MIDs is more ambiguous.  Those 
points that lack elements of the managerial coordination regime, point 1 and 2 do not have a pacific 
influence on international military conflict. Beyond these central findings a number of secondary findings 
of interest were produced. 
MECHANISMS AND INFLUENCE ON DOMESTIC EVENTS 
 
The main goal of the evaluations in this manuscript was to establish if and what kind of influence 
on international conflict increasing managerial major power coordination had. That said, I also wanted to 
conduct some preliminary studies on the possible mechanisms that could explain a negative association 
between my variable of interest and conflict. The quantitative methods used in my evaluations cannot 
prove causation, but if I could show that theoretically valid mechanisms for the negative association 
between managerial coordination also had an association with pacific results, then I would be closer to 
establishing the possibility of something more than an associational relationship.  
The two mechanisms I focused on are denial and discouragement. Denial entails the major 
powers denying other states military and political support. The expectation is that this means that states 
cannot easily discount the costs of military action and thus will prefer to avoid the use of force to resolve 
issues. Discouragement entails minor states not taking military action due to the fear of major power 
censure or punishment. The evaluations of these mechanisms conducted in this manuscript were very 
preliminary due to the lack of data on some of these actions.  
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I created a proxy for denial by using the association of major power managerial coordination with 
the likelihood of a dyad having a military buildup. This was done on the assumption that if the major 
powers, who tend to be the biggest arms exporters, deny material support to states, those states will have a 
harder time funding military expansions. I also proxy it with the unwillingness of major powers to enter 
unilateral alliances with minor powers. The assumption here is that if my supposition is right then when 
major powers are engaged in increasing managerial coordination they will eschew alliances with minor 
powers.  
For discouragement, I initially focused on whether major power managerial coordination was 
associated with multilateral interventions by the major powers against states.  The assumption is that if 
coordination works then managerial interventions should only happen during it. This was the prelude for 
looking at whether the existence of a managerial intervention in temporal proximity made minor powers 
less likely to take part in a military dispute. The assumption here was that seeing the major powers punish 
another state via intervention will make minor powers less willing to engage in an adventurous policy that 
might bring about major power wrath. I also looked at whether major power managerial coordination 
made it less likely that minor powers will enter an ongoing dispute. The assumption is that since at the 
core of the managerial coordination regime is the limitation of the diffusion of conflict that could bring 
about major power conflict, minor powers will be unwilling to engage in a behavior that is proscribed by 
the major powers. 
The findings indicated support for the denial rather than discouragement mechanisms. Increasing 
managerial major power coordination had a negative association with a dyad engaging in a mutual 
military buildup during the 1816-2001 period. It also had a negative association with major powers 
entering unilateral alliances with minor powers in the 1816-2001 and 1715-2001 period, but not in the 
pre-coordination 1715-1815 period. The discouragement mechanics did not have any supporting 
indicators in the 1816-2001 period, beyond the fact that managerial interventions only happen under point 
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3 and 4 coordination intensity.  While these evaluations are not decisive they indicate directions for 
further research, which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Finally I was interested in evaluating the long-term effects of managerial coordination. This is 
partly fueled by a wish to find out if such a unique major power regime had an effect on international 
politics after its demise, which if found would add to the relevance of this study. Partly I sought to 
evaluate Paul Schroeder’s argument that the legitimist policies of the conservative Vienna Congress had a 
positive effect on the democratic evolution of states. I conducted three evaluations of these arguments. 
First, I looked at whether major power managerial coordination had a positive effect on increases 
in participation, competitiveness and executive constraints within polities. These three elements are 
usually equated with democracy, something that is not necessarily true. Even so, increases in them should 
make a polity more representative and more open, which will contribute to democracy. The assumption is 
that the pacification of international relations will dampen some of the domestic constraints to political 
openness that the fear of war creates (Gibler 2012). The findings supported this argument in the 1816-
2001 and 1715-2001 period. 
Second, I looked at whether major power managerial coordination had a positive influence on the 
enactment or reinstatement of constitutions. This was a very specific hypothesis based on Schroeder’s 
legitimist argument.  The legitimists in the Vienna Congress did oppose democracy, but they also disliked 
arbitrary power. The happy medium for them was constitutions that placed limits on the arbitrary power 
of monarchs without giving power to popular elements. The findings did not provide clean support for 
Schroeder’s argument. Only in the 1789-1815 period was some support found for a positive relationship. 
No such support was found in the 1816-2001 and full 1789-2001 period.   
This greatly undermines the legitimist argument, but the positive relationship between increasing 
managerial coordination and increases in participation, competitiveness and executive constraints 
indicates that managerial coordination has a positive association with a political evolution conducive to 
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democracy. The failure of the legitimist argument to find support in conjunction with the positive findings 
on participation, competitiveness, and executive constraints indicates that the mechanism at work here is 
relaxing of political constraints when the international relations of a state become more pacific.  
Finally, I evaluated whether major power managerial coordination had a positive effect on the 
increase of state membership in IGOs. The findings were not supportive of such a relationship. The 
assumption was that the pursuit of multilateralism and consultation by the major powers would lead them 
to institutionalize those elements. States would then copy the new tools of the major powers. At the same 
time major power managerial coordination would make it harder for major powers to block regional 
attempts at the creation of IGOs. The findings do not indicate a relationship between the 
institutionalization of major power relationships and the general rise of international organizations. Of 
course the date 1816 is crucial for the rise of IGOs, since the Rhine Commission was created by the 
Vienna system, but why it is important and whether that importance applies to the concept of managerial 
coordination is another question.  
INTERESTING FINDINGS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
  
A battery of control variables was used in the evaluations in order to increase their robustness. 
Some of the findings are interesting for current debates. The most salient findings were about dyadic 
democracy, in the 186-2001 period the variable did not have an independent statistical influence on MID 
onset, and its statistical influence of war onset was wiped out by the other control variables. In the full 
1715-2001 period, there was no influence by dyadic democracy on MID onset and the one on War Onset 
was wiped out by the other control variables. This is a highly challenging finding. Managerial 
coordination was able to keep its statistical influence on conflict onset for both the 1816-2001 and 1715-
2001 period.  Its substantive effect was stronger than that of dyadic democracy. This indicates that 
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scholars who stress major power activity as the basis for the democratic peace may not be completely 
wrong (Mitchell 2002; Narizny 2012). 
This indication becomes stronger when I consider the findings about the effect of an increasing 
proportion of major powers that are democracies.  This variable had a strong negative statistical influence 
on war onset in the 1816-2001and 1715-2001 period, and on the number of MIDs and wars a dyad had in 
the 1715-2001 period. These are findings that would be expected by the Mitchell “norm” argument and 
the Narizny “liberal hegemony” argument. More importantly the proportion of major powers that are 
democratic has a positive statistical influence on increases in participation, competitiveness and executive 
constraints within states in the 1816-2001, on the enactment and reinstatement of constitutions in the 
1816-2001 and 1715-2001 period, and on IGO membership in the 1870-2000 period. 
These findings call for further research on whether the measure is an accurate proxy for the effect 
of democratic major powers in world politics, and more detailed evaluations of that effect. But they 
corroborate past findings on the importance of democratic major powers. Importantly in these evaluations 
that variable out-performed dyadic democracy on the crucial tests on war onset. The increase in 
democratic major powers may be one of the most important peace-inducing factors in the history of the 
modern international system. But the exact relationship between that variable and dyadic-democracy and 
peace in general is still an open question. 
When it comes to other control variables, the findings support the association of a preponderance 
of military capability in dyad with the avoidance of MIDs (1816-2001,1715-2001), the association of 
outside alliances with MID onset (1816-2001,1715-2001), the stability-instability paradox about nuclear 
weapons and MID onset (1816-2001), the association of strategic rivalry, and generally a history of 
conflict, with MID onset (1816-2001,1715-2001), and the conflict inducing character of territorial 
disputes (1816-2001). 
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In the 18th century (1715-1815), the main conflict inducing variables were the presence of a 
preponderant sea-power, a finding that raises questions about the pacific attributes given to the presence 
of a preponderant sea-power in a system by Thompson and Levy (2012), and the existence of a territorial 
dispute.  The finding on sea-powers is different for the 1715-2001 period, which pinpoints an area that 
could use further research. The fact that the members of a dyad share an alliance was positively associated 
with MID onset and negatively with war onset, a finding that sheds some light into the dynamics of 
alliance making in the 18th century. Alliances seem to have been primarily made between states that had 
conflictual relations with the prime goal being the avoidance of war. That said further research of the 
conflict dynamics of the 18th century and comparisons with the post-1816 period are called for.  
This is partly because a lot of the null findings in the 1715-1815 period may be due to the lack of 
variation in the variables and the small number of variables available. The lack of variation with variables 
leads to higher standard errors which undermine significance. A lot of the variables are crude, as new 
variable tend to be and future research in the period using richer variables and more of them, may produce 
more interesting results. There are also topics that are of future interest are the role of international 
variables on interstate conflict, peace-inducing variables, the role of issues in conflict onset and the 
evolution of the IGOs regime.  
Since the evaluations of this manuscript are part of a bigger project on major power managerial 
coordination, important work is still needed to be done. First off, this entire project mainly focused on 
evaluating the association of major power managerial coordination and conflict onset. Future work should 
focus on initiation and more specifically how would be initiators of military conflict are affected in their 
decision by major power managerial coordination. A major project will focus on developing the “war 
wariness” theory about the causes of major power managerial coordination, and evaluating it for the post 
1715 period, especially in comparison to competitor theories like “war-weariness”. Such a project will 
need to use both qualitative case studies and archive work focusing on the war-wariness as a condition 
among decision makers, and quantitative work requiring a variable for war-wariness.  
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When it comes to the effects of managerial coordination on interstate conflict further evaluations 
of the mechanisms are required. To start, most of the evaluations of the discouragement mechanism were 
based on tenuous proxies. More careful data on major power discouragement activity is required for better 
evaluations. This means data on the causes of major power managerial interventions, a conceptualization 
and data on how major powers express discouragement towards states, and how states perceive that 
discouragement. This is work for both theory and data collection. Further theoretical work on how major 
powers discourage minor powers from entering ongoing conflicts and data on such activity is also 
necessary. It is also worthwhile to think about what other ways of discouraging a set of activities major 
powers have in the international system. 
On the question of denial what is needed is foremost data and work on major power arms and 
monetary support towards other states and how that support affects the decision of other states to engage 
in military conflict. For the post-1975 period the Uppsala Conflict Database Project has some useful 
information, but in order to gain the most from the variation of managerial coordination, data going at 
least to 1816 is needed. The collection of such data would require a long and challenging process of going 
through national archives. It may be worth to initially limit this to the major powers and a number of 
minor states than to attempt to do it for the maximum number of possible cases.   
Finally, the concept of major power managerial coordination may have important effects on other 
political phenomenon. The positive association with the expansion of participation, competitiveness and 
executive restraints within polities is worth further studies, both quantitative and qualitative, in order to 
uncover possible mechanisms for this association. Major Power managerial coordination may have a 
pacific effect on the internationalization of intrastate conflicts, as the major powers attempt to contain an 
intrastate conflict in order to avoid diffusion. It may also have other effects on the resolution of such 
conflicts or elements within them, for example of attacks against civilians. Another worthwhile project 
could focus on the role of major power managerial coordination on the expansion of the capitalist system 
and on the creation and maintenance of the international political economy regimes.  
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FINAL THOUGHTS 
 
The role of major powers in international relations has always been of interest to scholars. But 
most of the focus has been on how major powers behave towards each other, or on how their policies 
contribute to conflict in the international system or intrastate conflict. Few scholars looked at how major 
power behavior or interaction could contribute to peace. The few that did focused on either balance of 
power dynamics, that have little empirical influence on peace, or conducted historical studies of pacific 
management regimes that they believed were unique. The few studies that tried to conduct a more 
methodical evaluation of the effect of specific types of major power interaction on interstate peace, had 
their potential limited by methodological, data or theoretical issues.  
The turn of the majority of scholars of international relations from the study of major powers over 
the last two decades, would indicate that scholars do not believe that there is much to be gained from a 
focus on that area of international relations. And yet there are findings that indicate that major power 
behavior still plays an important and under-searched role in pacifying international relations. Major power 
cooperation has been found to have a positive influence on democratization and the creation of 
international regimes (Boix 2011, Ringmar 2012). Kevin Narizny makes the argument that the democratic 
peace can be explained by the role of two liberal major powers, the US and UK in managing international 
relations (2012). What these studies raise is the question of whether the pacific effect of phenomena like 
the democratic peace or international regimes is due to major power activity. Such selection issues are not 
unknown in international relations, and they are usually not an issue if the variable causing selection does 
not also cause the dependent variable.   
This raises a crucial question about the relationship between major power activity and peace. 
Does major power cooperative activity bring peace itself or do the regimes made possible by that activity 
bring peace. In the first case not only do major powers create peace, but they do so independently of other 
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pacifying regimes (democracy, IGOs). In the second case that activity in itself does not create peace, but 
created regimes that create peace. The findings of this project indicate that it may be the first case. This 
would follow arguments about the fostering effect peace has on regimes, like democracy, that make it 
more possible to maintain peace in the future. This indicates that the study of the influence of major 
power cooperation on the behavior of other states and the  system is not just of academic interest for those 
who seek to explain the history and evolution of the international system, but also for those that wish to 
understand how we keep peace in the present. The warmongers may have become peace-bringers, and 
missing the magnitude of such a transformation in international relations is both a pity for future 
generations, and a pitfall for understanding international relations today.   
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